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SOUTH-CAROLINA

IN THE

REVOLUTIONARY WAR:

BEING A REPLY TO

CERTAIN MISREPRESENTATIONS AND MISTAKES
OF RECENT WRITERS, IN RELATION TO
THE COURSE AND CONDUCT OF
THIS STATE.


BY A SOUTHRON.

CHARLESTON:

WALKER AND JAMES.

1853.

ASTOR, LENOX AND
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THE contents of this little volume are drawn from the pages of the "Southern Quarterly Review," where they appeared at different periods. It has been thought by many that their publication, in a compact form, would be of use and interest. Some slight attempts have been made to revise them ; but the subject is one which deserves much more labour than the compiler is at present able to bestow upon it. Should a future edition be required, an effort will be made to render the collection more worthy of the occasion, and more useful to the inquirer. Much *matériel*, in connection with the subject, remains yet unnoticed, which should be incorporated with the text ; and shall be, whenever a fit occasion offers.

SOUTH-CAROLINA IN THE REVOLUTION.*

OUR rubrick is a long one, but it should not be suffered to alarm the reader with any apprehensions that the Revolutionary war is to be discussed anew; or that we are even to examine, at length, that subject which gives its title to the work first designated in the catalogue below. The Revolutionary History of the United States is no longer a fit theme for generalities; and the business of the reviewer, in present times, who proposes to consider it at all, must be confined wholly to selections from its numerous details. The career and character of the American Loyalists, it is true, furnish one of the legitimate provinces of this fruitful history; but even this is scarcely our object, except as incidentally bearing upon another topic, which, fortunately, belongs to a single locality.—Something, however, it behooves us to say in regard to the volume of Mr. Sabine, whose work, if not especially devoted

* 1. The American Loyalists or Biographical Sketches of Adherents to the British Crown, in the war of the Revolution, alphabetically arranged with a preliminary Historical Essay. By LORENZO SABINE. Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown. 1847. 2. Memoirs of the American Revolution, so far as it related to the States of North and South-Carolina, and Georgia, &c. By WILLIAM MOULTRIE. New-York: 1802. 3. The History of the Revolution of South-Carolina, from a British province to an Independent State. By DAVID RAMSAY, M.D. Trenton. 1785. 4. Manuscript Memoranda of the details of the Siege of Charleston, supposed to be from the pen of M. DE BRAHM, a Foreign Engineer officer in the city during the siege.—From the papers of JAMES FERGUSON, Esq. Published in the Charleston Courier. 1847. 5. Original Journals of the Siege of Charleston;

to the subject which provides the material for this paper, is, in truth, the provocation to it. We are not prepared to quarrel with that taste, or passion for novelty, which, of late, seems disposed to busy itself in rescuing the memories of the American Loyalists from the appropriate obscurity of the past.— There is, no doubt, something natural, and perhaps necessary, in these researches. However unimportant in themselves, their results and discoveries constitute a certain portion of our history, and are essential to the unity and completeness of our records, if not to their authority and value. Pursued with strict conscientiousness, and a just and always carefully discriminating judgment, we can have no objection to any course of inquiry which may add to our historical possessions in relation to this subject; though we must still be permitted to regard it as one of those toils, of affliction rather than of wisdom, in which the seeker will be apt to discover much more than he cares to find, and, however conscientious, much more than he will be likely to put on record. It is certainly one of those labours of love, in which discretion keeps largely in the rear of sympathy; one of those unwise inquiries which extort painful and humiliating responses only; as if the diviner, with torturing spells, provoked only the anger of his oracle, when he presumed to fathom all its mysteries. The Loyalists of

being the Manuscript Notes of the daily progress of the siege kept by General McINTOSH and Major HABERSHAM, of Georgia, and an unknown officer. Magnolia Magazine. Charleston: 1842. 6. Original Correspondence of Col. JOHN LAURENS, J. L. GERVAIS, one of the Privy Council of South-Carolina, and other persons, during the siege of Charleston. From inedited papers of the LAURENS FAMILY. 7. A History of the campaigns of 1780 and 1781, in the Southern provinces of North America. By Lieut. Colonel TARLETON, commander of the late British Legion. Dublin: 1787. 8. Strictures on Lieut. Colonel TARLETON's History, &c. By RODERICK MACKENZIE, late Lieutenant in the 71st Regiment. London: 1787.

America were, very few of them, distinguished by remarkable endowments. Individually, they were not calculated to compel consideration in any period, and still less in such stormy times as always wreck the smaller craft of mediocrity. But few of them, either by reason of their achievements or abilities, can lay claim to the honours of biography; and the misfortunes of still fewer deserve to be regarded, apart from the errors and offences in which they originated mostly.—Many of them, doubtless, were very worthy people; such people as make the average of good citizens in a quiet, peace-loving community, and in periods of national repose. Some of them had respectable talents, which would have been valuable in smooth-sailing times; and a fair proportion of them were probably governed, in their adherence to the crown, by scruples and principles which must always commend them to the respect, if not the sympathies, of all justly-minded persons. But, saying this, we have said all. We have enumerated the several classes among them, which deserve toleration in the opinions of posterity. It is only toleration, indeed, that may be demanded, by even-handed justice, in behalf of the greater number. Praise is out of the question; and pity can only be challenged for those who suffered and sorrowed, without having striven, when the struggle would only have elevated the loyalty of the individual, at the expense of all social and human feeling. We do not find, as we cast our eyes, curiously, over the long array of names in this catalogue of the American Loyalists, that any of them ever attained to any very high distinctions, either in a civil or military capacity. One of them, only, appears to have acquired position in Europe, as a man of science; and but one or two more, prior to the revolution, had done themselves honour by their colonial services, chiefly upon the frontiers. A few of them, indeed, proved themselves clever and active officers of militia

during the war, and we may safely affirm, that all of those who merit any memorials with posterity, have already received all the acknowledgment which posterity is likely to award. To such acknowledgment we have no objection. Let the deserving have their dues. But, to employ history, as Mr. Lorenzo Sabine seems to have done, as a sort of universal dragnet; and to arrest, and to preserve together in the reservoir, without discrimination, the fish, flesh and fowl, of this mixed multitude, is to make a "hell-broth" of it, indeed, such as the witches of Shakspeare and Middleton might be led to admire and to envy for the various loathesomeness of the ingredients. We can scarcely conjecture the motive to such a resurrection of these dry-bones of history. Mr. Sabine's introduction and preliminary discourse gives us no sufficient clue to his object. That he wills to resuscitate, as far as he can, the names of all those Americans who strove against American independence, is all that he vouchsafes to let us know; but, with what professed benefits to the future, or compensation to the past—with what moral object of any sort—he seems never, himself, to have considered, and does not show to us. Passages of his book may be instructive—portions of it are interesting—here and there, we find a snatch of biography which commends the subject to our memories; and, sometimes, we meet with a fact which may reflect a little light on doubtful portions of our history; but, for the greater number of these pages, the matter is as decidedly worthless as the contents of a last years almanac. Yet it runs out to a most enormous measure. Here are more than seven hundred octavo pages, the greater number of which are consumed in records, the most meagre, of individuals the most obscure;—persons who occupy no place in history—whom nobody remembers for their virtues, and whom nobody cares to remember for their deeds. We turn leaf after leaf, and still we hap-

pen upon such memorials as the following. We open the book at random to detach these sentences :

“Lambert. George. Was a Lieutenant in the third Battalion of New Jersey volunteers.”

“Lambert, Peter. Of Charleston, South-Carolina. An addressor of Sir Henry Clinton, in 1780.”

“Lambert, Richard. Deputy Auditor General of South-Carolina. His estate was confiscated.”

This is a sufficient sample, all taken from page 414. Sometimes, this comprehensive account is extended to twice or thrice the number of words or sentences, by the addition of facts equally insignificant and worthless ; and, very occasionally, we have something anecdotal, which tends slightly to enliven the detail with a show of narrative. Ordinarily, however, the record is not more elaborate than such as is usually scrawled upon the grave stone of the village patriarchs—those ‘mute inglorious,’ who, dying, ‘make no sign.’ The absence of materials for the biography, should be conclusive against any necessity for the attempt. It is a good rule in such labours, as generally in those of letters,—which we commend to Mr. Sabine—that, when you have nothing to write about, you should write nothing. The counsel in this case is enforced by considerations of higher importance than those which simply concern the success of the writer. What benefit to the dead—what advantage to the living—the mere mention of the name, without any accompanying recollections of patriot merit or performing courage, by which the subject might be commended to the study or the sympathy of the reader ? If the record fails to honour the past, and cannot interest the future, why make it ? In the case before us, such a chronicle can have no other effect than that of hanging on high—gibbetting for the better acquaintance of posterity—the unfortunates, for whom their children should desire only

silence and obscurity ;—making the grandson blush for the secret of an ancestor, for whom he can probably offer no excuse ; exposing the descendants to the finger-pointing malice of envious and slander-loving contemporaries, and stirring anew, for the disquiet of an innocent generation, all the feuds and heartburnings of the past ! Could the loyalists be shown, generally, as in the instance of Count Rumford, and a few others, as endowed equally with virtues and talents ; resolving conscientiously, and achieving bravely—neither dishonouring their principles by a timid shrinking from responsibility, nor staining their valour by brutality and a wolfish appetite for blood ;—we should read the history with interest, and remember the subject with respect. Such a record as that of old Curwen, made by himself, in his misery and exile, would always prove useful to the student, agreeable to the reader, and not injurious to the reputation of its subject ;—but such a mere catalogue as that which we owe to the laborious and pains-taking Mr. Sabine—such a wretched skeleton of facts, so little vital or valuable—can have no other effect than that of mortifying thousands of the living,—the mistakes and misdeeds of whose ancestors, they had fondly fancied, would have been allowed to rest secure under the sheltering maxim, which commands us to speak nothing of the dead that shall not be grateful to their memories. But these meagre memorials revive simply the odium of the position in which the subject stood, without offering any details by which his defence might be urged, or his character vindicated, in his virtues and achievements. What he was or aimed to be—what he wrought or suffered—all is wanting to the history, except the simple fact of the false position by which he incurred the hatred of contemporaries and the scorn of posterity. His position is, at once, ridiculous and odious—a sort of moral scarecrow, hung up to grinning infamy, without being permit-

ted the poor privilege of showing that his offences were such as would even justify this equivocal distinction.

Considered, however, without regard to the benevolent maxim which interposes for the protection of the dead, we are constrained to say, that the present work was unnecessary on other grounds. The American Loyalists, except as a class, really left no memorials which merit the attention of the historian. They, certainly, were not so much in advance,—any of them,—as respects political science, social morals, and the rights of the race, as were the *mouvement* party; or they were too keenly sensible to selfish interests to allow their real opinions sufficient weight in determining their policy. We are necessarily compelled, in any estimate which we may think proper to make of their intellectual merits, to subject them to the tests of those lights and standards which we now possess, rather than of those which were common to the period of their performances. We assume that there is no living American who would be willing to return to the condition of a British subject. If then, according to present standards and convictions, the loyalists of the American revolution, did not claim so highly for the race, or see with a vision so prophetic, as their opponents, in what consisted its rights and its prospects—or anticipate the grand issues of the struggle to which they were hostile;—it is clear that their rank, in intellectual matters, will not bear comparison with the latter. Either this, or, seeing quite as correctly, they were yet the victims to inferior considerations, the recognition of which, if it tended to elevate their intellectual claims, could do so only at the expense of their principles and hearts. Many of the loyalists were hirelings of the British Government. These, in most cases, sustained government measures. The most distinguished among them, were born on British soil. They had no sympathy with the native population of America, and per-

haps, could not be expected to have. Generally speaking, the conscientious men of this party were fettered in their opinions, rather by their habits than their principles. These were mostly persons of advanced age. Habits, indeed, with the aged, are apt always to rise into the rank and importance of principles. The better minded, and the more honest, among the loyalists, obeyed the laws of routine and safe precedent, in the course which they pursued, as harmonizing better with that selfish reluctance to strive and struggle, which is the natural infirmity of advancing years. Lacking this selfish bias, they lacked, equally, those motives of personal ambition, which, in the case of persons of distinguished talent, among the natives, taught the individual to look at the established condition of things through media, derived rather from what is essential to the hopes and claims of the future, than from what belongs to the inherent in the past. You will scarcely be able to detach, from the long catalogue of loyalist names in our possession, any single history, the materials of which, however well elaborated, could be pursued with interest through the pages of a single duodecimo. There is no long array of mutually depending events, and no striking transaction—unless in the case of Benedict Arnold—in the life of any one, whose name we may now recall, that would repay the reader, or justify the biographer, for groping through the sheets of such a volume. Where the exception is found to the general proposition, it has been already acknowledged, and the life has been already written.

In thus generalizing, however, we are not to be understood as objecting to such a small body of biography, as, selecting from the mass, shall unfold us the lives of such of the loyalists as, by their known virtues, and unquestionable performances, might be worthy of perusal, and would do credit to their memories. These may and should be written, if only for the

justification of the subject. The age is an indulgent one. We are not unwilling to believe in the occasional excuse and plea, which are urged against rebellion in behalf of loyalty. We know that there is a plea for many. We can accord the fullest absolution to that virtue which errs in its adherence to what seems equally the path of duty and of safety; and where this adherence is coupled with active virtues—where the person performs in compliance with his principles—he deserves that posterity should do him justice. Nay, for that matter, there is no good reason why we should not possess—even though they be written in crimson characters, never to be obliterated—the memoirs of those sturdy wretches who made themselves famous by their brutalities and butcheries. If we pursue the history of great virtues, in order to win others by glorious examples, quite as important and necessary is it that we should preserve the tradition of corresponding crimes and vices, by which, painting them in just colours of infamy and shame, we may enforce still more impressively, by repulsion, those better performances which we aim to inculcate;—even as the teacher, by examples in bad grammar, exercises the youthful learner, and confirms him, in a knowledge of the good. But why we should make interminable catalogues of mere names and dates—of people who made no sort of figure in life—who were in obscurity as well as in error—is utterly beyond our comprehension. That Mr. Sabine's book will be found readable in the proportion of one page to fifty, is quite beyond the range of literary probability. That, for any service which it does to history, or any help that it affords to truth, it deserved such a waste of goodly type and paper, will hardly be affirmed by any critic who governs his opinion by the ordinary tests of good taste or utility.

But there are some few of these pages of Mr. Sabine, which concern us especially. South-Carolina is honoured, by him,

with numerous entries in this catalogue, a sample of which, we have already given. This indefatigable worker in the sessions of history, has taken care to put the brand on all our vicious cattle. We can call to mind nobody that escapes him. For that matter, we ourselves had already put the brand upon them, by various penalties of amercement, forfeiture and exile; but he has helped us to multiply copies of that record which humanity had prompted us, for some time, quietly to suppress. It is curious that, while getting most of his facts, in regard to our loyalists, from our own pages and records, he sturdily insinuates that we, ourselves, are ignorant of their existence, and that we brag of our history, as if we never had produced any but righteous patriots. Of this hereafter.

The historical essay with which Mr. Sabine introduces his biographies, is devoted to an inquiry into the origin of the revolutionary movement in the several provinces—of the remotely, as well as the immediately, impelling causes of outbreak in each—of the spirit by which it was manifested or sustained, and the principles which were developed in the struggle. The paper is written clearly and with force, and betrays some ingenuity and much industry. It betrays other qualities, however, which are much less commendable. Its mistakes are frequent, and are usually the result of that false medium, through which the writer sees his game, particularly when his eye ranges in a southerly direction. This is the common misfortune with New England writers and New England politicians; and the vice is one, now so thoroughly ingrained by habit, that it almost ceases to be censurable as an immorality, and must be regarded with the indulgence which we show to cases of acknowledged infirmity, and a chronic incapacity. It is, and has been, from the beginning, such an exemplary and delightful thing for New England to

regard her children as the saints, to whom the possession of the earth has been finally decreed, that it is, perhaps, not a thing to be wondered at, if the inheritors of so goodly a faith and fortune, should naturally assume that they are the proprietors of all the good deeds that are done within its bounds. They have all the talents, all the virtues, and perform all the achievements. Even Mr. Webster tells us, that Bunker Hill was the Revolution; the rest was "mere leather and prunella;" and nobody in the land of "steady habits" will gainsay authority so profound. Reading their own historians only, they are amiable enough to believe all their assurances; and historians thus honoured with their exclusive confidence, show themselves quite worthy of this trust when writing; as if they never once forgot that they were in possession of the ear of the entire parish. Fortunate historians in the possession of such a parish! Fortunate parish in the possession of such historians! Mutually fortunate parish and historians in the possession of one another! There is but one thing wanting, evidently, to the happiness of the parties: could they only provoke such a faith in the surrounding world, as they so graciously give to one another, the sum of their enjoyment would be complete. The great difficulty consists in drug-ging truth, so that she may slumber forever!

When Mr. Sabine approaches South-Carolina, he opens his batteries with sufficient frankness and audacity. He says:

"The public men, of South-Carolina, of the present generation, claim that *her* patriotic devotion in the revolution, was inferior to none, and was superior to most of the states of the confederacy. *As I examine the evidence, it was not so.* The population, composed as it was, of emigrants from Switzerland, Germany, France, Ireland, and the northern colonies of America, and their descendants, was, of course, deficient in the necessary degree of homogeneity, or sameness of nature, to insure any considerable unanimity of political sentiment. It is true, however, that, individual men took an early, a no-

ble, and a decided stand against the oppressive measures of the British ministry. It is equally true, that South-Carolina was the first state of the thirteen, to form an independent constitution, and that she overpaid her proportion of the expenditures of the war in the sum of 1,205,978 dollars. She sent some gallant whigs to the field, and several wise ones to the council. But, to use the apt sayings of every day life, "*One swallow does not make a summer,*" nor "*one feather make a bed;*" and so, a Laurens, father and son, a Middleton, a Rutledge, Marion, Sumter, and Pickens, do not prove that the whig leaven was diffused through the mass of her people."

And who ever said that the whig leaven was diffused through the entire mass of her people, and why should it be deemed necessary, that such should be the case, when the question is as to the action of the State?

It is a proposition of Mr. Sabine's own setting up, that he bowls down with such admirable dexterity. The public men of South-Carolina, claim nothing inconsistent with the records of their historians; and these have, in no instance, made any such idle assertion, as that of the general diffusion of the whig leaven among the great body of our people. Mr. Sabine tells us nothing new—certainly nothing that our own writers have not long since told *him*—when he speaks of the almost equal division, into opposite parties, of the people inhabiting South-Carolina, during the war of the Revolution;—and yet, even with the frank and frequent avowal of this fact, to be found in all our histories, from that of Moultrie and of Ramsay, to that of Johnson, and other more recent writers, down to the present day, our public men are still perfectly justified in the claim which they assert—"that her patriotic devotion in the revolution was inferior to none, and was superior to most of the States of the Confederacy." We repeat the assertion, however unaccountable it may seem to Mr. Sabine, after the admission already made, touching the partial diffusion of the

“whig heaven.” The simple fact, which this gentleman must yet learn to appreciate, is, that the character of a country does not depend upon the opinions of the mass, and is not determinable by the direction which its mere numbers may please to take. For this reason, it was by no means necessary that *all* of the people of South-Carolina should have united in the common cause or sentiment. It is quite enough if there be a sufficient number to give impulse to the action, and to determine the conduct and decision of the State; and the merit is the greater when this impulse is given to the body politic, so as to compel its action, by only a certain proportion of the people, and *in spite of the active opposition*, or the inert resistance of mere masses among the rest. So far from believing, or asserting, the sentiment of her people to have been unanimous, or nearly so, it is, on the contrary, the peculiar boast of South-Carolina, that, with her population almost equally divided, in consequence of the very causes that Mr. Sabine enumerates—arising from the absence of the degree of homogeneity so necessary in politics to the common action—she was yet able to achieve so much—to send into the field a large proportion of the noblest and ablest captains of the revolution, and into the councils of the nation so many of the boldest politicians and wisest statesmen. Her merit consists in having been able, while contending at home against a powerful and bitter faction, to make contributions of strength, valour, wisdom and patriotism, to the common cause, which no other State in the Union, though, perhaps, better circumstanced, has ever exceeded. Mr. Sabine is, in some degree, compelled to make this acknowledgement, but he does it as costively as possible. He admits the Rutledge’s and Marions’, the Laurens’s and Sumters’,—the chiefs and sages—but doubts the commonalty; as if officers and leaders, achieving such successes—winning, in fact, names and reputations which

stand out, almost alone, in some of the fields of our national effort—unexampled and almost unequalled—the partisan warfare for instance ;—as if the very existence of these chiefs did not necessarily imply a large, devoted and faithful array of followers. “One bird does not make the summer, nor one feather the bed,” truly, but, in the employment of these musty proverbs, it might be just as well to give us due credit for all our birds and feathers. Yet, if with our few, we achieve so wondrously—fix the character of the State—give the direction to its power—place it in the first rank of States, and furnish many of the names from which the nation derives its highest reputation—this, too, in the face of such a civil war as no other State in the Confederacy had to contend with,—we argue from it a higher renown—we claim for it a more unqualified eulogy—than can possibly be due to those States, who, without being able to show a greater or nobler list of great men and great deeds, were yet free from the disabilities arising from such great difficulties, as embarrassed the action of South-Carolina. But there are yet other grounds, still higher, upon which to rest the claims of South-Carolina, to that lofty station, which her public men may safely assert for her at any time.

In an argument of this description, and in relation to this history, it is important that we should look to the degree of patriotism which prompted the first movements of the several colonies ; and this patriotism is determinable, not merely by the show of resolution, and the efforts at resistance which are made, but by the absence of base and selfish interests as furnishing the impelling motive. If, in addition to the facts that South-Carolina was one of the first of the colonies to move in support of New England—that she was one of the most frank and fearless—and that she was one of the greatest sufferers, by the war, of all the colonies—we show, at the same time,

that her individual causes of complaint were fewer, and far less serious, than was the case with most of the colonies,—we apprehend that we urge an additional and stronger claim to the public admiration of her patriotism and prompt self-sacrifice. Let us inquire, with this point in view, in what degree the impulses which arise from the operation of selfish arguments, were at work to suggest and stimulate, equally, to a resistance of the power of Great Britain, the two colonies of Massachusetts and South-Carolina? In the case of the latter, the oppressions of the crown, which threatened to annihilate the mercantile and maritime resources of the former, were almost totally unfelt. As Mr. Sabine himself writes, in his preliminary essay, the oppressive legislation of the mother country fell almost exclusively on the northern colonies.

“They forbade the use of waterfalls, the erecting of machinery, of looms and spindles, and the working of wood and iron; they set the King’s arrow upon trees that rotted in the forest; they shut out markets for boards and fish, and seized sugar and molasses, and the vessels in which these articles were carried; and they defined the limitless ocean as but a narrow pathway to such of the lands that it embosoms as wore the British flag.”

None of these things disturbed the interests of Carolina.—She did not employ machinery, and was no competitor with British manufacture; she sent no ships to sea in rivalry with British commerce; she lost no vessels by seizure; the King’s Arrow, on her forest trees, in the boundlessness of her wild dominion, abridged no man’s plenty; Great Britain readily took and consumed her raw productions at prices of which she had no reason to complain. When her shores were infested by pirates, British men-of-war were furnished to protect them; when the Spaniard and the savage assailed coast or frontier, British armies and fleets were sent to her assistance. Originally founded by distinguished nobles, Carolina had al-

ways been a favourite, first of the lords proprietors, and afterwards of the crown, of which she became the *protégé*; and none of those selfish rivalries of trade, which, from an early period, embittered the intercourse between New and Old England, ever arose to disturb the pleasant relations which existed between this pet province and the mother country. The Revolution found the sons of nearly all of her leading men pursuing their studies within the walls of British colleges.— Yet those sons hurried home, at the first outbreak, to draw the sword against this protecting mother; following the example, in most instances, of their fathers, in Carolina. Certainly, there were none of those *pecuniary* considerations, prompting the revolution in Carolina, which prevailed to unite the people of New England in a cause which struck directly at their common interests. The wrong done to the South was of a different complexion. It consisted, simply, in the denial to the native mind, of its proper position. Great Britain, persisting in the habit of ruling the colony from abroad, outraged the claims of that native intellect, which was now equal to the necessities of the home government. This was, perhaps, the very worst of the wrongs which the mother country offered to Carolina. It was a wrong done to its pride and its ambition, rather than its purse; and was the true and almost the only cause of that sympathy, on the part of the superior classes in Carolina, which made the colony prompt, among the first, to second the movements of, and resent the indignities offered to, New England. No wonder that public opinion should lack unanimity in the South, when its discontents should have been confined entirely to the intellectual and ambitious portion of its population. With this spirit, the more slavish nature could have no sympathy. The more narrowly selfish, to whom the love of gain was the impelling motive, were naturally hostile to a revolution which threat

ened to disturb the quiet progress of a trade, in regard to which, having interests unlike those of New England, they had few causes of complaint; and it was with a prudence that could plead the continued counsels of common sense, that the loyalists of Carolina urged it as unreasonable and unwise to enter into a struggle, in which they could foresee nothing in prospect, but the prospect of exchanging the tyrannies, real or imaginary only, of Old England for those of New. The movement, in the low country of South-Carolina, was mostly confined to the native planters and professional men—the exceptions being chiefly among the clergy of the established church—who constituted the aristocracy of the country. These, again, were divided in their objects—one portion looking to final independence, the other only to a redress of grievances. In the City of Charleston, the tradesmen and mechanics, who sided with the planters, were natives also. The foreign settlers, the greater number of whom had been only a few years in the country, were, with the exception of the Irish, almost wholly opposed to the movement, for *any* object.—They felt no wrong to their interests, they apprehended no danger to their liberties. The Scotch, a people remarkable for their loyalty, were naturally with Great Britain. The German population found no whig arguments equal to the conclusive fact that George the Third was a Prince of Hanover. The commercial population, which, with few exceptions, was confined to Scotch and English settlers, were secretly, but firmly, opposed to the patriots, and only forbore to speak their hostility, while the latter were in the ascendant. The great majority of the addressors of Clinton, belonged to one or other of these classes. Of these, also, were most of those citizens of Charleston, who figure in Mr. Sabine's catalogue. The natives were comparatively few whom he thus embalms for their posterity. Of the foreigners, particularly in the interior, few

of them had been ten years in the country, and their sympathies, those of the Irish excepted, were all with a monarchy, and all with Great Britain.

In this brief array of facts and parties, we are prepared to see, at a glance, how wanting was the community in those arguments—more imposing by far than any influence arising from community of birth place—which could alone have brought about a unanimity of the popular action. Such a unanimity did *not* exist in *any* of the colonies. We have shown why it should be less likely to be found in Carolina than elsewhere. Her classes were naturally in conflict, and none of them acknowledged the impelling influences which moved New England to rebellion. It was in spite of the open and secret opposition of most of them—in spite of that want of harmony in council and feeling, so particularly necessary to the insurrectionary movement of a small community—in spite of that meaner impulse, the *argumentum ad crumenam*—which is usually so all-effective when addressed to a mixed multitude—that the revolutionary party in South-Carolina engaged in the struggle. We contend that purer patriots were never found; that hands cleaner of offence, freer from the stain of base and selfish motives, never grasped the sword of war; never more truly and faithfully carried life, property and sacred honour, as their pledges, for the prosecution of a glorious, national purpose. We deny that you have any right to inquire into their numbers, when compelled to acknowledge their achievements; when their achievements neutralize the deficiencies in number; and we insist that, as their aims and energies gave the direction to the politics of the State, and their courage and integrity fixed it firmly in those politics, they are the only true representatives of the State—which is not to be estimated by the position or deeds of those who opposed the designs of its great men, and fought stubbornly against their

progress. We insist that it is quite unnecessary, in claiming for her a position as eminent in patriotism as any other of the States, to show a perfect unanimity among her people, and the entire diffusion through her masses, of the whig leaven. It is enough to show that the native population, sustained usually by the Irish and French settlers, and opposed chiefly by the Swiss, German, Quaker, English and Scotch, did assert, for her, the highest position from the beginning; did obtain an ascendancy from the beginning; were among the first at the beginning, and persevered in it to the end; through privations and perils to which but few other States were subjected; contending against odds the most unequal; fighting, equally, an enemy within and without—fighting for her sister States until exhausted—almost deserted by her sister States; and, finally, with moderate help from their arms, coming out of the conflict triumphantly, though bleeding at every pore.

This is, in fact, the whole history, in the briefest summary. The chronicles will prove it true in every syllable. The claims of Carolina to the distinction which her public men assert, may be slurred over by ingenious misrepresentation, but she cannot be defrauded of them. They are to be estimated relatively with the difficulties with which she had to contend, the deficiencies of her numbers, the purity of her purposes, the rancor of her enemies, the spirit and wisdom of the favourite sons who swayed her councils and fought her battles, and the severity and frequency of her fields of fight. Her claims are necessarily based upon the achievements of those who strove for her independence, and not upon the hostility of those who strove against it. It must not be permitted that the former should be disparaged by looking to the numbers of the latter. We cannot allow that her fame is to be smutched, because there were many within her territories with whom her champions were hourly doing battle. We regard it, indeed, as the

strangest mode of reasoning, to be told by Mr. Sabine—when we show that, on the 21st April, 1775, Charles Pinckney, President of the Provincial Congress, Henry Laurens, Chairman of the General Committee, Thomas Lynch, one of the Delegates to Congress, Benjamin Huger, Wm. Bull, Wm. Henry Drayton, Christopher Gadsden, and others, all natives of Carolina, seized on the armouries of the crown, and possessed themselves of all the armanent and munitions; that, as an offset to the merits of this action, and as qualifying the claims of the State to the distinction that it might command—there was one

“Abercrombie, John, of Charleston, South-Carolina, (who was) an addressor of Sir Henry Clinton, in 1780.”

Or that one

“Adams, Samuel, of South Carolina, (was) an addressor of Sir Henry Clinton, in 1780.”

Or that

“Adamson, George, of Charleston, South-Carolina, was an addressor of Sir Henry Clinton, after the surrender of Charleston.”

Certainly, these names, *et id omne genus*, all foreigners, taken from the first leaves of Mr. Sabine's catalogue, cannot be suffered to interpose between the claims of the State, *as a community, acting through the acknowledged representatives of the native stock, and which perseveres, and finally succeeds in the assertion of its principles*—and substract from the honourable distinction which the latter have won, chiefly by their conquest over these very opponents. Yet this is the very argument of Mr. Sabine. This is the labour of love which he proposes for the exercise of his industry and genius.

When we mention that the siege of Boston, by Washington, was only continued by gunpowder despatched from Carolina, which certain Carolinians had just captured from an Eng-

lish vessel off St. Augustine,—Mr. Sabine leaps up and says—“Ah yes ! one bird don’t make a summer, for, *as I read your history*, I find that, at that very time, you had certain foreigners in your chief city, dealing in flour and molasses, who were, in their hearts, hostile to the proceeding, and would rather have seen this very powder employed to blow Washington and all his army sky-high, than that he should have besieged the British forces in Boston for a single instant.” “Do you doubt ?” says he, with a snigger—“look here ; I have been at a labour of love, in your behalf. I have made out a list here of all your loyalists and all your rascals. Here, for example, are James Blackburn, and Robert Blair, and Henry Blakenham, and I don’t know how many more, among the B’s alone, who were Charleston loyalists and addressors of Sir Henry Clinton.”

Sagacious Mr. Sabine ? But what of all this enumeration ? How does it effect the question ? Not a whit ; though the catalogue of these foreigners, for they were all such, had been thrice as copious. These people could scarcely have taken any other position. They were born subjects of the British King, for whom the community was not responsible. The argument is grievously unjust which should lessen the force of his suggestion, who, at this day, representing the State of South-Carolina, and claiming for her the deeds of those sons by whose devotion she became a State, should be told of certain persons who opposed their achievements, and united themselves with the foreign enemy, to prevent her from becoming a State. What were these citizens but allies of the enemy ?—and, in due proportion to their numbers, the claims of merit are necessarily increased, on the part of those by whom they were overcome. We are surely not answerable for the conduct and character of those who oppose, but of those who represent, us. But, to Mr. Sabine’s details :

“The whole number of regulars, enlisted for the continental service, from the beginning to the closing of the struggle, was 231,950 ; of these, I have once remarked, 67,907 were from Massachusetts ; and I may now add, that every State, south of Pennsylvania, provided but 59,493 ; 8,414 less than this single State ; and that New England—now, I grieve to say, contemned and reproached—equipped and maintained 110,350, or above half of the number placed at the service of Congress.” * * * “In considering the political condition of Virginia and North-Carolina, it was admitted that these States were not able to provide troops according to their population, as compared with the States destitute of a peculiar institution ? The same admission is now made in behalf of South-Carolina. Yet did 6,660 whig soldiers exhaust her resources of men ? Could she furnish only 752 *more* than Rhode Island, the smallest State in the Confederacy ; only one-fifth of the number of Connecticut ; only one-half as many as New Hampshire, then almost an unbroken wilderness ? She did not ; she could not defend herself against her own tories ; *and it is hardly an exaggeration to add, that more whigs of New England were sent to her aid, and now lie buried in her soil, than she sent from it to every scene of strife from Lexington to Yorktown.*”

The *suppressio veri* and *suggestio falsi*, are united in this passage, in a hardihood of manner which is rarely exemplified. It will probably surprise Mr. Sabine—who, no doubt, believes all he says,—being willing to believe it,—when we tell him that New England never had a dozen whig soldiers in the south at all ! The loose manner in which our early histories were written, has led to frequent misapprehension of the facts stated, which results in engrafting the most miserable errors upon our chronicles. Thus, the common phrases, “troops from the north”—“a northern army”—has led to the inference—which the New-England writers, by whom most of our popular histories have been prepared, readily adopt—that these northern troops were from New-England chiefly. But when Moultrie, Ramsay, and other southern historians speak of an army and

troops from the north, though they speak with literal accuracy, they speak loosely—implying only the States *north of South-Carolina*; and to those familiar with the organization of the army in the revolution, for the defence of the several sections, there can be no difficulty. The southern army was chiefly composed of contingents drawn from Virginia, Maryland, North-Carolina, South-Carolina and Georgia. A small, but excellent body of troops, were added from Delaware; and, towards the close of the war, when there were no further apprehensions from the enemy in the north, and when, in fact, the fighting had entirely ceased in the south, General Greene procured an auxiliary force from Pennsylvania, which proved very troublesome to him; a number of them actually sold him to the enemy, and were only detected in season to prevent his intended delivery. It will be difficult, we think, for Mr. Sabine, to find any proof that even so many as *twelve* New England whigs, ever appeared as soldiers in Carolina. We got a few officers from New-England, some of whom we should have done much better without. The two most prominent of these, were General Lincoln and General Greene. Lincoln was, no doubt, a very worthy gentleman; but he was slow and deficient in energy. His merits, as a military man were very ordinary. The great merit of Greene consisted in his coolness and tenacity of purpose. His caution, which was large, like that of Washington, while it enabled him to keep his army from mishap, as frequently tended to impair the value of his successes,—and we find him, accordingly, almost invariably allowing the trophies of victory to be snatched from his grasp in the very moment when he has her in his embrace. To the services of this gentleman, the south is, nevertheless, considerably indebted. She has shown no disposition to avoid the debt. But she denies that, with either Lincoln, Gates or Greene, there came any forces from New-England to the South.

When Charleston was first assailed, by a British fleet and army, in June, 1776, though Charles Lee was sent to take command of her defences, he brought with him no troops. The army of South-Carolina consisted wholly of native militia, "and of the regular regiments of the *adjacent* northern States," the latter amounting, in all, to about seven or eight hundred men. When Lincoln was sent to take command, what was the order given him by Congress?—"To take command of all their forces to the southward."* What constituted the regular army of General Gates, when he moved on Camden, exchanging his northern laurels for southern willows?—"Fourteen hundred continental troops, *consisting of the Delaware and Maryland lines.*"†—To these were added a similar force of militia, from Virginia and North-Carolina. The remains of this army constituted the nucleus of that of General Greene, for which he received no reinforcements of regulars, except the legion of Colonel Lee, most of which were Virginia and Maryland recruits, and a legionary corps, commanded by General Lawson, also from Virginia.‡ From this force of continentals, and the native militia, under Pickens and others, the detached command of General Morgan was composed.—When we have added to this array, a special requisition on Maryland for seventy-five horse, and an auxiliary force from Pennsylvania, furnished to Greene at the close of the war, as already mentioned, we have enumerated all the States *north* of South-Carolina, from which levies were ever made in her defence. We find no proof, any where, that New England ever supplied the States, *south of the Potomac*, with any troops, except when the army was under immediate control of the commander-in-chief, as at the siege of Yorktown. The eastern troops,—by which we mean those of New England—*never came farther south, during the whole war, than this*

* Ramsay.

† Johnson's Greene.

‡ Ibid.

point; and a single passage from the pen of a New England historian, may suffice as conclusive on this subject.

Sparks, in his *Life of Washington*, vol. i., p. 368, describing the army as under moving orders for Virginia, writes thus: "The soldiers—[that is to say, of the *Northern army*, moving, *for the first time*, to do battle for the South;—an army, by the way, which contained several regiments of Carolina troops, and several Virginia brigades] *being mostly from the Eastern and Middle States, marched with reluctance to the southward, and showed strong symptoms of discontent when they passed through Philadelphia. This had been foreseen by General Washington, and he urged the superintendant of finance* TO ADVANCE THEM A MONTH'S PAY IN HARD MONEY!"

He knew, it seems, the most efficacious process for resuscitating the patriotic sympathies of the East, for its suffering sisters of the South. That self-sacrificing region, whose services—as Mr. Sabine so pathetically laments—are so ungratefully acknowledged now! We proceed with his very pregnant paragraph, as it is one that deserves some farther illustration. He tells us that, of the 231,958 regulars enlisted for the continental service, 67,907 were from Massachusetts alone;—and—farther—that, of the first mentioned number, "New-England"—"now I grieve to say contemned and reproached"—"equipped and maintained, 118,350."

Verily, a goodly number,—but what became of them? Where did they show themselves? What did they do? The last three years of the war, there were no British armies in New-England, and we have shown that there were no New-England soldiers in the South, where the enemy was to be found alone. What then became of these men in buckram, whose claim to our gratitude is so great, and so little

recognized and acknowledged? Let us hear what Sparks says on this subject, and he is a New-England authority.

Quoting from Washington's correspondence on the 1st May, 1781—the very period when Carolina was mostly overrun by the enemy—“*Scarce any State in the Union has at this hour an eighth part of its quota in the field.*” Where was this host of New-Englanders? Again: “Before leaving Weathersfield, a circular letter was written by General Washington to the *governors of the Eastern States, urging them to fill up their quotas of continental troops with all possible despatch.*”* Can it be that these 118,350 troops were on paper only, for the purpose of getting the pay without the performance? This is a point to be referred to hereafter. But hear what Sparks farther says, of himself, only a page or two after. “*The Eastern and Middle States* IN PARTICULAR, after the French troops had arrived in the country, and the theatre of war had been transferred by the enemy to the South, relapsed into a state of comparative inactivity and indifference.” These patriotic, self-sacrificing New-Englanders, 118,000 strong! He (Washington) tried all his arts and entreaties to overcome this apathy, but the money chest being empty, and the immediate danger withdrawn from their own homes,—“*the recruits come in so tardily from the States, that the army (Northern) was never in a condition to authorize an undertaking of magnitude, without the co-operation of a French fleet superior to the British.*”† Even at the siege of York, the French forces were nearly equal to the continentals, and the Southern militia to the French; the former being more than five thousand strong, the militia more than four thousand, and the continentals about seven thousand. And these continentals, as already stated, contained several

* Sparks's Washington, vol. i., p. 359.

† Ibid, vol. i., p. 362.

brigades, a fair proportion, of Virginia and Carolina troops. The storming parties were led by a Frenchman and a South-Carolinian.* In all anxiety, we ask for this host of New-Englanders. We dread lest they have perished in battle; but we look in vain for a sufficiently bloody battle field. We are half afraid lest their captains played the game of Falstaff, and compromised the sound men and true, for such as were not fit to be marched through Coventry. It is very clear that they have no enemy in New-England, they have no field of conflict sufficiently desperate by which to insinuate their general massacre, and it is equally certain that there are only some seven thousand continentals, all told, from all the States, to march as far south as Yorktown; and such of these as come from the east, are reluctant to go even thus far, unless they get a little pay in advance, by way of invigorating the patriotic fury which first prompted them in the revolution.

The truth is, that the whole militia force of New-England was enrolled nominally in the continental service. They were all on paper, supposed to be forth-coming, but they never appeared, except on the record. This record sufficed for many things, as the pension list of the United States may partially attest. There was, if we remember rightly—though, at this moment, we cannot lay our hands on the precise authorities—some adroit *hocussing*, in certain quarters, by which all the militia of the East was put upon the continental establishment;—by which clever process, ostensibly liable to a summons at any moment to the field, they were yet mostly saved from this danger by the very incapacity of the government to provide the funds for their support. But the mere enrolling sufficed to establish a claim for compensation when the government did become able to compensate. Another reason, by which to account for the great numbers of

* Col. Laurens.

New-England troops. The militia laws called them out for a three months' service only. It is the complaint of Washington, that their whole time is consumed in marching to camp, drawing their rations, and marching back again. During the first three years of the war, when the States were all in their best condition, and while New-England itself was in the danger of the invaders, they were necessarily kept somewhat uneasy; but even then, their exhibition of force, in actual array upon the field, was miserably mean, *as we read the history*, in comparison with this magnificent show upon the pay and pension list. As soon as the enemy disappeared from the New-England territories—though the war originated with them, and was chiefly vital to them—they sent forth no soldiers. The tide of battle rolling southwardly, left them in a condition of comparative security, and their patriotism was then of a sort to enable them to snap their fingers at the distresses of the Southern people;—it is certain that they snapt nothing more potent in the ears of either friends or enemies. The South was left to do its own fighting, as it could, with such forces only, as could be drawn from hurried conscriptions in Virginia; Georgia, and the two Carolinas. South-Carolina became the great battle field for the controversy, during the next three years; and, if the fields might be allowed to speak for themselves, we should say that we certainly needed no better proof in behalf of the spirit and the tenacity with which South-Carolina maintained her principles and position. But these fields are begrudged us. They sound quite too nobly in our history to suffer New-England to be silent on her claims, and are, in fact, the true motives for that loving labour which seeks to prove, at this day, our short-comings in the day that tried men's souls. Mr. Sabine proceeds categorically.

“ Yet, did 6,660 whig soldiers exhaust the resources of South-Carolina ?”

It is to be kept in mind that this was the whole number of South-Carolinians that were put upon the pay list. It will probably be allowed that we had this number in the field, at least. If so, then it is clear that, if we furnished few, we got pay for no more than we furnished. On this point, something may be said hereafter. To answer the question of Mr. Sabine. We shall do so as briefly as possible, though it may seem that our responses are circuitously given. It is sufficient, then, to say, that, whether many or few, the troops of South-Carolina, single-handed, drove away the first British fleet and army—that of Sir Peter Parker—that came against her, in one of the most bloody battles of the revolution. Her troops were next employed for the defence of Georgia, and suffered terribly in the endeavour to storm the redoubts of Savannah, united with the French, under the Marquis D’Estaing. They invaded Florida—they traversed Georgia—fighting her battles as well as their own—and, for a long time, the province of South-Carolina had to support both provinces and keep off the invader. When Charleston finally fell into the hands of the British, she lost more than three thousand of her troops by captivity. Believing the State overcome—for, with all these 118,000 patriotic New-Englanders, Washington did not dare to detail a sufficient force from his own army to the assistance of the suffering State—one thousand South-Carolinians, (forming a splendid addition to the regular army of the North,) joined it, and were accepted and reviewed by General Arnold, then in command at Philadelphia. Subsequently, the Carolinians who remained at home, were engaged in a constant succession of conflicts, carried on at the same moment with the foreign invader, and a strong and vindictive domestic faction, which, though resi-

dents, were yet chiefly foreigners, who lacked that necessary sympathy with the soil which alone teaches the sense of independence. In this period, arose that brilliant race of partisan warriors, who have never been surpassed, if equalled, in any of the States. Here, from the native militia, sprang up Marion, and Sumter, and Pickens, and Lacy, and Cleveland, and Adair, and Davie, and Hampton, and Mayham, and Thomas, and Bratton, and Roebuck, and a host besides, whose deeds only want an adequate historian. What forces won the battles of King's Mountain, and Hanging Rock, and Blackstocks, and a hundred other places where Marion, Sumter and Pickens commanded? The forces of the Carolinas chiefly, and, with the exception of the first named, mostly of *South-Carolina*. Yet, these were militiamen, and militia officers; and it was in the commission of the State only, and not of Congress, that Moultrie, Marion, Sumter, and most of the Carolina partisans, obtained their greatest successes. By what troops were the battles of Eutaw, and Guilford, and Cowpens, and Camden fought? A single sentence of Mr. Sabine, will show the answer which New-England would now insinuate. It is some grace, in the instance of our author, that he does not *assert* that we owe them wholly to New-England valour.

“The exact question is, then, not *where* were the battle grounds of the revolution, but what was the *proportion* of men which each of the thirteen States *supplied* for the contest.”

The suggestion is an adroit one. It does not, you will perceive, directly insist that the troops of New-England fought the battles of Eutaw, King's Mountain, Cowpens, &c., but leaves you to infer this suggestion from the fact already insisted upon, that they supplied the great bulk of the American army during the war. You are to suppose them here

there and every where, these intense patriots, rushing in every quarter which promises them a chance of doing battle with the oppressor, and leaving their monumental names upon every field made sacred by valour in all the States and territories of the Union! And this easy mode of acquiring fame, and making records, is but too likely to be successful, when we find the histories of the country emanating, in so many forms, chiefly from New-England hands;—their writers, anxious, like Mr. Sabine, with a laudable regard to the “local habitation,” to shoulder it with all the glory which may be appropriated from other regions;—which, not morbidly eager after such objects, betray rather too decided an indifference to what is really proper and legitimate in the ambition of a community.

We leave it to the other States of the South to assert the truth in their several cases, and for their own defence. We shall confine ourselves wholly to South-Carolina. We think it fortunate that we can relieve any anxiety which Mr. Sabine might feel, lest, in his grasping anxiety to establish for his parish, the sole glory of the revolution, he might covet and appropriate some that may properly belong elsewhere. We beg leave to assure him, then, that, *so far as the battle fields of South-Carolina are concerned, New-England contributed just no soldiers at all. We never saw a dozen of her whole hundred and eighteen thousand. They never crossed the Potomac in our behalf. A corporal's guard would cover her entire contributions of men, rank and file, to the glorious and bloody fields of revolutionary debate within our limits.* The battles of the South generally, and of South-Carolina wholly, were fought by Southern troops exclusively,—including a small contingent which came from Delaware; and we have the farther assurance to make, that these battles were fought by thousands who never dreamed of the pay list,

which was probably, during all this time, in the keeping of New-England. No wonder that the account has been so well kept ; for her troops, the last three years of the war, had ample leisure for making all the entries. South-Carolina, like North-Carolina and Virginia, had thousands serving in the *army of the North*, and counted necessarily in with that section. They had thousands more, who fought, as Harry Smyth, of the Wynd, did, “on their own hook,” and were never enrolled, never asked and never received pay or rations. New-England is not a region readily to comprehend virtues so gratuitous, and her writers never insist upon what they do not understand. It is the misfortune of the South that the lion does not often write the history of his own career. In this history, he has left it almost wholly to the jackal.

Mr. Sabine, employing a frequent habit of later days, almost peculiar to that patriotic region which he esteems to have found so little gratitude and acknowledgment, for its services, from the rest of the confederacy,—sneeringly alludes to the slave system of the south, under the words “peculiar institution”—as a source of our assumed military weakness. But this military weakness of the south exists only in the imagination of the abolitionist. *As we read the history*, the slave institution has never been a source of weakness, and is, in reality, one of strength. It was a source of strength to Greek and Roman ; a source of greatness, too, infinitely beyond mere physical capacity. It has never enfeebled *us* in any foreign contest ; though, prior to the revolution, in consequence of a too little regard to the lessons of history, it was a source of anxiety and doubt. The progress of that conflict relieved the public mind from all of its apprehensions, and showed that, in a time of war, it becomes a source of superior strength, securing the community, at all times, an abundant agricultural supply—always in course of production—while

enabling the entire male white population to engage actively in the conflict, for which the constant use of weapons and horses has particularly prepared them. This was the remarkable history during the revolution. South-Carolina actually furnished the food for both armies, not only within her own borders but those of Georgia, during the last three years of the war. Her granaries fed equally the whig and tory, the Briton and the American. Her slaves produced this immense supply, and, in the majority of cases, were faithful to their masters. But a small body deserted voluntarily to the British, and were uniformed in their service. The greater number who passed into their possession, and were carried from the state into West Indian bondage, were victims to the cupidity of the enemy, and were made captive by force of arms. While the greater part of the negro population were engaged in the tillage of the fields, their owners, of both parties, were struggling in the fields of conflict. And this relation between the slave and his master was favourable to military strength. It secured protection for the one who toiled, and sustenance and food for him who fought. While the slave was peculiarly endowed for the staid and uniform employments of agriculture, the white man of the South was quite as remarkably constituted for the life of activity and adventure which belongs to the requirements of war. He was born, we may almost phrase it, on horseback, and with the rifle in his grasp. His ordinary exercise made these his familiar companions. His ordinary amusement was the chase; and, as a hunter, horseman, and rifleman, he was almost naturally trained to war. It is in these possessions, indeed, that we may boast of a militia in the South, such as the world has never elsewhere seen. These possessions combine the most powerful elements and agents of the military—habitual stratagem and adroitness in snaring and baffling game—a perfect mastery of the

horse, and an unequalled excellence in firearms. Exercise in these is naturally the source of spirit and vigilance, of confidence and courage in the field, which ordinary militia never possess ; and of a peculiar capacity for guerilla or partisan warfare, in which the South has especially been distinguished whenever her troops have been led by native officers, who knew how to appreciate and manage them, and who understood the business themselves. But we must pass to another of the fecund paragraphs of Mr. Sabine :

“South-Carolina, with a *NORTHERN* army to assist her, could not or would not even preserve her own capital.”

We have shown already that the word “*Northern*” must not, as is too frequently the case in New England books, be misunderstood to mean New-England. Their writers seem determined to have it so, and charity requires that we should suppose them always to believe what they themselves assert. *In every instance where the language is employed, we beg leave to repeat that no troops from New England ever crossed the State of Virginia.* Let us look to the details. What, for example, was this northern army that came to the help of Charleston, when threatened by Clinton ? “The North-Carolina and Virginia continentals, amounting to fifteen hundred men, two frigates, a twenty-four gun ship, and a sloop of war were ordered from the *northward* for the defence of Charleston. *This was all the aid that could be expected from Congress.*” But these fifteen hundred troops were not all available. “Out of a thousand North-Carolina militia, commanded by General Lillington, whose term of service expired while the siege was pending, no more than three hundred could be persuaded to remain within the lines.” “Seven hundred continentals, (Virginians) commanded by General Woodford, *was the only reinforcement which the garrison*

received during the siege."* When the town fell, the whole number of continentals, *including the Carolina contingent within the State* was but "*nineteen hundred and seventy-seven*, yet the return of prisoners was more than *five thousand*."† So much for this redoubtable 'Northern' army. It is true that, before the leaguer, and in order to confirm the resolution of the people to defend the city, they were *promised* from Congress and other quarters, an additional force of some nine thousand troops, but these only made their appearance after the fashion of those tardy spirits whom Glendower summoned from the vasty deeps. They were pretty much the same order of soldiers as were enrolled on the New England establishment—never to be seen except at the serving out of rations; and as Charleston had but a slender supply of provisions, falling, at last, from famine, such feeders, with such an aversion to short commons, could not surely be expected in such a place. But let us proceed with Mr. Sabine.

"South-Carolina, with a *northern* army to assist her, could not, or would not preserve her own capital. When news reached Connecticut that Gage had sent a force into the country, and that blood had been shed, Putnam was at work in his field; leaving his plough in the furrow, he started for Cambridge, without changing his garments. When Stark heard the same tidings, he was sawing pine logs, and without a coat; shutting down the gate of his mill, he commenced his journey to Boston in his shirt sleeves. The same spirit animated the whigs far and near, and the capital of New England was invested with fifteen thousand men. How was it at Charleston? That city was the great mart of the South; and what Boston still is, the centre of the export and import trade of a large population. In grandeur, in shipping, and commerce, Charleston was equal to any city in America. But its citizens did not rally to save it, and General Lincoln was compelled to accept terms of capitulation."

* Ramsay.

† Ibid.

How grateful should this contrast be, to one, at least, of the parties ! What a picturesque delineation does the author give us of Putnam setting off for the field of war, without changing his breeches ! and Stark, in his shirt—*Stark-naked* we may say—starting off from his mill, on a *milling* expedition, to Boston, gives us a high idea of the patriotism of every body in this wondrous region. It is to be regretted that our author had not asked how long this patriotic fury continued. At the first flush of an affair, an excitable people may find it rather pleasant than otherwise ; but as the latent properties of the subject begin to unfold themselves, the enthusiasm usually subsides. How was it with these half-clad heroes, and their fifteen thousand patriots ? Let us see. We quote from Sparks, as before :

“ The enlistments in the new army, (the leaguer of Boston in progress) *went on slowly. The dissatisfaction and cabals of the officers, the exacting temper and undisciplined habits of the men, occasioned endless perplexities.* General Washington felt intense anxiety. His patience and fortitude were tried in the severest manner. *A month's experiment had obtained only five thousand recruits.* At one time he was flattered with promises, at another almost every gleam of hope was extinguished, till, at length, *when the term of service of the Connecticut troops was about to expire, it was ascertained that they would go off in a body, and leave a fearful blank in an army already deficient in numbers, and weakened by internal disorders. He appealed to every motive which could stimulate their patriotism, pride, or sense of honor, but all in vain !*”

How these hot impatient patriots had cooled off, and in what a marvellous short space of time ! They could not be persuaded to defend their own homes, *though the general-in-chief was brought seven hundred miles from his Southern home*, to assist and lead them ; and there were, in this very army around Boston, recruits in considerable numbers, from

Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, of whose presence Mr. Sabine never says a syllable in his domestic array of fifteen thousand men.

"The army was soon augmented," (says Sparks,) "*by the companies of riflemen from Virginia, &c. The companies were filled up with surprising quickness, and, on their arrival in camp, the number of several of them exceeded the prescribed limit.*"

May we not write, after this, in the language of Mr. Sabine, "the New Englanders, with a *southern* commander and army to assist them, would not stay for the recapture of their own capital, *which they had already lost, without an effort, to the enemy.*" Were we governed by the sort of temper, and the sense of justice which governs him, we certainly could employ no more qualified language.

But there is something more on this subject, which is quite too good to be lost :

"When General Washington complained to Governor Trumbull, of Connecticut, of the extraordinary conduct of the Connecticut troops, the latter replied"—

And the answer is a rich one, full of significance :

"The pulse of a New England man beats high for liberty; his engagements in the service he thinks purely voluntary; therefore, when the time of enlistment is out, he thinks himself not holden *without further enlistment.* This was the case in the last war. I greatly fear its operation amongst the soldiers of the other colonies, as I am sensible this is the genius and spirit of our people."

This jargon was an answer quite as significant as the eager fury of the first rush of Connecticut into the field. But Sparks provides a suggestion more to the point, and explains the phrase "without further enlistment." "Another consideration," says he, "had great weight, *perhaps greater than all the rest—the men expected a bounty.*"

In other words, these fire eating patriots, who rush half

naked into battle, rather than lose the good and glory of the thing, had struck for higher wages, of which their patriotism never lost sight entirely. Sparks adds, "*A soldier's pay did not satisfy them,*" [of course they expected a patriot's pay also,] "as they could obtain better wages in other employments, without the fatigues and privations of a camp." Yet, during this time, Carolina was furnishing the powder, from stores which her sons had captured from the British, by which Washington was enabled to continue the leaguer of Boston; and the recruits of riflemen from Virginia and Maryland, were employed to invade Canada, in the army detached from Washington's, which was led into the wilderness by Arnold. Yet who reads these facts in Mr. Sabine's history, or in any history of New England self-glorification?

Here we might reasonably pause, satisfied with the sufficient commentary already furnished, on this agreeable topic of eastern self-complacency. But, while our hands are in, we may just as well, from unquestionable New England authorities, endeavor to illustrate still farther the qualities of this fierce New England patriotism, which Mr. Sabine deplores, with so lugubrious a visage, has never met its adequate acknowledgment. During this very leaguer of Boston, to which we find Connecticut rushing with such headlong fury, as to leave her no time to regulate her toilet, we find General Greene complaining that "several companies had clubbed their muskets, in order to march home." As a commentary upon the alleged myriads of New England contribution to the war, in the statement of such writers as Mr. Sabine, *he* says:

"Our situation has been critical. We have no part of the militia here, and the night after the old troops went away, I could not have mustered *seven hundred men, notwithstanding the returns of the new enlisted troops amounted to nineteen hundred and upwards.*"

They served a sufficient purpose on the pay list. Again he writes—and the comment is upon the patriotism of these men in buckram :

“The pay and provision of the troops cannot be lowered at present ; *they don't feel themselves under a necessity to enter the service for the support of themselves and families, and, therefore, would refuse to enlist again.*”

Shortly after he writes again, and dwells more particularly on this famous love of country which does not stop to button its breeches :

“In my last, I mentioned to you that *the troops enlisted very slowly in general.* I was in hopes then that ours, (Rhode Island,) would not have deserted the cause of their country ; but they seem to be so sick of this way of life, and so homesick, that I fear *the greater part, and the best of the troops from our colony will go home.* *The Connecticut troops are going home in shoals this day.* *There is a great defection among their troops.*” “*I sent home some recruiting officers, but they got scarcely a man, and report that there are none to be had there. No public spirit prevails.* *Newport, I believe, from the best intelligence I can get, is determined to observe a strict neutrality this winter, and in the spring join the strongest party. I feel for the honor of the colony, which I think in a fair way, from the conduct of the people at home, and the troops abroad, to receive a wound.*”

But precious little did these patriots, hungering always for their bounty and month's pay, care for the wounds of honour of the colony. Greene's next afflictions arise from the indignation with which Washington expresses himself on the subject of New England patriotism. In labouring to extenuate its short comings, he shows them up in beautiful colours :

“His Excellency has not had time to make himself acquainted with the genius of this people. They are naturally as brave and spirited as the peasantry of any other country, but you cannot expect veterans of a raw militia from only a

few month's service. *The common people are exceedingly avaricious; the genius of the people are commercial, from their long intercourse with trade. The sentiment of honour, the true characteristic of a soldier, has not yet got the better of interest. . . . The country round here set no bounds to their demands for pay, wood, and teaming. It has given his Excellency a great deal of uneasiness that they should take this opportunity to extort from the necessities of the army at such enormous prices."*

Simple General, to suppose that patriotism, like pork and beans, having its value, should not also have its price. General Greene, perfectly well acquainted with what he facetiously calls "the genius of the people," devotes letter after letter to the necessity of giving bounties. But neither Washington nor Congress can be brought to this; and how should they think it necessary, with a people fighting for their liberties, and in the defence of their own soil and cities? Enough it is thought, is conceded them, when their extortionate prices are yielded for the support of that army which fights their battles, in putting all their militia on the pay list, and in giving them the greater number of the general officers of the army.*

* This was another of the capital processes by which New England fed fat upon her patriotism. She filled the commissions of the army with the most incompetent drivellers in it. "Most of the generals," says Greene, "belong to the northern governments;" of major-generals, New England had, in 1775, 2; New-York, 2; and Virginia 1—(Chas. Lee, an Englishman.) In 1776, New England had 5, and Virginia 1—(Horatio Gates, another Englishman.) In 1777, New England had 2, Virginia 1, New Jersey 1, (Lord Stirling;) Pennsylvania 2, North Carolina 1, New-York 1, and France 4. In 1778, Prussia 1. In 1780, New England 1, Maryland 1. In 1781, France 1. In 1782, New England 1, South-Carolina 1. Total—New England 11 major-generals: the rest of the *states* together 11; of these Massachusetts had 5, Connecticut 4, and South-Carolina 1. Yet who will pretend to compare the public services of Ward, Lincoln, Thomas, and Heath, all

Something more from the Rhode Island General:

"It was not the lower classes of people that I meant to complain of, but the merchants and wealthy farmers. We find many articles of merchandize enhanced in price four times the first cost, and many of them cent per cent. The farmers are extortionate wherever their situation furnishes them with an opportunity. . . . The Connecticut troops went off in spite of all that could be done to prevent it." [The bounty not being forthcoming.] *"We never have been so weak as we shall be to-morrow. Our growing weaker, whilst the enemy are growing stronger, renders our situation disagreeable."*
. . . . "The regiments fill up very slowly here. It is really discouraging. . . . If the Congress had given a bounty, &c."

All agree that the bounty would have been the great panacea for the restoration of New England patriotism. Governor Ward, to whom Greene writes, fully responds to this sugges-

of Massachusetts, with those of Moultrie, Marion, Pickens, Sumter, and a dozen others of South-Carolina, whom the management of New England contrived to *overslaugh*, in the elevation of her own sons? A nearly similar disproportion seems to exist in the distribution of the appointment of brigadiers. In 1775, of nine brigadiers created, New England secured 7, Virginia 1, and New-York 1. In 1776, New England had 7, Pennsylvania 3, New-York 2, New Jersey 2, Virginia 3, North-Carolina 2, South-Carolina 2, Maryland 1, Georgia 1. In 1777, New England again had 7, New-York 1, Pennsylvania 5, Virginia 4, Maryland 1 (brevet,) North-Carolina 1. In 1779, North-Carolina 2, South-Carolina 1, Maryland 1, Pennsylvania 1. In 1780, Virginia 1. In 1782, Maryland 1. In 1783, Massachusetts 2, New Jersey 1, Pennsylvania 1, Virginia 1, South-Carolina 1, Georgia 1. These four last all by brevet. Yet for the last three years, the war had been wholly confined to the south. Whether the New Englanders furnished the army and fought the battles, or not, they at least contrived to secure an ample share of the spoils of office. This was a game at which they never failed to play with profit, from the days of the revolution to the conquest of California. They are always sure to be in at the division of the spoils, if not at the death of the game.

tion, and the simple southron, Washington, has no idea of resorting to this specific in such a case. Congress, he has often assured us, "would not give a bounty." And this growling and grumbling about the impossibility of getting the regiments filled, even in this region, which, according to Mr. Sabine, overflows with *sans culotes* eager for battle, is continued *ad nauseam*, by all our officers, throughout the entire war. We could quote passage after passage from Washington's letters on the subject, but prefer the confessions of New England officers themselves. The lack of troops from New England; their presumption, incapacity, and constant exactions; are the chief causes which prevent Washington from doing any thing in the face of the enemy.

We turn to another authority, in regard to these matters, and one which, as between north and south, must be held an impartial one. The reader is referred to the Pennsylvanian, Graydon, of whose work a new edition has been presented to the public.* Speaking of General Schuyler, a man sacrificed to the bigoted prejudices of New England, he says :

"That he should have been displeasing to the Yankees, I am not at all surprised. He certainly was at no pains to conceal the extreme contempt he felt for a set of men who were both a disgrace to their stations and the cause in which they acted, &c." "The sordid spirit of gain was the vital principle of this greater part of the army. The only exception I recollect to have seen to these miserably constituted bands of New England, was the regiment of Glover, from Marblehead. There was an appearance of discipline in this corps; the officers seemed to have mixed with the world, and to understand what belonged to their stations. . . . But even in this regiment there were a number of negroes, &c." "Ta-

* Memoirs of his own times; with reminiscences of the men and events of the Revolution. By Alexander Graydon. Philadelphia : 1846.

king the army in the aggregate," [this was soon after New-York had fallen into the hands of the British,] "he must have been a novice or a sanguine calculator, who could suppose it capable of sustaining the lofty tone and verbal energy of Congress. In point of numbers merely, it was deficient; though a fact then little known or suspected. Newspapers and common report, indeed, made it immensely numerous, &c."

But this was only in the arithmetic of New England. The fact is that this pretension of the Eastern States to numbers in the army, would be the most ridiculous thing in the world, in view of the actual fact, if it were not for the enormous robbery of the national funds, of which it has been made the pretext. So reluctant were they to appear in arms, that, at a later period, they could only meet the demands of Washington by enlisting the captured soldiers of Burgoyne's army, whom Washington refused to receive.

As Mr. Sabine has given us his picture of the Connecticut soldiery, under the excitement of patriotic and military impulse, and been pleased to do this by way of ungracious contrast to that of the troops and people of the South, under similar circumstances, it may not be amiss to hear Graydon's description of the same class of warriors. The period is that which was employed by the British in their first demonstrations upon New-York:

"Among the military phenomena of this campaign, the Connecticut light horse ought not to be forgotten. These consisted of a considerable number of old-fashioned men—probably farmers and heads of families, as they were generally middle aged, and many of them apparently beyond the meridian of life. They were truly irregulars; and whether their clothing, their equipments, or caparisons were regarded, it would have been difficult to have discovered any circumstance of uniformity, though in the features derived from 'local habitation,' they were one and the same. Instead of carbines and sabres, they generally carried fowling pieces,

some of them very long, and such as, in Pennsylvania, are used for shooting ducks. Here and there one, 'his youthful garments well saved,' appeared in a regimental of scarlet, with a triangular, tarnished, laced hat. In short, so little were they like modern soldiers, in air or costume, that, dropping the necessary number of years, they might have been supposed the identical men who had in part composed Pepperill's army at the taking of Simsbury. Their order of march corresponded with their other irregularities. 'It spindled into longitude immense,' presenting so extended and ill-compacted a flank, as though they had disdained the adventitious prowess derived from concentration. These singular dragoons were volunteers, who came to make a tender of their services to the commander-in-chief. But they staid not long at New-York. As such a body of cavalry had not been counted upon, there was, in all probability, a want of forage for their *jades*, which, in the spirit of ancient knighthood, they absolutely refused to descend from; and, as the general had no use for cavaliers in his insular operations, they were dismissed, with suitable acknowledgments, for their chivalrous ardor. An unlucky trooper of this school had, by some means or other, found his way to Long Island, and was taken by the enemy. The British officers made themselves very merry at his expense, and obliged him to amble about for their entertainment. On being asked what had been his duty in the rebel army, he answered that it was to *flank a little*, and carry tidings."

Graydon, after this, making liberal allowance for the people of New England while fighting for their own homes, indicating the defence of Bunker Hill as worthy of the bravest veterans, proceeds as follows :

"I attempt not to assign a cause for the falling off; and should even be fearful of recognizing it, were there not documents in existence, and hundreds yet alive,* to attest the truth of my representations. I have, in vain, endeavoured to account for the very few gentlemen and men of the world, that, at this time, appeared in arms from this country, that might

* The first edition of Graydon's Memoirs was published in 1811.

be considered as the cradle of the revolution. 'There were some, indeed, in the higher ranks, and here and there a young man of decent breeding, in the capacity of an aid-de-camp or brigade major; but anything above the condition of a clown, in the regiments we came in contact with, was truly a rarity. Was it that the cause was only popular among the yeomanry? [Greene and others show that the yeomanry made it profitable enough to find it popular, but it was only while selling to the soldiery, not in harnessing themselves.] Was it that men of fortune and condition there, as in other parts of the continent, though evidently most interested in a contest whose object was to rescue American property from the grasp of British avidity, were willing to devolve the fighting upon the poorer and humbler classes? Was it, in short, that they held the language of the world, and said—

“Let the gull'd fools the toil's of war subdue,
Where bleed the many to enrich the few!”

Or was it, that that simple way of thinking, and ill appreciation of military talent, which had made a drivelling deacon, (General Ward,) second in command, was then prevalent among them? Whatever was the reason, New England was far behind the other provinces in the display of an ardent unequivocal zeal for the cause, in the quality of her officers; and, notwithstanding that she has since shown herself more prolific of liberal, well-informed, exigent men, than any other part of the Union, her soldiery, at the time I am speaking of, was contemptible in the extreme.”

The truth is, governed always by a selfishness of the most exclusive, narrow-minded and exacting character, New England lost all interest and sympathy in the revolutionary struggle, as soon as the enemy were withdrawn to another quarter. She had long before shown a disposition to avoid all sacrifices, and her enthusiasm was entirely exhausted by the demonstrations of her Stark and Putnam. The war which was provoked by herself was by no means grateful to her interests, which were entirely commercial; and the departure of the British from her own homes, left her free to prosecute her

selfish interests, which were rather benefitted than injured by the continuance of a contest, the burden of which was to be borne only by the Southern and middle colonies. The denseness of her population enabled her to gather troops more rapidly together than in the other provinces; but we have seen with what rapidity the zeal subsided, which, in the first flush of the conflict, seemed to promise the most wonderful results. That the British withdrew from Massachusetts, was due entirely to the fact that they sought to escape the severities of the climate, in a region, the poverty of which, at that period, promised them little more than constant privations, if not hard knocks. Their withdrawal, as we know by a thousand proofs, at once rendered the region which they left comparatively indifferent to every thing in the progress of the conflict, but the possession of the spoils of office and victory; of which, by the way, their subsequent history shows them to have been always considerate. But we have some further hints from the pen of Mr. Graydon, which the discussion of our present subject does not permit us to disregard. Writing, with reference to the opinions of the army, while it occupied the heights of Harlaem, and after the surrender of New-York, Graydon says:

“In so contemptible a light were the New England men regarded, that it was scarcely held possible to conceive a case which could be construed into a reprehensible disrespect of them. Thinking so highly as I now do, of the gentlemen of this country, the recollection is painful, but the fact must not be dissembled.”

The wretched blunder by which it was resolved to defend Fort Washington, with a grossly inadequate force, with works untenable and badly chosen, is thus commented on by our author: “But suppose Fort Washington tenable, ‘what single purpose,’ as it has been observed by General Lee, ‘did it answer to keep it? Did it cover, did it protect a valuable

country? Did it prevent the enemy's ships from passing with impunity? No: but we had been too much in the habit of evacuating posts, and it was high time to correct the procedure. This garrison must stand, because it had been too fashionable to run away; and Pennsylvania and Maryland must pay for the retreating alacrity of New England." And they did pay severely; fought well, and gleaned nearly a thousand British victims, under the keen fire of the Maryland rifles, before the place was surrendered. To this passage the author adds, in a note: "Once for all, let me be understood as only alluding in these remarks, to the bad constitution of the New England troops, and by no means to the people generally, who have, no doubt, the means of furnishing as good officers as any other part of the Union. But, from their shameful inattention to it in this campaign, the Southern officers were warranted in their indignation."

Graydon was, himself, in the action at Fort Washington, and became a prisoner. He returns to his subject of complaint. In a controversy forced upon us like the present, we deem it only proper to employ his own language: "Because posts had been evacuated; because Long Island, New-York, King's Bridge, and White Plains, had successively been found untenable by the concentrated force of the continent, [New England and the Middle States is to be understood,] this handful has to apologize to the country for the supposed disgrace of our arms, and the defective condition of our military system. As "the troops were in high spirits and would make a good defence, why e'en let these southern men," says Generals Putnam and Greene, "take the glory of it themselves. Whatever be their fate, they will kill a good number of the enemy; and desperate expedients are adapted to the declining state of our affairs. "These, it is true, were dashing counsels; nevertheless, to those acquainted with the unfriend-

ly, repulsive temper which prevailed between the southern and eastern troops, and the selfish, clannish spirit, testified on all occasions by the latter, there would be nothing very revolting in the imputation of such motives; in which, also, the historian in the Annual Register might find a clue to the solution of the enigma, why an operation on so large a scale, should be committed to a colonel." Colonel Magaw was intrusted with the defence of Fort Washington, having under him a force of 2500 men. "It was, at any rate, a current opinion among us who were taken, that we had been sacrificed to selfish feeling; nor, upon a cool consideration of all the circumstances, after a lapse of four and thirty years, can I see full cause to renounce that opinion. I do not believe—at least if we had been New England men—that we should have been left there. If Greene really knew no better at this era, he was deeply instructed by his error, since whatever was the character of his subsequent generalship, it never disclosed symptoms of a rash audacity." To Greene's discretion it had been left to determine whether Fort Washington should be kept or abandoned. He decided on the former fatal course, which resulted in the defeat and capture of the garrison, in a position which was neither well chosen nor properly manned. Further, to illustrate the ungenerous and selfish character of the New England influence, the author remarks that it was never more strikingly shown than in "the partial exchange of prisoners, continually carried on in favour of the eastern officers, to the cruel discouragement of the southern."

In the desire to help Mr. Sabine in the laudable contrast which he gives us between the alacrity of the New England troops, and the reluctance of the southern to seek the enemy, we have somewhat wandered from our subject. To this subject we now return, calling Mr. Sabine to the stand again, as a willing witness.

“South-Carolina,” [remarks this gentleman,] “with a northern army to assist her, could not, or would not, even preserve her own capital! . . . How was it at Charleston? That city was the great mart of the south . . . the centre of the export and import trade of a large population. In grandeur, in splendour of buildings, in decorations, in equipages, in shipping and commerce, Charleston was equal to any city in America; but its citizens did not rally to save it, and General Lincoln was compelled to accept terms of capitulation.”

The grandeur and wealth of Charleston, her shipping and commerce, were, in truth, the sources of her weakness. Her wealth invited the attempts of the most formidable fleet and army which Great Britain had ever sent against America; and her shipping and commerce—her export and import trade—were in the hands of British and aliens. These were powers, which, in her own bowels, were hostile to her safety. The persons who represented these forces, were chiefly those who subsequently became the addressors of Clinton. They were mostly foreigners. To this point we have referred already. But what does Mr. Sabine mean when he says, that South-Carolina would not, or could not, maintain her own capital? He evidently means you to understand that the place was undefended—given up to the enemy, at the first summons, without striking a blow. “Its citizens did not rally to save it, and General Lincoln was compelled to accept of terms of capitulation.” This language certainly forbids the idea of any defence—and, by the way, the previous opinion of Washington, and most of the other officers of the army, was that it could not be defended, and that the defence was unwisely attempted—and we should scarcely imagine, from this statement, unless otherwise informed, that a leaguer of nearly two months, was maintained, by a force less than half the number of the assailants, behind the most trifling field-works, with inferiorartil-

lery, by a people suffering from a cruel epidemic, threatened with famine, and sustaining, day and night, the bombardment of batteries far superior to their own ! There is no doubt that Charleston was not as well defended as it might have been ; but this was rather the fault of the New England general in command, than that of the citizens ; and no imputation should be flung upon the valor or patriotism of the people, unless it can be shown that the arguments upon which they rest their defence shall be proved to be valueless. We shall indicate these arguments, but shall first return to the earlier passages in the history of the revolution in the south.

Mr. Sabine has given us a vivid picture of Stark and Putnam scampering off to the leaguer of Boston, under the gush of patriotic fury, without paying proper attention to the state of their nether garments. We have observed that this was the first scene at the opening of the revolution, and had the charm of novelty to recommend it. About the same period, or a little after, Charleston was invaded by a superior force of the enemy. What, then, was the conduct of the Carolinians ? They certainly showed, at that time, no want of patriotism or courage. What says Ramsay on this point ? "In South-Carolina, particularly, every exertion had been made to put the province, and especially its capital, in a respectable posture of defence." The alarm guns are fired, and "the militia of the country, very generally, obeyed the summons of President Rutledge, and repaired in great numbers to Charleston." Ramsay is not a picturesque writer, like Mr. Sabine, or he would have been at some pains to inquire whether Marion, from St. John's, Berkeley, and Thompson, from St. Matthews, and a score or more besides, of leading patriots who never asked for continental pay—certainly never struck for higher wages—did not leave their corn fields and lumber mills, for the defence of the capital, without looking to see that their

best Sunday garments were at hand ! Well, what was the result ? The capital was defended, the British *were* beaten off, *wholly by South-Carolinians*, in one of the most sanguinary battles of the war ! This was one defence of the capital. Another occasion followed, when General Lincoln, withdrawing all the regular troops away from South-Carolina, on a wild-goose chase into Georgia, left its whole sea-board open, and its capital city liable to a *coup-de-main* of General Prevost. What, then, was the course of the Carolinians ? We find Moultrie rushing to the rescue, with twelve hundred militia from one quarter ; and Governor Rutledge, with another body of native militia, pressing down, for the same object, from another quarter of the interior ; while Lincoln, with similar speed, was marching from a third direction ; and it is highly probable that some of these people hurried to the danger, stripped to the buff, as did those fierce fellows, Stark and Putnam. A *second* time were the British baffled in their attempts, and in neither instance was there a deficient courage or patriotism shown by the Carolinians in the defence of their capital. Nor was there any lack of the necessary spirit on the *third* and last occasion, when the town was finally yielded. Previous to this, however, the losses of the southern army were so considerable as materially to impair its strength. General Ashe, with the Georgia continentals, and fifteen hundred North-Carolina militia, was surprised and beaten, and his troops dispersed by Prevost. This disastrous event was followed by one still more disastrous, in the badly-managed assault upon Savannah, by the combined forces of D'Estaing and Lincoln, when they were defeated with prodigious loss—a loss falling particularly heavy upon the Carolina troops who alone succeeded in planting their standard upon the enemy's works—a barren, but an honourable achievement !

With forces greatly diminished by these and other disas-

ters, this *third* attempt of the British upon the city of Charleston, found it less prepared than ever for defence.

“Unfortunately for Carolina,” [says Ramsay,] “the most formidable attack was made upon her capital at a time when she was least able to defend it. In 1776, a vote of her new government stamped a value on her bills of credit, which, in 1780, could not be affixed to twenty times as much of the same nominal currency. At this important juncture, when the public service needed the largest supplies, the paper bills of credit were of the least value. To a want of money was added a want of men. The militia were exhausted with an uninterrupted continuance of hard duty. The winter, to others a time of repose, had been to them a season of most active exertions. The dread of the small-pox, which, after seventeen years absence, was known to be in Charleston, discouraged many from repairing to the defence of the capital. The six continental regiments on the South-Carolina establishment, in the year 1777, consisted of two thousand four hundred men; but in the year 1780, they were so much reduced by death, desertion, battles, and the expiration of their terms of service, that they did not exceed eight hundred.”

These are some of the principal causes of the weakness of Charleston at this period; but they are not dwelt upon with the needful emphasis. The dread of the fever of the metropolis, not less than of the small pox, was a sufficient reason for discouraging the militia of the interior; Charleston being at that period no such region of salubrity as she now appears. The familiar comparison of that day likened her, in respect to the malaria influence, with the pestilential climate of Batavia. Besides, a country militia like ours—men accustomed to the free ranges of the forest—are particularly reluctant to be cooped up within the walls of a beleaguered city at any time. Such a restraint would be adverse to every sensation of life of which they were ever conscious, and would, no doubt render, them obnoxious to every form of disease, which, whether an epidemic prevails or not, must seize upon the morbid and dis-

contented nature. There was yet another consideration, of even superior force to these, which naturally prevented the people of the mountain regions from leaving their own neighborhoods for any purpose. Whenever they had done so hitherto, particularly when a British fleet or army was upon the coast, their absence had been the signal for the rising of the loyalists and the Indians. But, in fact, with such a commander as Lincoln, there was no deficiency of men. There were, in fact, too many as it was, within the city. There was no food for those who occupied it. Lincoln neither saw properly to the provisions nor to the defences of the city, and it fell by famine, and *not* by force.

Our space will not suffer us to do more than advert to the many causes which lessened the strength and resources of Carolina at the approach of the enemy, in 1780, to her metropolis. Enough, we trust, has been said and shown to disprove utterly the false and malicious paragraphs which we have thought proper to examine, and to expose the injustice of any comparison between the acts of a people fresh for the struggle, under its first excitements, and as yet totally inexperienced in suffering; and another whom this struggle has left enfeebled and exhausted—conscious of their weakness and deficiencies, and failing in that promised assistance from without, which, in the misfortune of others, they themselves had been always ready to bestow. Let the history be written out in full, on both sides, with all its facts, with nothing reserved, and nothing set down in malice, and we do not fear but that the deeds and sacrifices of Carolina, and of the whole South, will bear honourable comparison with those of any part of this nation. But, for the present, we forego the theme. We propose hereafter to claim the attention of the reader, while we continue the subject to which we have just made our approaches—the siege of Charleston, in 1780—a subject for

which we find a particular inducement, in the possession of certain new materials, indicated in our rubric, which have never yet been spread before the public. We hope to show from these, that, in spite of native feebleness, bad management, inferior *materiel* and deficient *personnel*, the defence of the capital of Carolina furnished as noble an instance of manly courage, and social fortitude and patriotism, as it is the lot of the historian often to put on record.

NOTE.

It may assist the reader to appreciate the absurdity of this fiction of a hundred and eighteen thousand New-Englanders, ready always for the field, to learn something of the numbers of the British to whom they were opposed. Within a brief period, there have been published, in the (N. Y.) Literary World, certain letters from John Adams. In one of these, dated as late as Dec., 1809, he says :

“Great Britain, in our revolutionary war, *never had in North America, including the Canadas, at any one time, more than five and twenty thousand men.* During some part of the war, I thought they had *forty* thousand ; but upon examining their own most authentic documents and memorials, I have, long settled, an opinion that they *never exceeded twenty-five thousand, &c.*”

Certainly these ought to have been but a mere mouthful for these fierce fighting New-Englanders, 118,000 strong, who should have swallowed them with as much ease and eagerness, as a French *gourmand* swallows a fricasee of frogs ! But, Mr. Adams is, perhaps, a little below the mark. We are enabled, through Sparks, to quote from the official returns

in the State Paper Office, showing the numbers of the British forces in America, during the several years, 1777-'8-'9, 1780-'1-'2. By these, the reader will see where the enemy was; and if he will find out where the 118,000 Yankees were, at the same time, he will do more than the British ever did. The italics are ours.

BRITISH FORCES IN AMERICA.

As many of General Washington's movements and plans depended on what he supposed to be the strength of the enemy, a view of the general state of the British army, at different stages of the war, will contribute much to a just understanding of various parts of his correspondence. The following summaries have been copied from the original returns in the State Paper Office. The numbers represent *effective* troops.

State of the Army, June 3d, 1777.

<i>Jersey.</i>			<i>New-York.</i>		
British artillery,	-	385	British infantry,	-	1513
“ cavalry,	-	710	“ artillery,	-	20
“ infantry,	-	8361	Hessian infantry,	-	1778
Hessian “	-	3300			
Anspach “	-	1043			
		<hr/>			<hr/>
		13799			3311

<i>Staten Island.</i>			<i>Rhode Island.</i>		
British infantry,	-	515	British infantry,	-	1064
“ artillery,	-	11	Hessian “	-	1496
Waldeck infantry,	-	330	British artillery,	-	71
		<hr/>			<hr/>
		856			2631

<i>Paulus Hook.</i>			<i>Total of the army, 20957.</i>		
British infantry,	-	360			

Foreign Troops in America, June 24th, 1777.

Hessian,	-	12777
Anspach,	-	1293
Waldeck,	-	679

Total, 14749.

State of the Army, March 26th, 1778.

<i>Philadelphia.</i>	<i>New-York.</i>	<i>Rhode Island.</i>
British, - 13078	British, - 3486	British, - 1610
German, - 5202	German, - 3689	German, - 2116
Provincial, 1250	Provincial, 3281	Provincial, 44
<hr/> 19530	<hr/> 10456	<hr/> 3770

Total of the army, 33756.

August 15th, 1778.

New-York, - - 15886	Long Island, - - 8117
Staten Island, - - 3244	<i>Rhode Island</i> , - - 5789
Paulus Hook, - - 456	With Lord Howe's fleet, 572
<hr/> 19586	<hr/> 14478

Total, 34064.

November 1st, 1778.

New-York, - - 9568	Paulus Hook, - - 419
Long Island, - - 5630	Providence Island, - 225
Staten Island, - - 972	<i>Rhode Island</i> , - - 5740
<hr/> 16170	<hr/> 6384

Total, 22554.

The diminution since the preceding return was occasioned by detachments sent to the West Indies, Florida, and Halifax.

February 15th, 1779.

New-York, - - 9100	Nova Scotia, - - 3011
Long Island, - - 5714	Georgia, - - 4330
Staten Island, - - 1619	Bermuda, - - 240
Paulus Hook, - - 387	Providence Island, - 240
<i>Rhode Island</i> , - - 5642	<hr/> 7821
<hr/> 22462	

Total, 30283.

May 1st, 1779.

New-York, - - 9123	Halifax, - - 3677
Long Island, - - 6056	Georgia, - - 4794
Staten Island, - - 1344	West Florida, - - 1703
Paulus Hook, - - 383	Bermuda and Providence
Hoboken, - - 264	Island, - - 470
<i>Rhode Island</i> , - - 5644	<hr/> 10644
<hr/> 22814	

Total, 33458.

December 1st, 1779.

New-York and its Dependencies.	{	British,	13848	Halifax and	
		German,	10836	Penobscot,	3460
		Provincial,	4072	Georgia, - -	3930
			<hr/>	West Florida,	1787
			28756	Bermuda and	
				Providence Island,	636
					<hr/>
					9813

Total, 38569.

May 1st, 1780.

<i>New-York.</i>	<i>South-Carolina.</i>	<i>Nova Scotia.</i>
British, - 7711	- - - 7041	- - - 2298
German, 7451	- - - 3018	- - - 572
Provincials, 2162	- - - 2788	- - - 638
<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
17324	12847	3508
 <i>East Florida.</i>	 <i>West Florida.</i>	 <i>Georgia.</i>
British, - 536	- - - 590	
German, -	- - - 547	- - - 862
Provincials, -	- - - 316	- - - 1016
<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
536	1453	1878
 <i>Bermuda.</i>	 <i>Providence Island.</i>	
Provincials, 326	- - - 130	

Total, 38002.

August 1st, 1780.

New-York, - -	19115	West Florida, - -	1261
<i>South-Carolina</i> , - -	6589	Nova Scotia, - -	3524
Georgia, - -	1756	Bermuda, - -	204
East Florida, - -	453	Providence Island, - -	118
	<hr/>		<hr/>
	27913		5107

Total, 33020.

December 1st, 1780.

New-York, - -	17729	West Florida, - -	1261
On an Expedition, - -	2274	Nova Scotia, - -	3167
<i>South-Carolina</i> , - -	7384	Bermuda, - -	387
Georgia, - -	968	Providence Island, - -	143
East Florida, - -	453		<hr/>
	<hr/>		4958
	28808		

Total, 33766.

The whole number of *Provincial Forces* at this time in the British army was 8954.

May 1st, 1781.

New-York, - - -	12257	Georgia, - - -	887
On an expedition, - - -	1782	East Florida, - - -	438
“ under General Leslie, - - -	2278	West Florida, - - -	1185
“ “ Arnold, - - -	1553	Nova Scotia, - - -	3130
“ “ Philips, - - -	2116	Bermuda, - - -	366
<i>South-Carolina</i> , - - -	7254	Providence Island, - - -	128
	<hr/>		<hr/>
	27240		6134
		Total, 33374.	

August 15th, 1781.

Troops under Cornwallis in Virginia.

British, - - -	5541	Provincials, - - -	1137
Germans, - - -	2148	On detachments, - - -	607
	<hr/>		<hr/>
	7689		1744
		Total, 9433.	

State of the army, September 1st, 1781.

<i>New-York.</i>	<i>Virginia.</i>	<i>South-Carolina.</i>
British, - 5932	- - - 5544	- - - 5024
Germans, 8629	- - - 2204	- - - 1596
Provincials, 2140	- - - 1137	- - - 3155
<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
16701	8885	9775
 <i>Georgia.</i>	 <i>East Florida.</i>	 <i>West Florida.</i>
British, -	- - - 546	- - - 374
German, - 486	- - -	- - - 558
Provincials, 598	- - -	- - - 211
<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
1084	546	1143
 <i>Nova Scotia.</i>	 <i>Providence Island.</i>	 <i>Bermuda.</i>
British, - 1745	- - - 135	- - - 354
German, - 562		
Provincials, 1145		
<hr/>		
3452		

Total, 42075.

June 1st, 1782.

New-York, - - -	17229	Bermuda, - - -	344
<i>South-Carolina</i> , - - -	6973	Providence Island, - - -	244
East Florida, - - -	612	West Florida, - - -	852
Georgia, - - -	1799	Late garrison at	
Nova Scotia, - - -	3610	Yorktown, - - -	8806
	<hr/>		<hr/>
	30223		10246
		Total, 40469.	

From these figures, the reader will note that in 1777, the British army, stationed in *New England*, (Rhode Island,) amounted only to 2,631 men. In March, 1778, the number was increased to 3,770; in June, it was further increased to 5,789; in November, same year, it was 5,740; in February, 1779, it was 5,642, in May, 5,644; in December, same year, it was *nothing*. In other words, the increase of British force was due to the presence of the *French*, not the Yankees; the 118,000 never being sufficient in strength to expel this miserable force of 5,000 mixed British and Waldeckers. From February, 1779, we find the British feeling their way South. There are 4,330 in February, in Georgia; in May, (same year,) 4,794; in December, it is reduced to 3,930; and in May, 1780, they appear in South-Carolina. This was when Charleston was taken; and here we find them numbering 12,847; twice as many as were in all New-England, during the three years preceding. At the same period, there are in Georgia, 1,878. In December, 1780, *after* the supposed conquest of the State, the number still is 6,589 in South-Carolina; after Gates's defeat, (December, same year,) it is increased to 7,384; in May, 1781, it is 7,254; in September, it is again increased to 9,775; and in June, 1782, it is 6,973; showing, at most periods, an average of one-third, or one-fourth, of the whole force of the British in America.

II.

[From an article in the *Southern Quarterly Review*, on Kennedy's novel of "Horse-Shoe Robinson."

AT the opening of the twelfth chapter of the novel of "Horse-Shoe Robinson," the author gives us a summary of events in South-Carolina, prior to the revolution, and during its progress, the correctness of which we more than question. It has, of late years, been quite the practice, in certain quarters of the country, to disparage the share which South-Carolina took in the assertion of the independence of the colonies. Her course, in recent politics, has given such offence to parties throughout the country, that it has seemed good to many and agreeable to more, to show that hers was always a wrong-headed region; perverse, unperforming, and, perhaps, deserving of censure in those very respects in which her sons have flattered themselves that their claims to deference and regard were least questionable. In respect to party, it is quite sufficient to account for, if not to excuse this hostility, that South-Carolina has, for many years, refused to seek and to share its spoils. Among rogues, he is, perhaps, always the most suspicious character, who rejects his share of the plunder; since his forbearance, particularly where his scruples are of a virtuous nature, are justly offensive to those who do not suffer from like misgivings of the conscience. But there is another offence of which South-Carolina has been guilty, and for which it is not possible for her to make atonement. Somehow, through this very revolution, she has acquired a capital

of sectional character, which stands second to that of none of the States upon this continent. Hers have been the bloodiest battle-fields of the revolution, and it is among her sons that the chivalrous and ardent spirits of our country find their best models of heroism. Her Marion, Sumter, Pickens, Laurens and others, in the field; her Rutledges, Lowndes, Calhouns, in the council; these are recognized contributions to the common stock of national character, which challenge comparison with any region, and defy the claims of most.—To escape the recognition of these claims is impossible, and the policy seems now to be to recognize them only at the expense of her people as a whole. They are to be honoured as examples, *rari nantes in gurgite vasto*, where all besides is vacancy and waste—a dull, monotonous region, either stagnating and senseless, or in feverish disturbance from gales and storms of eccentric passions. Unfortunately, so imperfectly have our histories been written, with so little research, so little reflection or philosophy, and with details so partially given, that it is quite easy to err, with those who never study, and still more easy to misunderstand and misinterpret with those who are wilful. The general reliance, at this day, is upon a class of historians who wrote at a period when the chronicles were unavailable to their use, except in particular localities; and who wrote mostly from the representations of those who could report individual facts rather than truths—while the proper history requires the grouping of the several facts, in just relation to each other, out of which the philosopher extracts the truth, and the historian properly records it. No region has suffered more injustice from such imperfect chroniclers than South-Carolina—than the South at large—and the evil is naturally increased, when it is found the policy of those who are themselves hostile, to provide the history. We have no space now to advert to the variety of causes, amounting to

an apparent necessity, which results in receiving our books from the North; but the consequence has been a constant obscuration of the achievements of our people, the disparagement of their claims when stated, and the assumption of the merits of the performance, on the part of those who, in reality, did but little, or who wrought mischievously.

Now, we must not be understood as imputing any of this disposition to disparage South-Carolina, past or present, to the able and amiable writer before us. Mr. Kennedy is one of those gentlemen whom we highly esteem, as well for his great private worth, his purity and integrity of character, as for his endowments as a literary man. But Mr. Kennedy, like many others, has been misled by the false statements of superficial or corrupt historians, who are quite too numerous in our country, and who abuse the confidence of the reader, sometimes through their own ignorance and haste, sometimes through sectional prejudices, and, not unfrequently, because they aim to subserve the purposes of party. Following such blind guides, there are, accordingly, several errors in the summary which our author makes, at the opening of the twelfth chapter, in reference to South-Carolina. He says, for example:

“It was the misfortune of South-Carolina, during the revolutionary war, to possess a numerous party, less attached to the Union, or more tainted with disaffection, than the inhabitants of any of the other States.”

We join issue with him upon the fact. In the first place, the act of the revolution was the incipient state of union, and attachment to the Union, as we now regard it, was not to be predicated of a people, or the want of it charged unfavourably against them, while the Union was yet in an untried condition—a thing purely in embryo. But this does not affect the question. We deny that the disaffection was greater in South-Carolina than in New-York or Pennsylvania. The opinion

has grown current, in consequence of the greater degree of virulence with which the civil war prevailed in the former State, and this was due to the fact that the concentrated fury of the war fell upon it during the three last years of the struggle, the conflict having really ceased in almost all the other States. The closing events made, naturally, the greatest impression; and the malignity of the struggle was naturally increased, in due degree, with the increased efforts of the British, goaded by desperation, and that bitter feeling which grew daily more and more active, in correspondence with the growing hopelessness of the cause on the part of the invader. A small State, with a limited population, and the population, to a man, in the field, on one side or the other,—for such a people are never lukewarm—the conflict was invariably urged to the extremest issues. But there was another reason why it should be a conflict of intense bitterness, from a reason which we shall give hereafter. Enough, in this place, to repeat that the disaffection was *not* more extensive than in many other States, but that it was brought into more active exhibition, in consequence of the causes assigned, and others.

There were popular elements in conflict, in certain parts of South-Carolina, at that day, which we find hardly anywhere else; and she was compelled to endure the evils of a population which she did not own. To her fields, from 1778 to 1782, came, in herds, the refugees previously expelled from other States and seeking shelter in Florida. The propinquity of the latter colony, so soon as the British took foothold in South-Carolina and Georgia, brought over these two feeble States a locust swarm of outlaws, who, with locust instinct, scattered themselves at once abroad, wherever they might plunder. Let the historian properly inquire into the civil war of these regions, and he will find that the actual population was mostly the prey of the intruders, backed by British ar-

mies. He will wonder, indeed, that, with a population so really small, and greatly scattered, so much head should be made for the good cause, and so many successes achieved by the faithful. The writers of our country, ordinarily, have no sort of idea of our settlements then :—of their fewness, isolation and small resource—and rarely take into consideration the important fact, that, with Georgia only newly established, and, as yet, affording no barrier, South-Carolina, in the revolution, was simply an agricultural *border* State, liable to be overrun, at any moment, by a stealthy invader, taking advantage, as the British did, of a long train of circumstances, by which, including the disastrous affair of Savannah, the surprise of Colonel Ashe, and other events, her regular troops had been dissipated and destroyed, leaving her remaining forces of militia yet to be gathered, from remote settlements, and to be trained by inexperienced captains. Without money, and unsupported by Congress, it was not possible to draw these to a proper head, in season, for the encounter with Sir Henry Clinton. But this hereafter. Enough here to repeat, that the closing struggles of the war were in South-Carolina wholly, and in South-Carolina in particular; that the bloody frequency of her battle-fields would show the superior earnestness with which they were fought; that the final events made the most fearful impression, and that the war carried its sting in its tail. The venom and virulence of the conflict were reserved for the last acts of this long drama, and they took place almost wholly in South-Carolina, where the last blood of the war was shed.

“Amongst her citizens,” says our author, “the disinclination to sever from the mother country was stronger, the spread of republican principles more limited, and the march of revolution slower, than in either of the other colonies, except, perhaps, in the neighbour State of Georgia, where,” etc.

This is a singular mixture of truth and error. So far from

this being the fact, South-Carolina was one of the first colonies to precipitate events, as the following statements will sufficiently show :

1. The first steps towards a continental union were taken in South-Carolina, before the measure had been agreed upon by any colony south of New-England. This was so far back as 1765, immediately upon the passage of the stamp act.

2. South-Carolina was the first of the colonies that formed an independent constitution. This was done in March, 1776, and prior to the recommendation of Congress to that effect. But, in fact, an independent government had been in existence in the colony from the 6th day of July, 1774. On that day, a large convention of the people was held, and an unanimous vote was passed to support Massachusetts in the vindication of her rights. Except nominally, from that moment the Royal Government ceased to exist within the province.—The country became, on the instant, singularly popular, being governed actually by popular committees and voluntary associations, whose authority was rarely resisted.

3. In September, 1775, the royal governor convened an assembly, to provide for public exigencies, when the members gave him a singular proof of their republican tempers, their first and only act being the passage of a resolution, approving and affirming the popular resolutions of the convention of July, 1774. Fearful of more republicanism, the Governor immediately dissolved the Assembly.

4. On the 11th January, 1775, the first revolutionary provincial Congress met, and laid the foundation for the more regular meeting of the convention of March, 1776, by which the first constitution of South-Carolina was formed.

5. The convention of 1775 stamped money, established a Court of Admiralty, for the condemnation of British vessels, issued letters of marque and reprisal, and, on the 9th Septem-

ber, 1775, authorized the commencement of hostilities against two of the royal vessels, then lying in the harbour, having previously seized upon the king's forts, the guns of which were turned upon the ships, compelling their withdrawal.

6. To meet the danger which their patriotism had thus provoked, the South-Carolinians had raised three regular regiments of her own, and these, with her militia, constituted her means of defence. At this period, the whole white population in South-Carolina could not have exceeded seventy-five thousand persons. One would suppose that there was no evidence, here, of want of zeal, or deficient courage and republicanism. They were both soon to be tested.

7. The twenty-eighth of June found a British fleet, of great strength, and a land army of corresponding force, in hostile array, before the city of Charleston. Fleet and army were beaten off, with great loss, by the Carolinians—by native troops alone, be it remembered, and native officers exclusively. This event preceded the declaration of independence, on the part of the United States—preceded all the conflicts between the two powers, with the exception of those of Bunker Hill and Lexington; which, by the way, were in turn preceded by a civil war in the mountain country of South-Carolina, where certain Scotch settlements had embodied themselves a year before, on behalf of the crown; and where, after a severe and protracted struggle, they had been put down. The affair of Fort Moultrie was one of the best fought battles of the whole revolution. The slaughter on board the British ships was almost unexampled, exhibiting a mortality greater in proportion to the numbers engaged than that which occurred at Trafalgar, while the resistance to the efforts of Sir Henry Clinton, with the land army, at the east end of the Island, conducted by native riflemen, under Colonel Thompson, was such as to paralyze the enemy. This portion of the af-

fair has been but little commented upon by our historians ; yet the fire of Thompson's marksmen, with rifles, and from two small field-pieces, was such—and the British flotilla, advancing from Long Island upon the eastern end of Sullivan's, were so raked by the fire—that the men could not be kept to their guns. The decks were cleared, the flotilla dispersed, the enterprise abandoned ; yet the force of Clinton consisted of 2,000 British infantry, exclusive of some 600 or 700 marines and boatmen, supplied from the fleet ; while Thompson's strength lay in his two cannon, a small redoubt of palmetto logs, and 700 rifles. Surely, these events are enough to decide the republicanism and the zeal of Carolina. But farther :

8. At this very juncture, the emissaries of Great Britain had brought the savage and the scalping-knife down upon the frontier population, and several hundred persons, men, women and children, sunk under their barbarities. To quell these, joined with the British and loyalists, the whigs had to take the field, at the opposite extremity of the State, at the same perilous juncture. They did so, chastised the savages, drove them to their mountain fastnesses, while the loyalists fled to Florida, or promised submission, and implored and received mercy.

These were prodigious exertions for South-Carolina, utterly unexampled in the case of a State so small of population, and with its settlements so far asunder, and so much exposed. The consequence of this vigour and enterprise was a season of security ; but, in these achievements, Carolina was exhausting her resources and her strength, incurring a mountainous load of debt, and diminishing in numbers. Her spirit, always greater than her strength, led to one result, which operated injuriously in subsequent periods, as well to her reputation as to her safety. *It prompted friend and foe, alike, to over-rate her strength.* The consequence was, that she received

succour too slowly from Congress to avail for her security, while it prompted her enemies, when they did attempt her defences, to do so with forces so overwhelming, as to put it out of the question to dream of any successful resistance.—Overrating her strength, still, the historian would exact of her such performances as not only were not exhibited by any State, during the revolution, but which it was physically and morally impossible for any country, so situated, to exhibit.

We have shown the career of South-Carolina, up to a certain period, and her escape, thus far, from the power of the enemy, through her own isolated exertions. She enjoyed a temporary rest, in consequence. The next demonstration of the British, which brought her troops into the field, was upon the still feebler State of Georgia. The united forces of Colonel Campbell, from New-York, and General Provost, from Florida, got possession of Savannah and Augusta, at the close of 1778; but, before this, an unfortunate expedition was attempted against Florida, under General Howe, which had totally broken up the Southern army. Sickness, and strife, and starvation, had thinned down the Carolina regiments to a shadow, and the one regular Georgia regiment, made captive in various struggles, had perished in the prison ships of Britain. The defeat of Howe, at Savannah, and subsequently, Ashe's, at Briar Creek, tended still farther to dissipate the strength of Carolina; and it was in the hour of her extremest exhaustion, that, taking advantage of the blundering of Lincoln, who had command of the Southern army after Howe Provost made a rapid and formidable push for Charleston, having under him a force of 2,000 regular troops and 700 Indians and loyalists; while, to oppose him, General Moultrie had but a thousand militia men. We have spoken, already, of the result of this expedition; and, after this survey, we boldly repeat the denial with which we set out, that

the progress of republicanism and revolution was slower in South-Carolina than in her sister colonies; nay, we assert that it was more rapid than in most, and laboured only with this difficulty, that *the physical strength of the State bore no sort of proportion to its sentiment, its spirit, and its zeal*. South-Carolina has been subjected to a trial, both by friends and foes, which took for its tests rather her spirit than her strength. Had justice been done to both, respectively, she would have been succoured seasonably by Congress, and might have been spared a thousand miseries and losses, which are properly due to a selfish influence; which, monopolizing for a single section most of the resources of the country, has since added to the abandonment of another, the base and false disparagement of its claims, merits and sacrifices. All this history, North and South, has yet to be written; when it will be seen that, if the soldier of the South does not survive on the pension list, it was because he perished in the field, or in a captivity which the pensioner, well versed in the cautionary maxims of Falstaff and Hudibras, took precious good care to avoid. The sage military counsel,

“ He who runs away
Will live to *fight* some other day,”

needs only a little revision, to suit this large class of revolutionary warriors; and we may amend it thus,

“ He who runs away,
Feeds fat on *pensions* many a day.”

But he don't feed to fight. Witness the war of 1812 and the recent one with Mexico, where, still governed, as it would seem, by the well-conned and profitable maxim, they eschewed all of the war—but *the spoils*. Compare the number of New-Englanders in the war with Mexico, with those who pushed for California when it was well over, and you have just about the proportion between the true fighting men and the simulacra—

the feeding men on the pension list. But, to return. Our author writes,

“The audacity with which Provost threatened Charleston, in the same year, the facility of his march through South-Carolina, and safety which attended his retreat, told a sad tale of the supineness of the people of that province.”

On the contrary, it spoke quite as well for the inhabitants of South-Carolina, as did the progress of Ross to Baltimore, in 1814, when our author himself played an honourable part, fleshing his maiden sword in defence of his country. The expeditions were not unlike. Proctor was a dashing partizan officer, like Ross. He made a dash at Charleston, under peculiar circumstances, and was driven off, as Ross was driven from Baltimore. Nothing more—nothing less. He did not succeed; he was baffled. Both aimed at a *coup de main*, hoping to find the people, in both cases, unprepared. In some degree, they did so. The results, however, were the same in both cases. It was no reproach to the people of South-Carolina, or of Maryland, that Provost and Ross were audacious captains. It might have been a reproach had they both been successful. As it was, neither succeeded.

But our author's facts are as erroneous as his conclusions. He speaks of the “facility of Provost's march *through* South-Carolina.” Why, Provost can scarcely be said to have entered South-Carolina at all! His progress was confined to a march along the the sea-coast, not so far from his flotilla but that he might have reached it at any moment, with a few hours' effort, and through a region of swamp country, penetrated by creeks and water-courses, arms of the sea, occupied by but few white inhabitants, covered with unbroken and dense thickets, through which, with moderate skill and caution, he might at any time make his way, without waking up the country at all. Moultrie, with one-third of his force, and

those badly armed militia, could only harass and retard, and not prevent his march. The two armies had sundry skirmishes, in which the Carolinians showed no supineness. Moultrie regained the city, and prepared for defence, having no force but the militia and the citizens. Negotiations were opened, and, to gain time for the arrival of Governor Rutledge and General Lincoln, from the interior, were gravely deliberated upon. Had the city been taken, there would have been nothing to surprise, and the reproach would have lain only at the door of the continental general, who, with the regular forces of the country, had rambled off into the backwoods of Georgia, as if purposely to invite the bold enterprise of the British commander. The reduction of the city, the year following, was far less easily effected than that of Philadelphia, New-York, and other places; while the inequalities of force were even greater. We could take up, sentence by sentence, this summary of our author, and show its equal injustice to the zeal, the republicanism and the courage of South-Carolina, but that our space and leisure do not allow. We trust that we have suggested clues enough for the reëxamination of the whole history. Summed up in brief, South-Carolina had shown a zeal and spirit which provoked the British government to extreme hostility; the more particularly because her republicanism was regarded as ingratitude, she having been a favourite of the British crown. Her strength, as we have said, bore no proportion to her spirit. Her numerical force was lessened by the Scotch, German and Quaker settlements of the interior, all of which were loyalist. Her enemies were particularly strong in consequence of her propinquity to Florida, *which colony had become the harbouring place for the refugee tories from all the States*. These must not be assumed as any portion of her population; yet these poured into South-Carolina, in hordes, the moment that the regular forces of Great Britain,

within the State, were sufficient to give them security. To these, South-Carolina had not the physical strength to offer opposition; but the moment that these bands became scattered—the moment that one-half of the British regular troops had been withdrawn—we find the native partizans every where in activity, and such partisans as they could array in no other region. But we will not dwell on a history which the people of the country have by heart, and cherish in their heart of hearts. South-Carolina cannot be deprived of her battle-fields, and the great domestic names which have helped to hallow them. Our author, in the rest of his summary, shows how glad he is to honour them, and to this portion of his summary, though still marked by erroneous premises and assumptions, we care not to object. We shall have occasion, in other pages, to discuss several of his suggested topics, and show how grievously they have been misunderstood and misrepresented. For the present, we must pause. The reader will understand us, as joining issue with our author in a friendly spirit, and with no purpose to impute to him a single injustice, or wilful or unkind assumption. He is one of our favourites, whom we hold in great respect as an author, and in great regard as a man. His book, we cordially commend, as truthful in its spirit, and lively and attractive in its interest. Our dissent from some of its details must not be construed into any disposition to decry its genuine claims, or to detract, in any wise, from its real merits.

III.

WE endeavoured, in the last number of this periodical, to discuss the claims of South-Carolina and New England, on the score of their separate services in the war of the revolution; aiming rather to correct existing errors in our popular histories, and suggest proper clues to future historians, than to occupy the attention of the reader with our own narrative. The limits of a journal such as ours, naturally forbade the free employment of detail; and our end was answered, if we put it in the power of the reader to find the way himself, to the acquisition of the truth. But we reserved to ourselves one topic in this great history, for which the possession of a considerable body of unpublished, and hitherto inedited material, seemed to furnish a sufficient sanction to our purpose of detaining the attention of the reader, by a copious array of facts. This topic was the final leaguer of Charleston, in which it fell into the hands of the enemy. We have seen how Mr. Lorenzo Sabine discusses and dismisses the subject. It will be for ourselves to provide the reader with authorities at once less diseased by prejudice, and more conclusive as teachers. In general terms, we indicated the difficulties and disabilities under which South-Carolina laboured at this juncture. We showed that the assailants drew nigh to her fortresses, when it was least in her power to rally to their defence. We showed the two formidable previous attempts which had been made, in separate periods, to effect her overthrow, and with what manly spirit, vigour and success, she had, almost single-handed, encountered the invader, and

driven him back from her territory. But in the fall of Georgia, by which South-Carolina became a frontier,—and in her feeble but frequent attempts to succour and to save her still feebler sister,—we have shown how she crippled her own strength, and impaired those resources upon which, in the day of her danger, her only reliance could be placed. The assault upon Savannah, by the combined troops of Lincoln and D’Estaing, in which the Carolina troops were the most successful and the most to suffer : and the unfortunate surprise, by which the brigade of General Ashe was cut to pieces, left her with a native force quite too inadequate for the encounter with that powerful array, with which, on the third occasion, the British generals prepared themselves for the work of conquest. With diminished squadrons, with disease of an infectious character prevailing within her chief city, with a valueless currency, and deeply in debt, South-Carolina was less capable of resisting the assault at this juncture, than upon any previous occasion. Her resources had been exhausted by nearly four years of conflict. Her frontier lay open to the tory and the savage, already active under the influence of British gold ; her ports were accessible, without obstruction, from the sea, in every but a single quarter. Georgia, overrun by the enemy, and completely in his power, was a sufficient *point d’appui* for the British operations against her ; while her proximity to the British West India Islands rendered it easy to accumulate, with great rapidity, upon her coasts, their most powerful armaments. Her wealth was a lure to the cupidity of the enemy ; while the foreign population within her limits—a very numerous proportion of her people—furnished an ally to the assailants, within her walls, which suggested an ever-present necessity to watch and fear. There were special reasons why the British should concentrate all their powers for her overthrow. Twice had they been

beaten from her walls, in one instance with circumstances of the most bitter humiliation; and they could not but regard the movement of this province—taking part in a revolution in which her grievances, if equal in degree, were of a very different sort from those of which the Northern colonies complained—as ungrateful and unnatural. There was much in the argument, which urged against South-Carolina her indebtedness to the care and kindness of Great Britain, and her alliance with communities, which, at best, only aimed to occupy, in relation to herself, the position which the mother country had, with much more propriety and reason, maintained before. To punish South-Carolina for her alleged ingratitude, was, from the beginning, one of the leading motives to the special attempts upon her chief city by the forces of the enemy. Her weakness and wealth equally invited the effort now; and never did Britain, through her generals in America, prepare a more formidable and select armament for the prosecution of her objects, than that which, towards the close of the year 1799, she assembled for the siege of Charleston in the harbour of New-York. The troops detailed for this service consisted of twelve regiments, four flank battalions, a large detachment of artillery, combining the material for an immense siege and battering train, and a force of some three hundred horse. To these, during the progress of the siege, reinforcements brought considerable increase, making the assailing army to consist of something like twelve thousand men. To this force, add that of a fleet of some fifty sail of vessels of all classes, ranging from the sloop to the man-of-war, and you have an array, the very enumeration of which—as opposed to that of a little city upon the Atlantic, such as Charleston must have been in the days of the revolution—seems to preclude all idea of resistance. Yet, resistance had been determined upon, without material, without money,

without provisions, without credit, without men enough to man the works—with pestilence within the walls—no succour from without, and in spite of the almost total disregard of Congress, (under the great powers of New England absorption,) from whom neither men, nor money, nor munitions, were to be acquired. The bare statement of the fact is conclusive of the spirit and patriotism of those to whom the keeping of the State had been confided, and entirely refutes the unjust and ungenerous insinuations that the Carolinians shrunk from the defence of their chief city. But this matter has been sufficiently considered in preceding pages.

The royal army destined for the reduction of Charleston was embarked in the fleet of Admiral Arbuthnot, in December, 1799. The departure had been delayed until the French fleet of D'Estaing had disappeared from the Southern coasts. The passage was a long and tedious one. Touching at Savannah for refreshments, they sailed for North Edisto, and, landing about thirty miles from Charleston, made their approaches gradually, taking possession of the several islands which lay between, and, finally, of James Island and Wappoo Cut. On the approach of this fleet and army, the Assembly of South-Carolina, which was then in session, delegated the most ample powers to John Rutledge, the Governor, and such of his Council as he could conveniently consult in exigency, by which he was authorized "to do every thing necessary for the public good"—in other words, in the old Roman phrase, to see "that the republic sustained no harm." Rutledge, thus armed, proceeded with due energy to the business of defence. But his means and appliances were wretchedly few and feeble. The South-Carolina continentals had, in the three years of the war already passed, been reduced from six regiments of twenty-four hundred, to but little more than a regiment of one-third that number. The force obtained from

Congress consisted of fifteen hundred Virginia and North-Carolina continentals, and four small vessels of war, under Commodore Whipple. The only hope was in the citizens of the place besieged, and the country militia. The force might be three thousand, all told, of whom most of the British subjects were secretly friendly to the invader, and proved of great service to him during the progress of the siege; and the country militia were not to be persuaded to the defence of a beleaguered city, from which there was no escape, and within whose walls a pestilence was said to rage, of which they had always entertained a feeling of the profoundest fear and horror. An attempt was made to negotiate for succours with the Governor of Havana, but it failed; and, according to Ramsay, had Sir Henry Clinton pushed forward boldly with a force so overwhelming as that under his command, he might have possessed himself of the place in four days after he approached it. But Sir Henry was one of the cautious captains of the old school, lacking—as did most of the military men of that period, as well British as American—of that first of all soldierly virtues, an active military enterprise. The age was a fighting one, unquestionably, but its military genius was not remarkable. There was no fit successor to Eugene and Marlborough. Certain, Sir Henry Clinton was not a representative of any, the least of the endowments of these great men. He felt, rather than forced his way; and was content to make himself sure by perseverance, rather than achieve the same results by bold and brilliant adventure.

We now propose to supersede our own as well as the narratives of the regular historians, by the details afforded by our several journalists, to whom reference has been already made in the list of authorities which form the caption of this article. The first of these from whom we propose to draw, is Monsieur De Brahm, of whom we know little, but who has

been described as a man of science, and is supposed to have been an assistant engineer, a Frenchman, employed in the city during the siege. His first date, that of Feb. 9, 1780, mentions the arrival of the English fleet in Stono Inlet.

"Feb. 9. The alarm was fired in Charleston. Feb. 10. The (British) troops landed." [*De Brahm.*]

"Feb. 12. Heard that between forty and fifty sail of the enemy's ships came in yesterday at North Edisto Inlet, and were landed in force upon John's Island." [*Gen. McIntosh's Journals, &c.*]

• "Feb. 14. Heard the enemy landed some light troops at Stono—that our light horse were ordered, and upon their march from Sheldon, (our infantry stationed there having passed some days ago.)" [*Gen. McIntosh.*]

"Feb. 22. Bacon's Bridge. I did not write you sooner, as I waited for the return of a party of horse that had gone out towards the enemy's lines to Stono. . . . Major Jameson informs me he was within view of the sentries of their picquets posted at the cross roads. . . . He believes there are not so many at Stono as when they first took post there, that some of them are returned to John's Island. I have not one militia man doing duty here. . . . They are patrolling in their different districts. They declare against going into town. . . . are afraid of the small pox breaking out when they are cooped, which they say will be worse to them than the enemy. . . . The rains have filled our rivers and swamps so much, that it is almost impossible for the enemy to drag their cannon and artillery stores along. I think they cannot pass this way. . . . We have a detachment of horse constantly waiting on their motions." [*Moultrie to Lincoln.*]

"Feb. 23. Major Maham and Capt. Sanders, with a party of horse, took Capt. McDonald and eight privates yesterday near their picquet. . . . We are much in want of ammunition—the people about the country have none." [*Moultrie to Lincoln.*]

"The returns made me this day of the troops under my command at Bacon's Bridge, were, cavalry of all ranks, 379, and the infantry under Col. Marion, 227—total, 606. My

being so strong in cavalry, kept the enemy pretty close to their lines." [*Moultrie.*]

"Feb. 25. Reconnoitered the enemy on James and John's Islands; we proceeded to Wappoo Cut, from whence we had a good view of their whole encampment; their left on Stono river, extending their right along the ditch near Wappoo creek, which I take to be a quarter of a mile: by the stacks of arms and number of men moving about, I judge them to be about 1,000 or 1,200 British and Hessians. In Stono river I saw three galleys, three schooners and some small boats. . . . One galley lay at the mouth of Wappoo, one at Fenwicke's lower landing. They have thrown up a work near 'the Cut.' I was informed that 90 flat bottomed boats and canoes went down Stono, towards 'the Cut,' a few days ago." [*Moultrie to Lincoln.*]

"Feb. 26. There are, as yet, no militia at this post. They refuse to go into the town on account of the small pox. I most earnestly request you will order me some ammunition; as not only the militia want it, but Major Vernier reports to me that he has not more than four rounds to a man." [*Moultrie to Lincoln.*]

"Feb. 28. The enemy are opening the ground near Fort Johnson. I expect our ships will disturb them before night." [*Lincoln to Moultrie.*]

"Feb. 29. Our garrison is at present so weak that I shall be obliged to send for the light troops the moment that you have a hundred or two of the militia to join you." [*Lincoln to Moultrie.*]

"1st March. Gen. Moultrie writes that the enemy are preparing to withdraw from Stono, and collect their principal force on James Island. This I can hardly persuade myself to believe; neither can I account for their conduct hitherto, on any other principle than that which I mentioned before you left town." [*Col. John Laurens.*]

"1st March. Bacon's Bridge. The enemy have crossed Wappoo, and are approaching this way. Our horse are retreating towards us." [*Philip Neyle to Lincoln*]

"4th March. Charleston. Last night we were alarmed by a fire in Tradd street. The troops turned out with great alacrity, and the fire was soon extinguished. It is said the

enemy are erecting a bomb battery. One of these nights, I suppose, they will give us a salute." [*John Lewis Gervais.*]

"4th March. Charleston. At half after six this morning, one of the enemy's frigates sailed close in with the ship's channel, and fired, at long intervals, about ten shot at one of our galleys stationed in that quarter, but as she fired at extreme range and without probability of effect, the American officer did not condescend to return the compliment. The brigs *Notre Dame* and *Gen. Lincoln* lie nearer in shore to support the galley, and co-operate with her in preventing the enemy's boats from sounding. After the frigate had passed, a 50 gun ship, preceded by a pilot boat, ranged the bar in the same manner, but did not fire. The enemy's ships then spoke each other, and stood for Stono. The fatigue men at Fort Johnson are now employed in transporting logs and plank from the ruins to a spot two or three hundred yards in the rear. A ship, a brig, and a fleet of small craft, such as schooners, entered Stono the 2d instant. They probably were charged with provisions and stores. Mr. Timothy says he cannot discern whether the enemy's three galleys are in Wappoo Cut. Our horse officers say they are. A deserter from the 7th British regiment, who left the post at Stono three days since, says that the enemy's principal force is on James Island—that two brigades, consisting of the 7th, 23d, 33d, and the Hessian Jagers, remain on John's Island—that there are no more than 40 men in each redoubt at Stono—that great discontent prevailed in his regiment, and he thinks there will be great desertions, whenever they are less encircled with wet ditches. Last night, a little before 10 o'clock, a fire broke out in an old workshop in Mr. Warham's yard, Tradd street. It raged furiously for a short time, but was happily extinguished and prevented from spreading, by the activity of the Charleston militia. It was an inexpressible satisfaction to me, to see the troops paraded at their alarm posts, with so much rapidity and order. The North-Carolina militia brigade, which I had an opportunity particularly of seeing at the commencement of the alarm, as I was ordered to conduct one-half of them to supply the place of the town militia on the lines, paraded and marched in full numbers with an alacrity which at once astonished and delighted me. Gen. Hogan's

continentals discovered the alertness and steadiness of veterans, and seemed to rejoice that they had arrived in the nick of time. The troops generally regarded the conflagration as the effect of design, and expected a serious attack. A scattering fire of musketry from a few inexperienced sentinels, and a few shot from the Queen of France, which probably were directed at spectators on the James Island shore, confirmed them for a time in this opinion. However, the fire, which appears to have been accidental, was happily subdued; and our troops, after remaining a proper time in order of battle at their alarm posts, were ordered to quarters. The Queen of France illuminated fore and aft her gun deck, and, prepared for action, presented a very pretty spectacle on the water. Our fatigue parties are employed in completing the horn work, in erecting some new batteries on the south-west face of the town, and in taking off the surface of the marsh, for a proper width, from right to left on that front. Boats with a proper foundation of earth and bricks a-midships, for tar barrels, &c., are anchored at a proper distance from the shore and each other; having combustibles on board to be fired at the enemy's approach in a dark night. Every individual seems to be inspired with confidence by the preparations which are making for our defence, and this contributes greatly to success." [*Col. John Laurens.*]

"March 7. Bacon's Bridge. By accounts from Major Vernier and a prisoner taken this morning, the enemy crossed Wappoo last night at 8 o'clock, with 1,000 grenadiers and light infantry. The last accounts we have of them, they were about three miles from Ashley Ferry." [*Philip Neyle to Lincoln.*]

"March 8 and 9. Seven vessels were sunk near the mouth of Cooper river, and cables fixed from one to the other, to prevent the entrance of this river." [*De Brahm.*]

"March 10. We had gathered a number of cattle about Ashley river, some say 500 head, four or five days ago; the enemy heard of it, crossed Wappoo with about one thousand men, took most of the cattle, the drivers, and five or six militia men. They were at Mr. Legg's, at the ferry house, and surprised Thomas Farr and Mr. Loyd at breakfast, and carried them off with Farr's son, a little boy. It is said they

made Mr. Farr drive the cattle, saying, 'keep up, Mr. Speaker.' Mr. Abraham Ladson was also taken prisoner. . . . The gallees and vessels of force that lay in Ashley river, are gone this morning to reinforce the Commodore near Fort Moultrie. The wind is westerly and the tide low. The river is bare of armed vessels now. Our works are more perfect. We are now working on 'the Bay.' We hear nothing of the Virginia Line. . . . Col. Thomson is forming a camp near Orangeburg, to put a stop to plunderers. . . . When the enemy retreated with their booty, (the cattle,) our horse took eight prisoners." [*J. L. Gervais.*]

Our next extract is from a letter of Peter Timothy, the editor of the Whig newspaper in Charleston at the time. His observations were usually made from the steeple of St. Michael's. He writes to Henry Laurens, and just as he sees.

"10th March. The 7 men-of-war off the bar have not moved. The springs (tides) are over. The ship on the bar, (very small,) a small sloop and galley remain there. . . The enemy laid buoys and erected landmarks yesterday afternoon. . . . A frigate and a 20 (gun) have chased a brig to-day—but she is of their kidney. . . . A two decker is coming up from Stono. . . . Another still lies at anchor there. . . . A fleet is come out of North Edisto. I reckon 20 sail, all square rigged and large. There may be more. All our armed vessels are collecting in the road. . . . The enemy have no cannon yet mounted on their new works. . . . A galley and a brig are going down channel to see after the buoys, &c. . . . Head-quarters are at Hutson's. About 20 sail of vessels are there. A schooner is come to the fleet from Stono. . . . Besides the men-of-war off the bar, there are three large transports which have lightened the respective two deckers to which they were assigned. . . . Believe some land forces will go on board our armed ships."

Our armed vessels consisted of the Bricole, 44, the Providence and Boston, each of 32 guns, the Queen of France, 38, L'Aventure and Truite, each 26, Ranger and brig Lincoln,

each of 20, and the Notre Dame of 16. They were commanded by Commodore Whipple.

“10th March. I was on board the ‘Providence’ yesterday, where I was posted with a few marines, as the enemy were making dispositions with their fleet for passing the bar. Ten sail anchored the day before yesterday in a position for embracing the first favourable opportunity to enter. Three appear to be two deckers. According to Mr. Timothy, they had their yards *à pic*, and three transports were employed in lightening them. The rest were frigates. Yesterday the wind was favourable for entering. The sea was very placid, and upon a signal given, the whole unmoored and came to sail; but, whether the wind was too light, or they did not choose to venture, as the height of the springs (tides) was past, I can’t determine, but they came-to, after a little manœuvring. They had, in the meantime, found means to establish a large white buoy on the bar. The galley was towing down to interrupt them—the boats of the fleet, (American,) a gun-boat, &c., were ordered down to cut away all clear; but a reinforcement of two galleys and a large ship appeared from the southward, and all the boats of the enemy’s fleet seemed to be in motion. Evening came on and put an end to further operations. Our Commodore (Whipple) will now have a reinforcement of ships and galleys, as the enemy’s present design seems to be to penetrate by the harbour. This morning the wind is westerly, and I think there is but little prospect of the enemy’s getting over the bar. If they do, they will probably meet with a second edition of Sir Peter Parker’s adventures, with large additions and improvements. I am bound to my station, and am obliged to scribble in the greatest hurry. Col. Gervais will inform you of the enemy’s foraging party and the capture of our speaker.” [*Col. John Laurens.*]

“11th March. Heard cannon all this day, as we rid along the road, which makes us impatient. [Heard] that Gen. Moultrie, who commanded the horse at Bacon’s Bridge, was taken sick, and Gen. Huger sent to take command in his room. It consisted of Bland’s, Baylie’s, Pulaski’s and Horry’s

corps, with some volunteers—altogether about 250. Came to Charleston in the evening, and put up at Mrs. Minis's, though disagreeable on account of some British persons quartered at her house. Hogan's brigade arrived in town 3d inst." [*Journal of Gen. McIntosh, &c.*]

The complaint from which Moultrie suffered, was the gout—a not unmilitary disorder, since it never suffers a soldier to run.

"12th March. Found the enemy had possession of James Island, since the latter end of February, and were now erecting a work upon Bunker Hill, behind Fort Johnson. We saw their fleet, transports, store-ships, merchantmen, &c., in Stono river, Wappoo Cut, from Ferguson's house, in Tradd street; and some men-of-war over the bar. Our horse skirmished near Ashley Ferry." [*McIntosh's Journal.*]

Tarleton writes :

"The army immediately took possession of John's Island and Stono Ferry. James Island, Perronneau's landing, Wappoo Cut, and other adjacent places were soon after obtained; and by a bridge thrown over the canal, the necessary communications were secured, and the advanced part of the King's army occupied the bank of Ashley river, opposite to Charleston."

"13th March. The enemy took possession of the land on Ashley river opposite the town, constructed a battery near the mouth of Wappoo, on the prolongation of Tradd street." [*De Brahm.*]

"13th March. The enemy burnt Fenwicke's house on Wappoo Neck, (made a pest house for the small-pox,) and erected a battery of three or four (six) heavy cannon—distance — yards from the town. I was ordered to take the command of the South-Carolina country militia." [*McIntosh.*]

"13th March. Yesterday morning presented to our view an astonishing instance of the enemy's industry and labour, in a battery with five embrasures at the western point of Wappoo, close by Fenwicke's landing, which in no shape could be said to exist at sunset the preceding evening. A

galley stationed there discovered them a little after sunrise, and by firing some ineffectual shot hastened the mounting of a brass 32 pounder. The Notre Dame and Batard (?) galley soon after came up the river. The latter fired several shots, and had them returned, and with the same effect—which is none. Our Lady (Notre Dame) however, fared worse; four shot being fired at her, one of which riddled her in the fore-chains, which occasioned her to cut and run. All our vessels are since come down. The Queen of France and Truite had been three days before sent down to the road to strengthen the line of battle. The enemy's shipping are anchored close to the ship channel. One of the two deckers is getting her guns taken out; so that, in all probability, we shall have it hot enough next springs, (tides,) which begin on Friday or Saturday." [*Thomas Wells, Jun., to Henry Laurens.*]

We extract from a journal of Timothy, comprised in a letter to Henry Laurens.

"13th March. In my last I acquainted you that I saw a fleet of transports coming out of Edisto. The same day 19 ships and 1 brig of that fleet entered Stono, (without troops,) most of which are now behind Hutson's house. Two other ships, with a brig, a schooner, and a sloop of the same fleet, came to the fleet off our bar. Yesterday, 4 more ships came out of Edisto, 3 of which anchored off Stono, and the 4th came off the bar; where the fleet now consists of 3 two deckers, 2 frigates, 2 20 gun ships, the Germaine, a galley, a small sloop, and six transport-cats, which serve as lighters to the two deckers. At Hutson's there are 35 sail, of which 15 are ships and 4 brigs. Besides, there must be about 15 other square-rigged vessels in different parts of Stono river. Friday, (as I suspected, the day before, the movement of a body,) about noon, a considerable number of the enemy appeared at Lining's plantation at Wappoo. In the afternoon they had a camp all the way from the back of Hervey's. Sunday morning, by daylight, they had a battery at Wappoo, with six embrasures facing our westward works. By 7 o'clock, they had a heavy cannon mounted. The Lee and Bretigny gallies being placed in that quarter the day before, they fired upon the work, but it was wasting ammunition. By the 11th,

the Notre Dame having got up also, the enemy fired at her—the fourth shot hit and went through her; the 3d fell into the marsh, between Cumming's and the hospital, was taken up, and weighed 32 lbs. The 5th fell near the sugar house. The Notre Dame was obliged to remove; the galleys followed in the afternoon, and one of them was fired at. This was yesterday afternoon, 4 o'clock. Immediately after, upwards of 200 pioneers went to work, uncovered, completed that face of the battery, and an entrenchment northerly of it. They also laid abatis round the lines at Hutson's. This afternoon, the generals, &c., visited the battery (Sir Henry there.) This morning (13th) I saw them relieve their guards, when 100 marched away towards Hervey's. At 9, 250 went from the battery on fatigue duty; they have been all day employed in fetching pickets at some distance, with which they are enclosing the back of the battery. They are giving it extension by a face to the creek. (They began to work as soon as our gallies came off yesterday.) There has been a grand cavalcade of generals, &c., at Wappoo. They staid some hours on the end of the wharf, till a cutter came down, surveyed and sounded the mouth, and found it unobstructed, when they all went off with an appearance of satisfaction which their countenances did not indicate before. James Simpson, Esq., was among them (?). [*Timothy.*]

"14th March. The British fleet has probably renounced the idea of passing the bar till the next spring tides. They continue in their stations. The enemy's operations on the land side plainly indicate their intention to carry on a siege in form. In the course of the night of the eleventh, they erected a battery with six embrasures, near the mouth of Wappoo Cut, and mounted a twenty-four pounder the next day. They fired it, to try the range, and the shot dropt at the edge of the bank at Cumming's Point. Our gallies interrupted their work on the 12th, by firing now and then. The Notre Dame, by a mistake of orders, and ignorant of her danger, sailed up Ashley river, and anchored directly opposite to the battery. The enemy fired several well-directed shot at her—the last struck her upper works, but luckily did no material damage, and missed the crew. Upon this, the captain took the hint to change his station. The enemy's transports

from North Edisto are all anchored in Stono river. Sir Henry Clinton's plan seems to be to establish his place of arms and magazines at Wappoo, and either force the passes of Ashley river, or avoid them by making a circuitous march by way of or above Bacon's Bridge. We continue to strengthen our works and prepare for his approaches. The garrison of Fort Moultrie and a number of negroes are employed in improving that post, and the Commodore is contriving an obstacle which will delay the passage of the enemy's ships, and subject them to such a cross fire as I hope they will not survive." [*Col. John Laurens.*]

"14th March. The enemy erected another battery of two heavy cannon, south side of Ashley river, about Hervey's, above the other, and a bomb battery upon a rising ground between the two gun batteries. The latter never played." [*McIntosh.*]

"15th March. A colonel's command, kept for some time at Ashley ferry, this side, were withdrawn this day, and marched down to Gibbs's, about one and a half miles from our lines, where we had a picquet before. Only 25 men, for a look out, left at the ferry." [*McIntosh.*]

"16th March. The light infantry of Hogan's brigade ordered to relieve the command at Gibbs's. Twelve sail of shipping seen off the bar." [*McIntosh.*]

"17th March. My family, servants, horses, &c., were moved yesterday to new quarters, Mr. Lowndes's house, where Gen. Hogan lodged, near Ferguson's; and early this morning went to it myself." [*McIntosh.*]

"18th March. The enemy's ships off the bar disappeared—being stormy last night." [*McIntosh.*]

"18th March. Charleston. I am happy to say that to this day we may still convey letters to you. The enemy have made but little progress since you left us. They are still fortifying themselves at James Island. They have withdrawn their post at Stono, and levelled their works at that place. Our horse keeps still at or near Bacon's Bridge. Their fleet is still off the bar, waiting, I suppose, for the spring tide to-morrow or next day. This day has been rainy, and this evening the wind is inclined to north-west; but should they come in, I still think chances are in our favour. Their fleet

consists of the *Raisable*, of 64 guns, (which they don't mean to bring in,) the *Renown*, of 50; the *Roebuck*, of 44; Captain Hammond and Admiral Arbuthnot on board the *Blonde* of 32; the *Perseus* of 28, and another of 20. It is said the *Raleigh* joined them yesterday. Now, I think our vessels, supported by Fort Moultrie, are more than equal. We have the two continental vessels, the *Truite*, the *Bricole* and the *Adventure*, besides four galleys; for they have all left Ashley river, which is defended by two batteries at Coming's Point, one of which mounts three 26 pounders and 4 eighteens. Yesterday, the enemy were at work near Old Town, and we at Coming's Point. The forts upon the bay are nearly finished. Col. Cambray goes on briskly at Fort Moultrie making a glacis. A few militia are coming in. Col. Garden brought in 100 two days ago. But the enemy have crossed a body of three or four hundred men from Georgia, at the Two Sisters, and some horse from Port Royal, which, it is said, are at Sheldon. I suppose they are three regiments of new levies which were left at Ebenezer. The 7th inst., Gen. Williamson was encamped near Augusta. With the Georgia militia, he may have some 7 or 800 men. After he hears of the enemy's movement from Ebenezer, I make no doubt he will move after them. The Tories are partly routed. Several have been brought to gaol. Yesterday, their Col. Anderson was brought in by one Captain Richards, who took him near the Salkehatchie, with four of my negroes. They are all six now in the hands of our friends. Col. Pickens has been down with a party of horse scouring the country. Balentine, who attempted to go over to the enemy, was hanged last Thursday. Anderson, I expect, will follow. A special court is appointed for the trial. We are still hoping for the Virginia line. Sometimes they are near, sometimes at a distance. As for General Scott, I believe he never will come." [*J Lewis Gervais to H. Laurens.*]

"19th March. The enemy's ships appeared again off the bar, being fine weather." [*McIntosh.*]

"20th March. This morning, the enemy's ships (seven of them) got over our bar, and are now in Five Fathom Hole. Perhaps they may begin their attack to-morrow. I hope we shall give a good account of them. The enemy (land forces)

still remain at Wappoo. We hear they are to march to-day this way." [*Moultrie.*]

"20th March. This morning, the enemy's shipping (men-of-war) came over the bar. Eight, from 20 to 50 guns." [*McIntosh.*]

"20th March. The crisis of our fate approaches pretty near. . . . This morning, soon after five, signals were made. At six, the admiral's flag was shifted to the *Kaisonable*, and all the men-of-war, except the now admiral's ship, loosed their topsails. They were all under way in five minutes; and at half past seven every one safe anchored within the bar, without meeting the least accident. Since that, five of the transports, which have the heavy ship's cannon on board, and an armed brig, are come in, and some of the lighters are alongside of the *Renown* and *Roebuck*. After these, another frigate came in from sea, and anchored near the admiral. These, too, I suppose, will come in with to-morrow morning's tide. I am sorry that the buoys and landmarks were not cut away when in our power. I am sorry, also, that our opposition was not made at the entrance of the bay, where the large ships entered divested of our (their) guns. I dare say, if a French fleet should appear off our bar, the English would make [at this point] their principal opposition. But I believe it is not the lot of many naval officers to alter any plan they have formed, to adapt it to occasional circumstances!" [*Peter Timothy.*]

The hit here was at Commodore Whipple, who seems to have been entirely incompetent to the occasion.

"21st March. The English fleet passed the bar, and anchored in Five Fathom Hole." [*De Brahm.*]

"Our ships, the *Providence* of 30, the *Boston* 32, the *Queen of France* 18, the *Ranger* 20 guns, continentals; with — 24, the *Polacre* — guns, French, and the *Bricole*, (a state ship of 28 guns,) were stationed near Fort Moultrie with two armed brigs, to intercept the British fleet there; but this day were ordered, and came up to Charlestown, in order to take their guns and sailors for our batteries, as also the galleys, and to sink some of them in the channel of Cooper river, before the town." [*McIntosh.*]

"21st March. The enemy have got in ten of their men-of-war, one of 52, two of 44. and seven frigates and 20 gun-ships. We have seven ships and three galleys to oppose them. If they will lay any time before the fort, I will engage we beat them." [*Moultrie.*]

"22d March. Very busy landing the cannon, &c., from the shipping, making traverses, &c. Fine weather." [*McIntosh.*]

"22d March All our ships and gallies are ordered up to town, their guns taken out, placed in the batteries, and manned by the sailors; by which means we have a reinforcement on shore of 1,200 men, which adds greatly to our strength. We are to sink some ships, to stop the channel from the Exchange over to the marsh. . . . Commodore Whipple did not choose to risk an engagement with the British fleet. I think he was right in the first instance, when stationed just within the bar to prevent the British fleet from coming over, as that was a dangerous place; but his second position, when he was to lay a little above Fort Moultrie, within point blank shot of the fort, with his ships across to rake the channel—in that situation it would have been impossible for them to pass without losing some of their ships. I scarcely think they would have attempted it." [*Moultrie.*]

Our next quotation, of the same date with the preceding, is from an anonymous correspondent. His letters appear, unsigned, among the manuscripts of Henry Laurens. We detach only such portions as relate to the facts before us.

"On 22d March, Monday, the enemy got all their shipping over the bar, and this evening we expect they will pass Fort Moultrie, and make a very heavy attack upon the town in conjunction with their land forces from James Island. Yesterday our four continental frigates, with some armed vessels belonging to this State, (having had previously their station under the guns of Fort Moultrie) came up to town, in order, it is said, to place their guns and men in the batteries on the Bay, having discovered that they could not possibly withstand the enemy's naval force. The acquisition of their guns and men will be very great. I apprehend our ships will retreat up

Cooper river. Our troops are in high spirits, but the great misfortune is that we have too few of them. The Virginia Line, which we have so long expected, have not yet made their appearance, and I am much afraid they will come too late. Col. John Laurens, who, while our ships lay at Sullivan's Island, had the command of the marines, is now stationed with his men in a battery near Fort Moultrie, where he is determined to give the British troops the first salute, and where I expect to join him to-morrow as a volunteer. As soon as the enemy passes the fort we shall proceed up to town, as the principal and only opposition will be made here, there being no retreat for us if the enemy should succeed." [*Anonymous.*]

"March 22d. Charleston. You guessed right. The shipping of the enemy got over the bar on Monday morning in part, and in the evening the remainder; one of them a 64 gun ship. This was not expected. It is a little surprising that we should have been in possession of this country a century, and at this day only know that a vessel of such a draft of water could come in, after destroying the beacons and blackening the church.* This success of the enemy made it necessary to adopt different plans. The shipping have left their station near Fort Moultrie, and is come to town yesterday evening. The guns are taking out to be placed in the batteries, to be worked by the seamen; this gives us an addition of eleven or twelve hundred men. Several hundreds of the North-Carolinian's time is out in three or four days. Propositions have been made to them of a large bounty, and the greater part have agreed to stay three months longer. A battery is erecting near Liberty Tree, at the old Indian fort, which will command Town Creek, and it is said the Bricole is to be sunk in it—if the enemy leaves us time to do it. Traverses are making to cover our lines from the fire of the shipping. In a few days, perhaps to-morrow morning, the matter will be very serious. Fort Moultrie, if they stop there, I make no doubt

* St. Michael's steeple, which had been always employed as a beacon. It was blackened when the British fleet appeared, but the British alleged that the black made it more conspicuous than ever as a beacon.

will make a valiant defence. Col. Laurens, I am told, came up last night, and is gone to Fort Moultrie this morning.”
[*John Lewis Gervais.*]

“23d March. The same as yesterday, at work ; and the enemy busy at their works, south side Ashley river. Very cold, windy, rainy, and stormy. Gallies came through Wap-poo Cut. One sub., one serjeant one corporal, and twenty-five privates, ordered to relieve Ashley ferry, last time.”
[*McIntosh.*]

“About the middle of March,” says Tarleton, “Gen. Patterson crossed the Savannah river, and on his march towards the Combahee, through swamps and difficult passes, had frequent skirmishes with the militia of the country.”

“23d March. In the afternoon (Tuesday) the shipping came up to town, Col. Laurens on board, for the purpose, as is said, of placing their men and guns in the batteries ; and in the evening Col. Ternant arrived. . . . Col. Ternant seems to be of opinion that, if we are tolerably active, the enemy will find it a very tedious affair to subdue this town.”
[*Moses Young to H. Laurens.*]

Col. Ternant had been despatched to Havana with the hope of obtaining assistance for the defence of Charleston. We have before us a copy of his letter to Lincoln, informing him of the cause which rendered his mission fruitless. It is dated March 23, 1780.

“23d March. General Lillington, with his North Carolina militia, all went home, except about one hundred and seventy volunteers of them, who agreed to stay under the command of Col. Lytle. Major Habersham appointed their major. Cold, clear weather.” [*McIntosh.*]

“24th March. Charleston. The absolute impracticability of our shipping being adequate to the defence of the channel between Sullivan’s and Morris’s Islands, has produced a reinforcement of 150 pieces of artillery, and 1,100 seamen to the garrison. With these additions, we are at least 4,500 strong exclusive of negro labourers and assistants to the artillery, which make full 1,000 more. About 500 of these may be at

Fort Moultrie. Allowing that three or four hundred of the North-Carolina militia should go, I am very confident our force will considerably exceed 4,000. The lines of Savannah were not so strong, and pretty nearly as extensive as ours, and we have fully double their number to defend our works. We have in town about 250 pieces of artillery, of different bores, and abundance of ammunition. Should that run scarce, the enemy will, in some degree, assist us with theirs. That is to say we can return them. We have a prospect of a reinforcement of 1,200 veterans of the Virginia Line being here in ten days, who, even if we should at that time be blockaded, may as effectually assist us as if they were within the lines. These considerations give ample room for expectations of a glorious and successful defence. . . . In a situation like ours, we are apt to form conjectures of future operations on the part of the enemy. Take the trouble, then, to attend to some of mine. Their force on the south of Ashley river I apprehend is about 5,000 men. The corps under the command of Brigadier-General Patterson, from Georgia, consists of the 71st, a battalion of Hessians, the South-Carolina, North-Carolina, and Georgia loyalists, perhaps amounting in the whole to 1,000 or 1,200 men. We will estimate their whole effective land force at 6,000 men. Their shipping inside of our bar is the *Renown* 50, *Roebuck* 44, *Romulus* 44, *Blonde* 36, *Raleigh* 32, three other frigates of 28, with the *Camilla* and *Perseus* 20 gun ships. These, with two galleys and some attending store-ships or transports are just now in Five Fathom Hole. About forty sail of transports are now in Stono river. Two galleys, one of them the *Congress*, taken in Georgia, are now in the mouth of Wappoo Creek, within pistol shot of Ashley river. The crews of the ten men-of-war and four galleys I think may be 3,000 men; to which you may add a few hundred that may be drawn from the transports to assist in the batteries. We will then estimate their whole efficient numbers at 9,000. Their works on James Island and the Main will require all the sailors they can get from the transports and near 1,000 of their land forces; 5,000 of the latter are to be detached for other services. What these are to be, must claim our attention. Some movements took place yesterday, and signal guns were fired last night. A party of light infan-

try were yesterday forenoon at the Church (?) Bridge, a little below Ashley Ferry; two or three gallies or gun boats from Georgia, were (perhaps now are) at Jacksonborough, doubtless with a view to facilitate the corps under Patterson in crossing. The detachment from the main body may be to reinforce the corps at Bacon's Bridge; thence to proceed on 'the Neck,' or, as they have most of their horse in that corps, to forage the country. The latter appears to me most probable; they are full as averse to hunger (?) as we are, and this is certainly the best as well as the safest game they can play. Our horse are, indeed, thereabouts, but nothing more can be expected from them than obliging the enemy to keep pretty close together. The gallies remaining so open to our view, appears to me calculated to excite a jealousy in us for our left flank, and to draw off our attention from some very different manœuvres. The passage from James Island to Haddrill's Point is now entirely open. Boats are said to be collected behind Fort Johnson. The first southern or S. E. wind will bring such of their shipping as they may choose past Fort Moultrie. Under their protection, (though, indeed, it is not required, yet their apprehensions may suggest otherwise,) the passage of 2,000 men may be effected, and those of Patterson, by a circuit of forty miles from Dorchester, may join them. The town will then have only one avenue, and that a hazardous one, and Fort Moultrie will be entirely blockaded. Indeed, I am almost fully convinced that something like what I have now suggested is their plan of operations." [*John Wells, Jun*]

"24th March. Charleston, 12 o'clock, (midnight.) I believe it was on Wednesday morning that I wrote to you last. The position of the English fleet the day before underwent very little alteration that day. Our armed vessels that were ordered up, in consequence of the 64 gun ship having got over the bar, did not all get up; no less than four of them got ashore! Till ten o'clock *that* day, I never saw a British soldier at either of the Horry's, but now they appeared in plenty at both. In the course of the day they began and finished a redoubt, near Living's Landing, and began another at Elias Horry's landing, called Old Town. This day reckoned the shipping as high as Hutson's house, and they amounted to

57, near 40 of them ships. The Bricole and all our gallies' cannon were landed to be mounted in town. Advice was received that fifty of our militia were surprised in a tavern near Salkehatchie Bridge; some were shot, some bayoneted, some are missing, and the enemy got fifteen horses. Report was also received that Cornet Hart and his brother, of Horry's light horse, being out with a party, and meeting with some of the enemy, rode off to them. *Thursday, 23d March.* The 64 gun ship, in the morning early, cast off her lighter, and swayed up her main yard. 9 o'clock, a number of tents are taken out of T. Horry's and carried beyond E. Horry's house. The redoubt, begun at the latter's landing last night, was completed by 10 this morning; half past 10, Lord Cornwallis and a Hessian general, with the usual attendants, with spy glasses, &c., viewed the several works and seemed to pay particular attention to Gibbes's place next to Williams's; 15 wagons, 10 without bodies, I suppose to carry boats, went from Lining's to the brick yard landing, but I could never perceive their return. A ship and a brig came in to the fleet this day, and a Providence man-of-war yesterday. . . . 4 P.M. The two British gallies in Wappoo came down to the mouth of that creek before the battery there. One of them mounts 4 guns in the waist, 2 in the prow, and 1 in the stern; the other (the largest) has two prow guns, 1 in the stern, and only two small ones in her waist. I expected they would have slipped up Ashley river in the night, where they might have covered the landing on this side, at what place they pleased; but they had not moved this morning. This day the continental frigate landed thirty guns, and we shall also have the use of her seamen. Other vessels are unrigging, &c., to be made a proper use of from the market wharf across to the marsh. *Friday, 24th March.* This morning the North-Carolina militia laid down their arms! their time being expired, and several of our speculators, who have amassed thousands, are very much indisposed.* It has been very foggy at sea all day. I had only one view of the fleet at eight in the morning, and shall subjoin their position, which was not altered this evening. Their gal-

* The imputation here is, that they feigned sickness, in order to be sent out of the city with their treasures.—*Ed.*

lies lie where they were last night. I don't know of a signal the admiral has made. It not being foggy on the land side, observed the enemy bringing down and laying hurdles of ten or twelve feet in length, and two or three feet narrower (less in breadth) upon the marsh at Lining's landing and causeway, to pass over to a point of Horry's land, whence the enemy are supposed to intend to cross to Gibbes's place. Several boats full of soldiers, and some bulky articles, came down from Wappoo to the brick yard landing, from whence the soldiers marched to Lining's. Many tories* have been down to-day to view the batteries erected at Wappoo and this town. Reckoned the vessels again to-day, as high as Hutson's house in Stono river, and they amounted to 67, besides several down the river." [*P. Timothy.*]

"25th March. Our armed vessels before Fort Moultrie, returned to town; their cannon were transplanted into the land batteries." [*DeBrahm.*]

"25th March. Fired at the enemy's gallies in Wappoo Creek from our batteries. There were three of them seen. Cold, clear weather." [*McIntosh.*]

"25th March. I have to acquaint you that a third galley (which got through 'the Cut' yesterday,) joined the two others to day, which were before at the entrance of Wappoo Creek. That the one which was with the fleet left them this morning, and went into Stono this evening. That two more large frigates, yellow sides, having 26 guns in their batteries, and the famous Galatea, of 20 guns, having arrived off this bar and anchored there, together with an armed sloop of 10 guns, and 3 large transports, all of which, I suppose, will come in to-morrow. That the gallies' boats have this afternoon been employed in sounding, and have come quite into Ashley river, were fired at from Cumming's Point Battery. That the enemy have done nothing to-day on the land side that I could discover, but increase the number of piles of hurdles at Lining's causeway, to that of the United American States (13,) and collect boards and plank at E. Horry's barn, Old Town landing. That I have reckoned the enemy's shipping again to-day,

† Distinguished by their costume from the British and Hessian line forces.

wherever in view, and find their number amounts to 121, viz : in Stono river, back of Hutson's house, 73 ; lower down that river, 6 ; just within the entrance, gone thither to-day, 1 galley, 3 sloops, (the Providence-man, one that came in this morning, and one that joined them in going,) 4 ; in Wappoo Creek, just at the entrance into Ashley river, 3 galleys, 1 schooner, 4 ; at the brick yard landing, in said creek, 2 schooners ; within and off the bar, 32 ; total, 121. Of which, the vessels of war are (reckoning only their batteries)—1 of 50 guns ; (the ship all along taken for a 64, from the disproportion in her size to that of the 44's. Captain Engs, who has seen her, says it is the Renown, which is remarkably large.) 2 of 44 ; frigates of 26, generally called 32 ; 4 20 gun ships ; the Germaine, of 16 or 18 small guns ; 2 brigs, one of 16, the other, I believe, the Keppel, of like force, came in to-day ; 1 armed sloop, of 10, also arrived to-day ; 4 galleys, 1 of 7, 1 of 5, 1 of 4, and 1 of 11 guns. One of our vessels, the Notre Dame, has been sunk this evening ; the other vessels are not yet ready. They are the Bricole, the Truite, the Queen of France, the ships James and Thomas. *We generally begin things too late, or are too long about them !*" [Timothy.]

"25th March. We have made traverses to the right of our lines, and a battery of six guns is finished near Liberty Tree, which commands Town Creek. To-day we have begun a battery near Commin's Creek, which will command a point of land at Cannon's (?) place. Since the continental vessels are come up and the guns taken out and placed in our batteries, we are certainly strong—particularly as the seamen will be sufficient to man the different batteries, and the troops will be all employed for the defence of the lines. But, unluckily, many of the North-Carolina militia's times expired yesterday. We offered a bounty of 300 dollars and a suit of clothes to those who will continue for 3 months longer. It is said two or three hundred have engaged to remain, but the greater number are going away, which is not to be wondered at when General Lillington will not stay himself. I think, in our present situation, it would be justifiable to detain them till the relief arrived. We have no accounts yet from the Virginia Line. I am sure the enemy have been very gene-

rous. They have given us time enough. However, I make no doubt, the first fair wind we shall be at it from all quarters." [*John Lewis Gervais.*]

"25th March. Your prediction with respect to the entrance of the British fleet proved exactly true. Their ships passed the bar without accident or difficulty at the time mentioned in your letter, and moored safely in Five Fathom Hole, where they still remain. Whether the pilots have enveloped the passage of the bar in mystery, to increase their own importance, or contented themselves with such a knowledge of it as barely suited their purposes, is uncertain; but it appears that their accounts of it hitherto have greatly exaggerated the difficulties of it. I believe I mentioned to you that the Commodore had formed his line of battle between Fort Moultrie and the middle grounds; and that he was forming an obstruction in the narrowest part of the channel in his front. This, if it had been so effected as to bring up the leading ships of the enemy, would have thrown the whole into confusion, and prolonged the duration of a cross fire upon them which would have been insupportable. Although the greatest exertions were used by active and intelligent officers of the navy, the unconquerable elements foiled them. The chain was not stretched and moored so as to be capable of any resistance, before the enemy's fleet was anchored in Five Fathom Hole. It then was evident that the British, having a far superior naval force, would, with a leading wind and tide, pass the fire of Fort Moultrie, break through our line of battle, and then come to immediately, having our ships between them and the fort. In this case, the fire of the latter became useless. Our ships could not move without falling aboard of the enemy, and must, after having been bloodily cannonaded, have fallen a sacrifice. The number of ships and additional soldiers (who would immediately have entered into their service) would have been a most important reinforcement to them. These matters being considered, the general called a council of war on board the Commodore; the result of which was that the ships should, as soon as possible, retire from their station near the fort and proceed to Charlestown—their guns taken out and disposed in different batteries, to be manned by the sailors under the command of

their respective officers. The Bricole, the Truite, the Queen of France, the Notre Dame, and some smaller hulks, to be sunk across the channel of Cooper river, from the Exchange Battery to Schultz's Folly, which is the narrowest part and best defended. These several hulks to form points of support for a boom made of cables and spars, to be stretched across. I was of opinion, and still am, that an obstruction might be formed, without sacrificing so many ships—but the gentlemen of the navy know best. The general, I am in hopes, will cause a battery to be constructed on the southern point of Schultz's Folly—the ground will admit of it, and we still have time. This, with the boom, and the batteries from Broughton's bastion to the Exchange, will exclude the enemy's ships from Cooper river. As long as this is the case, the enemy cannot complete their investiture. We have an opening to receive succours, refreshments, &c., and even for retreat, in case of the last necessity. The Boston, Providence, Ranger, and galleys are to lie dismantled by the walls—their guns and crews, with those of the other ships, have made our batteries very formidable. . . . The engineers have been working very diligently on the right of our lines. A very respectable battery is raised on the foundation of the old Indian fort at Mazyck's, called Liberty Battery, in honour of the tree which formerly stood there. Immense traverses, or rather *par à dos*, (literally back-shields,) are constructed, which make our militia men feel bold. . . . The wind is westerly, and the enemy's ships remain in Five Fathom Hole. We have a ten inch mortar at Fort Moultrie, which, if it does not destroy, will at least frighten and disconcert some of them in their progress. Their army seems to be busied in establishing communications and strengthening the position of Wap-poo Neck. Two galleys appear in the creek under cover of their battery, but no show has yet been made of passing Ashley river." [*Col John Laurens.*]

We must not lose sight of the pregnant remark of Mr. Timothy—" *We generally begin things too late, or are too long about them.*" Undoubtedly the monstrous error was in not opposing the physical obstructions to the passage of the

enemy's fleet, holding them in check, while the cross fires of Fort Moultrie and our own shipping had full play upon them. But, too readily deluded with the idea that the greater vessels of the British could not effect, and would not even attempt the entrance, the Commodore made himself easy until the whole line of the enemy were within the bar. It was then too late to do any thing, but sink the vessels as a *chevaux de frize*, the most wretched use to which they could be put. Floating masses of timber, linked with chains, and anchored across the passage, might have been constructed while the enemy were fixing their buoys. On this subject, Tarleton writes thus :

"The Americans had a considerable marine force in Charleston harbour, from which powerful assistance to their defences and great destruction to the approach of the British fleet might be equally apprehended. . . . These, at first, adopted the plan of disputing the passage up the channel, by mooring with their galleys at a narrow pass between Sullivan's Island and the middle ground, in which station they could have raked the British squadron on its approach to Fort Moultrie ; but this design was abandoned for a less judicious one. . . . Without yielding any assistance to the fortification on Sullivan's Island, the ships were sunk to block up the passage of Cooper river." [*Tarleton's Campaigns.*]

The reasoning of Col. Laurens is quite correct, when you once admit the monstrous supineness which left the proper moment for providing the obstruction of the channel to escape unemployed.

"26th March. The army moved to the front lines—the North-Carolina regulars on the right, the Virginia next, then Lytles' corps and South-Carolina regulars. General Moultrie ordered to have the direction of the batteries and artillery." [*McIntosh.*]

"26th March. The enemy are throwing up works at the mouth of Wappoo, on the north side, and at different places

for about two miles near the bank of the Ashley; I suppose to cover their stores, rather than to annoy us from them. Their grenadiers, light troops, and two or three regiments are moving up. By our last accounts, they were near Drayton Hall. . . . We anxiously wish the arrival of Gen. Woodford and the expected reinforcements." [*Gen. Lincoln to Henry Laurens.*]

"26th March. Nothing important has occurred since I had the pleasure of writing to you yesterday. The wind has not enough of easting in it for the purpose of the British fleet, and it continues in its former station. No report from our out-posts, from whence we conclude, that matters are in *statu quo* on the land side. We have begun to sink the obstructions in Cooper river. The Notre Dame, scuttled near Schultz's Folly, lies as well as we could possibly wish, and will make a fine point of support. The reinforcement of sailors is an immense acquisition. It is true that they were a little riotous and disorderly before they were quartered, as seamen generally regard themselves as licensed on shore; but now that they are stationed under the conduct of their own officers, proper discipline will be maintained. . . . General Lincoln gives me the command of a handsome battalion of light infantry. The project of the Janizaries has been frequently urged since you departed, and supported by new arguments arising from our circumstances; but as the House of Assembly, in their wisdom, pronounced that it was premature when proposed to them, and that it ought to be adopted only in the last extremity, the Privy Council, in their wisdom, declared that the seasonable moment was passed, and that the plan ought to be renounced altogether. However, we shall succeed in spite of their languor, and our independence will be established in spite of the avarice, the prejudice and the pusillanimity which oppose" [illegible.] [*Col. John Laurens.*]

"26th March. The enemy are advancing slowly. The head of their army is about John Cattel's; but I imagine they intend crossing over to Gibbs's place with their main body. They are busily employed on the opposite shore in making fascines and other things. I suppose it will be a day or two yet, before they appear before our lines. They have

their galleys at the mouth of Wappoo Creek, quite open to us.”
[*Moultrie.*]

“27th March. A council of general and field officers held this morning at head-quarters, Tradd-street, for their opinions upon the propriety of evacuating Fort Moultrie. They were all of opinion (except Col. Parker’s officers) that it should *not* be evacuated.

“*Note.*—This is the first council of war called since I was in town. Col. Hamilton and Dr. Smith taken by Col. Washington at Stono. The Colonel (Washington) killed some and sent more of the enemy’s prisoners into town. Some boats went up Ashley river in the night from Wappoo Cut.”
[*McIntosh.*]

Tarleton writes :

“27th March. A body of the continental calvary, consisting of Washington’s and Bland’s light horse, and Pulaski’s hussars, carried off Lt. Col. Hamilton, of the North-Carolina Provincial Regiment, with some other prisoners, and owing to the imprudence of the officer who commanded the advanced guard of the British dragoons, sent in pursuit, was on the point of gaining advantage over that corps. The error was rectified, and the affair ended with equal loss to both parties.”

Tarleton shows himself peculiar in his choice of language for this affair. Ramsay briefly reports it thus :

“His (Tarleton’s) next rencounter was on the 27th, with Lt. Col. Washington, at the head of his regular corps of horse, between the ferry on Ashley river and Rantowle’s bridge on Stono. The Americans had the advantage, took seven prisoners, and drove back the cavalry of the British legion ; but, for want of infantry, durst not pursue them.”

“28th March. The enemy crossed Ashley river in force, two miles above the ferry, and drove our small pickets, stationed on this side, down.” [*McIntosh.*]

“29th March. The English army crossed Ashley river twelve miles above the town.” [*De Brahm.*]

“29th March. We are informed to-day that the enemy, or at least a picket of them, have crossed Ashley river at Drayton Hall. This shows that they have found it difficult

or dangerous to cross it lower; and will prolong the time before we are invested; and, in all probability, give time to the Virginia line to come in. I am told that Col. Laurens is gone to dispute the ground with them inch by inch, and thereby to retard their advances. The wind has been fair for the shipping these two or three days; but they lie still at Five Fathom Hole, no doubt waiting first for the arrival of their troops on 'the Neck.' But from their past conduct, I believe it will be a tedious siege. In my opinion, General Clinton (nor the Admiral) will not risk all upon one die. We are told our provisions will hold out very well, and I assure you, our garrison, including the militia, are in high spirits, and wish to defend the place to the last extremity. Our works go on spiritedly, although our number of negroes are diminished. I wish our friends about Georgetown would send us a reinforcement to work on the fortifications. The night before last, the garrison was alarmed about 10 o'clock at night. Some boats came over Ashley river from Old Town towards Gibbs's place *up the path*,* but they soon went back again. I believe it was rather a feint to keep our forces near town. It is possible they were apprehensive we should defend the passes above Ashley ferry. At this last place we had a small post. It is said now that they crossed at Ashley ferry, Williman's plantation and Drayton Hall." [John L. Gervais.]

"30th March. This morning I have heard nothing new. Last night we have been quiet. I wish we may continue so three or four days longer, in hopes that the Virginians will come in that time. A party of our horse has taken prisoner Col. Hamilton of the Carolina levies, one Doctor and seven privates at Governor Rutledge's house on the Stono. If they had come twenty minutes sooner, they would have caught Sir Henry Clinton. But a few days before that, they had a little advantage over our militia horse. They killed three, one Swinton, of St. Paul's Parish, Jos. Smith, a brother to Mrs. Farr, and one Farrell, overseer to Mr. Bee. Mr. Melli-champe was dangerously wounded, and they took five or six

* Idiomatic—meaning the main path from the city through the forest precincts.—*Ed.*

prisoners. Capt. Roger Saunders was sent with a flag to Gen. Patterson, who commanded the troops that came from Savannah river, said to be about one thousand, who treated him very rudely. He told him it was unmilitary to come in the rear of his army, and he deserved to be hanged. Saunders replied, *he* did not think it unmilitary, for he could not know where his front or his rear was; that, to be sure, he (Patterson) had the power to hang him, but he was not afraid to be hanged. He then said he must go to headquarters, where he would be treated better than he deserved. He was detained three days. Merlin Wilkinson and another gentleman went with him under the sanction of the flag. He (Patterson) said he should detain *them*, as they were not mentioned in the flag. Capt. Saunders told him it had been the custom of the Southern army, on either side, these two years; and if it was intended to alter the custom, he should have first given notice of it. However, they have detained them—it is thought mostly because they had two fine horses.”

“30th March. The advanced guard of the enemy came within two miles of Charleston, when a party of 200 men, under Col. Laurens, (and a little while after two field pieces,) were sent against them, who, after a skirmish of some hours, returned, towards sunset. The fortifications of Charleston were, at this time, very incomplete. All the negroes in town were impressed, who, together with the parties detailed from the garrison, were employed upon the works.” [*De Brahm.*]

“30th March. The enemy came down as far as Gibbs’s, from whence they skirmished with and drove our light infantry, who continued skirmishing with them all the day in view of our lines, each retreating and advancing alternately in excellent order. Lieut. Col. Laurens, who commanded, was reinforced in the evening by Major Low and ninety men, with two field pieces. Our officers and men, stimulated in view of both armies and many ladies, vied with each other in acts of firmness and gallantry; particularly regaining an old breast-work the enemy took possession of in the evening, after our people were retreating regularly to the garrison. A mere point of honour, without advantage! and afterwards left it about dark, retreating very orderly into the garrison. Our loss—Capt. Bowman killed, Major Hyrne and seven privates

wounded. The enemy must have lost many. Their view seemingly was to draw our men over the river into the woods. They were all this day ferrying their troops over from Wappoo Neck to Gibbs's." [*McIntosh.*]

"30th March. Capt. Elphinstone of the navy having stationed the gallies to protect the boats on their passage with the troops to the Neck, twelve miles above Charleston, the main body of the forces moved from their ground, embarked and crossed the river on the 29th of March, without opposition. On the following day, Sir Henry Clinton ordered the light infantry and yagers, supported by the grenadiers, and the other corps and regiments, to gain the principal road, and move on towards the lines of the enemy. A few scattered parties of the Americans skirmished with the head of the column, and after wounding the Earl of Caithness, acting aid-de-camp to the commander-in-chief, and a few private men, fell back to their fortifications. The royal army, without further molestation, took a position across the Neck, about a mile and a half from Charleston, and effectually invested it between the rivers Ashley and Cooper." [*Tarleton.*]

"31st March. At day break, we observed that the enemy had opened his trenches." [*De Brahm.*]

"31st March. The garrison busily employed throwing up works, mounting cannon, &c., all day. The enemy first broke ground this night at a considerable distance—say 10 to 1200 yards. Fine weather. Gen. Scott arrived without troops." [*McIntosh.*]

"31st March. The enemy were upon the Neck about 10 or 12 o'clock yesterday morning. Col. Laurens was at Gibbs's, and began a skirmish with them, retreating towards the rope walk. The enemy had a field piece. A reinforcement was sent to him, and two field pieces, and then he drove the enemy back out of the little breast-work above Kirkland's. In the evening he returned to town. Major Hyrne was wounded, in the beginning of the skirmish, in the face; the wound not dangerous. One Capt. Bowman, of the North-Carolina troops, was killed in the afternoon with a cannon ball, and we had seven privates wounded, one only dangerously, through the thigh. We brought off all the wounded and the body of Captain Bowman. Several of the enemy were

killed. Two of them some of our people stripped. The wind is westerly this morning. I hope it will continue so the whole day. I wish some of these brave Virginia veterans would come in time to reinforce our garrison—we certainly want a few more men.” [*John Lewis Gervais.*]

“31st March. The British began to cross Ashley river the day before yesterday morning, at a mile’s distance above the ferry. The next day they advanced, having boats collected at the landing place, opposite Gibbs’s, for the purpose of crossing their artillery, &c. My battalion of light infantry had been posted at the old advanced work near Strickland’s, to watch the motions of the enemy, and prevent too sudden an approach. As soon as I received notice of their advance, I went forward with my Major (Hyrne) to reconnoitre them. We went rather too near, for single horsemen, to the yagers, who fired from behind trees on each side of the road. The Major was unfortunately wounded in the cheek, which will deprive us of the services of a valuable officer during the siege; but as the bones are not injured, the surgeon apprehends no danger. The violence of the blow dismounted him, and I had barely time to cover his retreat and drive off his horse. The Hessian seized the Major’s hat, but did not enjoy the trophy long, being killed in the skirmish which ensued, and the trophy was recovered. My corps was drawn up in the rear of the old entrenchment above mentioned, and two platoons were posted in proper places for checking the progress of their horse, should they advance, and for the security of our flanks. They advanced a field piece in the road, and filed off parties of infantry and cavalry to our right and left, with a view of turning us; but finding that they were likely to be exposed, they desisted. The General, (Lincoln,) in the meantime, informed [me] by Col. Ternant, that it was not his intention we should engage seriously—that the object of our being advanced was answered—and that he wished me to withdraw the infantry by degrees. After some scattering fire between the advance marksmen on each side, I withdrew the corps by platoons, alternately, to a position near the lines, and remained there till the afternoon. Having advanced patrols of marksmen, I had, upon the first appearance of the British, requested a couple of field pieces; but as it did not

enter into the General's plan to engage seriously, and as, in fact, there was no valuable purpose to be answered, he did not send them at that time." [*Col. John Laurens.*]

"31st March. Learned that Col. Laurens with his light infantry had a skirmish with the enemy on the Neck. His party consisted of about 130 men; was reinforced by Col. Ternant with 120 more, and drove the enemy, who fired about a dozen cannon shot, one of which killed Capt. Bowman, of Gen. Hogan's brigade. We had six men wounded in the affair, besides Major Hyrne, who fell from his horse, and left his hat on the field. This was afterwards taken from the head of a dead yager, when the enemy retreated. Col. Laurens did not return any cannon shot." [*Journal of Moses Young.*]

"1st April. Fine weather. Our troops employed as yesterday. All quiet on both sides. Charleston militia ordered from the Bay to the right of the lines—first time." [*McIntosh.*]

"1st and 2d April. The enemy's works were a little extended, and ours augmented." [*De Brahm.*]

"1st and 2d April. Col. Neville arrived from Woodford's brigade, with despatches for the General. . . . Friday night, about 10 o'clock, a deserter from the enemy swam across Wappoo, which occasioned an alarm in our lines, and spread through the town. The deserter says that Sir H. Clinton was wounded in the hand, and General Leslie mortally, on the 30th inst.; that the enemy's main body was on the Neck; says that Mr. Farr is treated with great contempt by the British officers, who oblige him to work with the fatigue parties. Another deserter says Clinton is wounded in the hand, and Cornwallis in the head; that he has heard several of the British officers say they almost despair of being able to take Charlestown." [*Moses Young.*]

"2d April. The enemy very busy on Saturday night with boats in Ashley river, supposed to be sending stores and provisions from James's Island to the army on the Neck. Same night they opened their trenches at the distance of about 1000 yards from our lines. Another deserter says they have sixteen 26 pounders ready to mount there." [*Moses Young.*]

"2d April. Foggy morning—the enemy very busy the

two last nights throwing up their works and entrenchments, which are seen this morning very plain from our lines. One redoubt is nearly opposite our nine gun battery on the right of the horn-work, and another a little to the left of the horn-work, about 1000 yards distant. Their shipping lie off the bar very quiet. Our allowance of beef shortened, and sugar ordered in lieu thereof. Guard altered, &c." [*McIntosh.*]

"2d April. On the night of the 1st to the 2d inst., the enemy erected three works, about half a mile from our lines. We fired a few shot at them, I believe, with very little effect." [*John Lewis Gervais.*]

"3d April. This morning another work appeared to their right, towards Ashley river, about Cannon's place. A deserter came in, also, who reports that the day of the skirmish, Lord Sinclair was mortally wounded." [*John Lewis Gervais.*]

"3d April. This morning, the battery (F) was discovered upon a height at Hampstead; a battery of four pieces was constructed on our right to oppose that of the enemy; from which, as from all the others, a continual firing of shot and bombs was kept up the following night along the lines." [*De Brahm.*]

"3d April. Though our cannon have been continually playing upon the enemy since Friday night, it does not seem to retard their works; they are busily employed day and night in completing the two redoubts above mentioned, and erecting another on our left, nearly opposite battery No. 4, about the same distance with the others from our line." [*McIntosh.*]

"3d April. Mr. Seagrove arrived on Monday, with an account that Gen. Woodford's brigade was at Camden, on Wednesday, the 29th March, and would be within 40 miles of town on Monday evening." [*Moses Young.*]

"Capt. Whipple dined with Col. Laurens, and proposed that he should be authorized to take an exact account of the quality and quantity of provisions in Charlestown, for which purpose he would take with him the pursers of the fleet; offered to lay a bet that we had not salt provisions for 40 days. 38 of his own crew now in the hospital; 2 of them died yesterday." [*Moses Young.*]

“3d April. The enemy are now before our lines, and throwing up works very fast. They have four redoubts abreast finished ; one at the broad road at Watson’s ; one at Hampstead, where St. Edmond Head’s house stood ; and one between these two ; another they have on our left near Cumming’s point. I suppose, to-night, they will have one where Taggart’s house stood. We began to cannonade them yesterday, and shall continue every day. Their batteries are not yet opened ; but I suppose to-morrow or next day they will begin. Then you will hear a great deal of noise, but there is very little danger from this sort of fighting. I hope the obstructions laid across our river, before the Exchange, will deter their shipping from coming up. We have established a hospital at Cainhoy Meeting House, for all those who are not able to do duty to repair to. I forgot to mention to you that the women walk out from town to the lines with all the composure imaginable, to see us cannonade the enemy ; but I fancy when the enemy begin, they will make themselves pretty scarce. We had a skirmish with the enemy on their approach to our lines. Col. Laurens commanded a corps of light troops, and fought them two or three hours. Several were killed and wounded on both sides, and was obliged to retire within the lines. Major Hyrne was wounded in this skirmish.” [*Moultrie.*]

“4th April. This morning discovered to us the enemy’s battery very much injured.” [*De Brahm.*]

“4th April. Several deserters came in to us within this three or four days past, who say that on Thursday last the enemy had upwards of twenty men killed and wounded—among the last was Lord St. Clair and a Lt. Col. ; and that they were bringing their heavy cannon on the Neck. The cannonading from our batteries continues day and night. Two ten-inch and one seven-inch mortar are removed from the Bay to play upon them. They are all this day hard at work, finishing their batteries, redoubts, and throwing up lines of communication. A sortie, to be commanded by Gen. Scott, Col. Clark, Lt. Col. Laurens, &c., was intended, but was not put into execution. Fine weather. The continental ship *Ranger* and the French ship cannonaded the enemy’s works

on our right, from Town Creek, which was returned by two 24 pounders from their field pieces. Wolf-pits begun, and additional works in the gorge of the horn work." [*McIntosh.*]

"4th April. This morning another work appeared at the enemy's left, at Hampstead, on a rising piece of ground. This obliged us to make a traverse opposite to it to secure our new lines near Liberty Tree. Our continental frigate, the *Ranger*, was sent up Town Creek to cannonade this work, but she made very bad shots. The enemy fired at her with field pieces, with more skill, hit her two or three times and obliged her to sheer off. Now an expedition was determined on, to send three armed vessels to take them (the British) *en reverse*, whilst a detachment of the garrison, under command of Col. Laurens, were to endeavour to take possession of this work and destroy it. During the afternoon we kept a brisk fire at their works and threw a few shells at them. But the wind being contrary, the vessels were not got up after sunset, which I am afraid will frustrate the intended expedition altogether: at least it will render it more precarious to-morrow. Luckily the enemy's shipping is not come up yet. The wind has been westerly all day." [*John Lewis Gervais.*]

4th April. Tuesday morning, (4th,) the *Ranger* was ordered up Cooper river to discover the situation of the enemy's battery on Hampstead Hill, upon which depended the propriety of a sally from our lines (against that work) of 500 men, who were held in readiness to act as soon as a certain signal should be made by Captain Simpson. When he got within the reach of the enemy he began to fire, and a very heavy cannonade commenced from our lines. This was continued until the *Ranger* received a shot in her bow from a field-piece brought to the side of the river by the British troops. She then returned, and Major Clarkson, who was sent in her by the General, reported that the enemy's work on Hampstead Hill was enclosed; the intended sortie was laid aside. The cannonade was renewed from our lines and continued without intermission all Tuesday, principally directed against the Hampstead battery, which was very much damaged, and the embrasures, 7 in number, destroyed. We kept up the fire during the night, and prevented the enemy from bringing their guns to that place, as asserted by two deserters who

came in about an hour before day. Mr. Dervil, a sensible officer of our navy, is of opinion that the enemy only mean to amuse us on the Neck, until they land their troops from Wappoo under our batteries on Ashley river, where he thinks we are weakest. 800 Charlestown militia within the lines; about 300 from the country. General Williamson at Augusta with a very trifle of men. Col. Thompson raising men—has got 20. Col. Kershaw sent about 35 troops to town.” [*Moses Young.*]

“5th April. Last night the fire of our batteries was kept up as heretofore. The enemy’s galley (G) approached the town and fired upon it all night. We began to dig wells in our fort and to close up the gorge of the horn-work.” [*De Brahm.*]

“5th April. Last night we fired a great deal, all night, and threw several shells at the enemy’s works; and saw, this morning, it had greatly damaged their work at Hampstead and had prevented them from erecting any new works. About 7 o’clock this morning, Thomas Horry, attending the negroes on the public works, received a contusion from a spent musket ball, from the works on their right, in his right shoulder. It was the first shot fired against the town. He thought at first it had only cut the cape of his great coat, but on inspection it had drawn blood, was greatly swelled in the afternoon, and his arm grown very stiff. The enemy fired a few shots afterwards, without doing any damage. The negroes were a little frightened at first, but they continued at their work. During the day we fired a few cannon shot at them, and threw some shells right into their works. Last night three deserters came in, who say our cannon did not kill many.” [*John Lewis Gervais.*]

“5th April. Last night the enemy carried on their approaches to Hampstead Hill, upon which they erected a battery for twelve cannon. and a mortar battery a little in the rear of it; although we were annoying them with our cannon and mortars. The enemy’s batteries on Wappoo Neck, and four of their gallies which came out of Wappoo Creek into the stream of Ashley river for the purpose, cannonaded the west side of the town briskly all night, without any other damage than shattering some houses, killing two horses at my quarters, and killing one man in King-street.” [*McIntosh.*]

"5th April. Very little firing from our lines on Wednesday (5th). In the evening the enemy sent 2 galleys about two-thirds across Ashley river, and began to cannonade about 8 o'clock, being very dark. Their object seemed to be our battery, No. 1, on Coming's Point, where the 3d South-Carolina regiment is posted. Their shot were 24 and 32 pounders, and struck the following houses in town, viz: Mr. Ferguson's, the General's, Alexander Rose's, Col. Merridan's, Mr. Lowndes's, the Magazine, Mr. Shubrick's, Mr. McQueen's, a small house in King-street, near Mr. Wills's, Mr. Demong's, a house in Horlbeck's alley, one near Mr. Gervais's. . . . Mr. Morrow, of the militia grenadiers, was killed by a 24 pounder, as he stood at his own door in King-street, and one of Capt. Warley's men wounded in the shoulder. A few shot were returned by Capt. Pines, from battery No. 2 on Coming's Point." [*Moses Young.*]

"5th April. Last Wednesday night, 5th April, the enemy detached 50 horse and 500 foot, to surprise our cavalry at Middleton's place; they went by way of Dr. Garden's and came out at Tom Smith's; entered Col. Washington's encampment with fixed bayonets, found the fires burning, but no troops. The Colonel had taken the precaution to remove to the 23 Mile House, being apprehensive the enemy had received information of his situation from two deserters who left him the night before. The British, being disappointed, commenced their retreat, and Col. Washington sent a party of his horse after them, who picked up three of the enemy's rear guard." [*Moses Young.*]

"6th April. The fire of the batteries and the works continued as before. To-day the reinforcements under General Woodford arrived." [*De Brahm.*]

"6th April. The enemy approached from their centre redoubt, and erected a battery of five guns opposite, upon the angle between our batteries No. 11 and 12. Our cannon and mortars played briskly and were well directed, all last night and this day; and were doubly retorted upon us during the night from their galleys and batteries upon Wappoo Neck, as before.

"Gen. Woodford, with his brigade, came into the garrison from Addison's ferry, over Cooper river; and some North-Car-

olina militia under the command of Colonel Harrington." [McIntosh.]

"6th April. Thursday, (6,) Capt. Crawley's galley was mantled with 2 guns, and in the night the enemy's galleys again cannonaded us. The same night the enemy raised a covert way between their works on the Neck, as they did also some nights ago at Wappoo." [Moses Young.]

"6th April. Friday, at 10 o'clock, General Woodford's brigade arrived in Charleston, consisting of about a thousand men,* very fine looking troops, the sight of whom made an amazing alteration in the countenances of the citizens, who had almost despaired of their arrival. In the afternoon, the lines were manned, and a *feu de joie* was fired from 13 pieces of cannon, followed by three huzzas from the troops. The Charleston militia were ordered from the right of our lines to take post on South Bay; the Virginia troops supplied their place. The enemy have not yet been able to mount a single gun on the Neck. The inhabitants very busy in throwing up banks of earth against their dwelling houses to secure them from the British shot. The wind fair for the enemy's shipping. Col. Laurens surprised that the British Admiral does not make use of the present opportunity. . . . Two horses belonging to Gen. McIntosh's aids, killed last Thursday night. Capt. Warley tells me that a few of the 3d regiment of South-Carolina, are in the small-pox on board the Hospital Ship; only five or six of the officers of that regiment have had the disorder. The enemy strong in works at Wappoo, which, Colonel Laurens says, is naturally very defensible, and they have been at great labour to preserve their communication between the army on the Neck and stores on James Island. The late reinforcement from the *Northward*, (*Virginia, be it remembered*,) have had the small-pox. Mr. Owen's wound healed up, but very painful. His late fatigue on the lines has hurt him much." [Moses Young.]

"6th April. Last night about 9 o'clock, the enemy began to cannonade the town from four or five galleys and their batteries at Wappoo Cut. They wounded one man of the 3d regiment at the battery at Coming's Point. The widow

* About 700 says Moultrie. --[Ed.]

Pinckney's house, Mrs. Elfe's, the corner of King-street, Thomas Shubrick's, upon the 'Green,' Col. Skirving's, near the Governor's, received a shot each, and one 32lb. ball fell in the Governor's yard. The bullets whistled thick by my house, but I received no damage." [*John Lewis Gervais.*]

"7th April. Last night the enemy erected another work near Ashley river. About 11 o'clock they began a heavy cannonade from the same quarter as last night. They fired at least a hundred shot. They killed one man in King-street, a carpenter named Morrow, just as he was going out of his house. Several houses were damaged by 24 and 32lb. shot; among them, Mr. Ferguson's; next to him, Gen. McIntosh's quarters, in which he had two horses killed; Mr. Lowndes's house—he was at the lines; Daniel Horry's houses *enter bridges* (?); Capt. Stuart's, Lenox's, Thomas Fuller's, and several others in King-street. The firing continued till about 3 o'clock this morning. My house has again escaped." [*John Lewis Gervais.*]

"7th April. Very little fire from our batteries last night, and none on the part of the enemy. The enemy has prolonged the right of the first parallel. All our workmen employed in digging wells." [*De Brahm.*]

"7th April. This afternoon twelve sail of the enemy's shipping passed Fort Moultrie, under a very heavy cannonade from the fort, which was smartly returned from each of the ships as they passed singly. One of them, a large store ship, ran aground in the Cove, and was blown up by her own people. One fifty and two forty-four gun ships, four frigates, two ships supposed to be transports, a schooner and a sloop, anchored under Fort Johnson. Ships remained in Five Fathom Hole. The damage done the shipping is uncertain; but not a man hurt in the fort." [*McIntosh*]

"7th April. The Virginians are now landing at Gadsden's wharf. . . . No doubt you heard the firing yesterday. It was the British men-of-war, passing Fort Moultrie. They are now lying by Fort Johnson. The fort has damaged them a little and obliged them to burn one got on shore. We cannot tell whether it is a man-of-war or a store ship, but we see the people from the fort are very busy in picking up their plunder." [*Moultrie.*]

"7th April. At half-past 3 o'clock, the British fleet got under weigh, the Admiral in the Roebuck was the headmost ship, and the Renown brought up the rear ; the Romulus with four frigates and two smaller vessels in a line in the centre. Each of the ships gave the fort a broadside, and one of the frigates had her foretopmast carried away by a shot from the fort, which saluted them in very quick succession, so that in a few minutes both fort and passing ships were enveloped in smoke. No other visible damage done to the enemy. and in about three-quarters of an hour from their weighing, they cast anchor again under Fort Johnson, thence extending towards Hog Island. The Roebuck was afterwards obliged to come upon a careen. A vessel, supposed to be a store ship, got aground about a mile and a half from the fort, upon which Col. Pinckney sent to Haddrill's Point a couple of field pieces, which played upon her so quickly that the hands were obliged to take to their boats and then set her on fire.

"Tais afternoon, Gen. Woodford's brigade arrived in very good time, for yesterday the time of the North-Carolina militia expired, and they refused to do any farther duty." [*John Lewis Gervais.*]

"8th April. Last night the enemy commenced a battery of six pieces. All our workmen employed in making traverses. A quarter of an hour before sunset, the British fleet passed Fort Moultrie under a heavy fire on both sides, and anchored in a line near Fort Johnson. No person killed or wounded in Fort Moultrie. The fleet consisted of the following vessels—one of 50 guns, two of 40, four frigates ; two vessels armed '*en flute*,' and two other smaller ones. One of those armed *en flute*, grounded on a bank called 'the Green.'" [*De Brahm.*]

"8th April. The cannonade from the garrison is continued night and day, to retard the enemy's works ; they are, notwithstanding, constantly employed carrying on their approaches and finishing their batteries ; and their batteries over Ashley river, and their gallies from Wappoo Creek, pay us in kind, especially at night. The Charlestown militia are ordered from the right of the lines to the South Bay, as formerly. Gen. Hogan takes their place in the lines ; Gen. Woodford on his left, &c." [*McIntosh.*]

"8th April. Gen. Lincoln received no report from Fort Moultrie, until the afternoon of Sunday, when Major Pinekney came up and informed that not a single man had been hurt, and but about *ten* of the enemy's shot struck any part of the works. . . . Sunday afternoon, Capt. Crawley's galley advanced upon the headmost ship belonging to the enemy, and gave her several shot, which were returned very briskly from the ship. The galley then retired." [*Moses Young.*]

The British had now gone through all the preliminaries of investment. A single passage or two from Tarleton, will suffice to connect events in the chain of our narrative.

"The General and his engineers having fixed upon the point and mode of attack, a large working party broke ground, under cover of an advanced detachment, on the night of the 1st of April. Two large redoubts were thrown up within 800 yards of the American lines, and were not discovered before daybreak, when the fire from the town had very inconsiderable effect. The next evening another redoubt was added, and for five successive days and nights, the labour of artificers and soldiers was directed to the construction of batteries, which, on the 8th (April) were completed with artillery. . . . The Roebuck, Richmond, Romulus, Blonde, Virginia, Raleigh, Sandwich and Renown, weighed about one o'clock, and exhibited a magnificent and satisfactory spectacle to the royalists, by steadily effecting their passage, under the fire of the American batteries, with the trifling loss of 27 men, killed and wounded. The *Acetus*, a store-ship, grounded and was burnt. . . . The frigates, now taking a position under James Island, blocked up the harbour, and Charlestown was debarred from all communication with the country, except in that quarter which faced the river, Cooper." [*Campaigns.*]

"9th April. The vessel which grounded was abandoned and burnt by the crew last night. This morning the commencement of a battery (L) appeared in front of our left. Our workmen employed as heretofore." [*De Brahm.*]

"9th April. The enemy last night carried on their approaches from their left redoubt, and threw up a battery for ten cannon against the angle of our advanced redoubt, or half moon battery, and the redan No 7. Cannonading as usual,

and some at their shipping at Fort Johnson, without effect.”
[*McIntosh.*]

“ 9th April. A continued series of fatigues, hard duty and want of rest, incident to a besieged garrison, has been our lot in a very high degree for these last ten days past. . . . The three Virginia regiments arrived here a few days ago, and wear the appearance of what they are in reality—hardy veterans. A salvo from 13 pieces of artillery and a loud hurra, apprised the besieging army of this reinforcement. Indeed, they were sufficiently apprised of it by the vessels, eleven in number, coming down Cooper river with them. An opportunity was unfortunately given, by marching the whole corps, in regular order, to their encampments, to ascertain their precise number; which, not according with the expectations almost universally entertained, may have been the occasion of several desertions which happened the same night. . . Extreme caution marks the conduct of Sir Harry. Even at Wappoo, there are lines of communication between his works. . . . To speak freely of our works, they cannot be considered in any other light than *patch work*,—no regular system can be traced. The enemy have discovered much judgment in the position they have taken; for, till they had demonstrated the truth of the epithet given above, by fire, and our guns being brought to bear on their works, it would have [been] deemed heresy to have suggested this idea. Nothing could be more evident than that a strong battery would be erected at Hampstead Hill; yet, when it struck our sight in the morning, only two guns could be brought to bear. The error, or fault, had been attended to the day before, and a battery of three guns were then set about, 100 yards to the westward of the Indian Fort. These five guns have been almost incessantly employed, and have retarded this work of the enemy very considerably. Indeed, they have found more trouble there than any where else. Some shells have been thrown exceedingly well into it. . . . As far as I can learn, there are covered ways or lines of communication between all the British works on the Neck. They will summon, I apprehend, in a day or two. The answer is obvious. On the next night a bombardment will commence, and an incessant cannonade from all quarters,

usher in the dawn of the important day. . . . A sortie was in contemplation a few days since. The Hampstead battery was the object. Two ships were to co-operate with Gen. Scott, who had the command. But, I think, very fortunately, the wind veering to the westward, prevented it being attempted. A very large body of troops (British) were within ten minutes run to reinforce the party, (working at Hampstead,) which could not be, of itself, less than 350. Judge then of the probable issue, more especially, when you are informed [that] the sallyers were not volunteers or picked troops, but even some of our Charlestown militia were draughted for the service. . . . With respect to the issue of the siege, it would be presumptuous to give an opinion about it. Whatever side success favours, I am perfectly confident we will merit it. A blockade, regular approaches, and slow cautious movements, will be most favourable to the enemy, and they cannot but know it. An assault, even if successful, will cost them too dear, to be attempted." [*Thomas Wells, Jr.*]

"6th April. The present state of suspense is a state of hope, and well founded hope, considering the slow progress of the enemy; for, although they broke ground the night of the 1st inst., and commenced at once with the first parallel, which they have supported with redoubts, there appear to be only two works destined for batteries; one on our right, the other on our left; in a very imperfect state, and with unfinished communications. In the meantime, the Virginia [force] has arrived; the remainder of Scott's levies are at hand; our works are daily improving and strengthening; in addition to our abbatiss, we have covered the whole front with wolf-traps which will remain an excellent defence against storm, after they have cleared away our abbatiss by an incessant fire of artillery. Our obstructions in Cooper river are completed, which prevent the enemy from accomplishing the investiture. A body of North-Carolina militia, marching to our assistance, is ordered to halt at Cainhoy. Col. Malmedy is sent to take the command, and with an engineer to establish such posts as shall be necessary for the security of our communication. The ground is very favourable to our purpose, and has been already reconnoitred by Col. de Cambray. . . . The enemy's galleys,

under cover of their ships, now ride at anchor near the ruins of Fort Johnson. If they attempt to force our obstructions, they will be bloodily handled. Gallies and other armed vessels lie within to prevent their detaching boats to cut the boom. If they attempt to go up Ashley river, the navigation is intricate, and they will run the gauntlet of a great many batteries, firing shot and shell, without being at all advanced; for I am persuaded they will not attempt to anchor within reach of our cannon." [*Col. John Laurens.*]

"10th April. The works of the enemy more advanced.—Our negroes employed in making a battery of five pieces in the redoubt (M) and the soldiers on fatigue in making traverses. This evening a parley was received from the enemy, demanding the surrender of the town. It was refused." [*De Brahm.*]

"10th April. Sir Henry Clinton and Admiral Arbuthnot sent in a flag summoning the garrison and town to surrender. To which Gen. Lincoln immediately, and without consulting any one, sent them for answer that his duty and inclination led him to hold out to the last extremity. This evening, Capt. John Gilbank killed by accident in Bottar's (?) battery." [*McIntosh.*]

See Moultrie for the summons and the answer. Tarleton describes the defences of Charleston, on the land side, as consisting

"Of a chain of redoubts, lines and batteries, extending from one river to the other, and furnished with eighty cannon and mortars; the front works of each flank, strengthened by swamps, originating from the neighbouring rivers, and tending towards the centre, through which they were connected by a canal passing from one to the other. Between these outward impediments and the redoubts were two strong rows of abbatiss; the trees being buried slanting in the earth, with their branches facing outwards, formed a fraise work against the assailants; and these were farther secured by a ditch double picketed. In the centre, the natural defences were inferior to those on the flanks. To remedy this defect, and to cover the principal gate, a horn work of masonry had been constructed, which, being closed during the siege, formed a kind of citadel. . . . Ships, with *cheveaux de frize*, connected

by spars and booms, were employed to block up the channels, and piles and pickets were fixed in the ground at all the landing places to prevent any debarkation from boats. The whole extent was likewise covered by batteries formed of earth and palmetto wood, judiciously placed, and mounted with heavy cannon." [*Campaigns, &c.*]

"11th April. Our batteries kept up a great deal of fire last night. The enemy had repaired his batteries and mounted some cannon. Finished the battery (M) in the redoubt. Our workmen employed in making traverses and strengthening the profiles of some works. This evening Major Gilbank was accidentally killed in making some experiments with shells." [*De Brahm.*]

"11th April. The enemy use double diligence now in completing their works and mounting their cannon; whilst we ply them with our cannon and mortars as usual; and they, from their galleys and batteries west side of Ashley river, in return." [*McIntosh.*]

Tarleton says: "On the rejection of the summons, the batteries were opened, and soon obtained a superiority over those of the town. In a note, he says, they were opened the next day after the rejection of the demand for surrender.

"12th April. Very little firing last night. The enemy had more cannon mounted. The workmen employed as before. Our sailors employed in elevating the parapet near 'Exchange battery,' (O,) and making embrasures to it. At 12 o'clock, M., three shallops passed Fort Moultrie and joined the fleet, although fired upon all the time by the fort." [*De Brahm.*]

"12th April. The same as yesterday on both sides. It is said several flat-bottomed boats were hauled on land, by the enemy, across 'the Neck,' from Ashley to Cooper river. This day, Gen. Lincoln sent for the general officers to his marquee, and presented a letter to them directed to Gov. Rutledge,—which they all signed, signifying their opinion, in support of the General's (already given) that the Governor, and part of the Council, at least, ought to leave the garrison, for many substantial reasons." [*McIntosh.*]

"13th April. Very little firing last night. This morning,

the enemy's battery (F) was finished; those marked (I) and (L) not quite. The trenches (A and B) extended. This morning, at 9 o'clock, the enemy opened his batteries, firing bombs, carcasses, red hot balls, which was returned with all our force from the batteries. This lasted about two hours, when the firing abated on both sides, till about 5 o'clock, when all the fire was on the side of the enemy. We had one 18 pounder dismounted, and two houses burnt. Our workmen employed as before." [*De Brahm.*]

"13th April. On Thursday, (13th,) about 9 o'clock in the morning, the enemy opened their batteries against the town. About 12 o'clock, I left it with the Governor, Col. Pinckney and Daniel Huger; it having been determined, some days before, that we should leave Charlestown, to preserve the executive authority of the State, in case the town should be entirely blockaded. Gen. Gadsden is chosen Lt. Governor, and remains in Charleston with *five* of the Privy Council, more to satisfy the citizens than [because of] the propriety of the measure. When we left town, a child of Myer Moses, with its nurse, at Ansonboro', were killed, and one man of Gen. Hogan's brigade who would stay upon the ramparts as a bravado. The corner house where Mrs. Ball lived, and Daniel Legaré's house, were burning when we left town. The fire took by accident; some negroes were boiling pitch, and when the cannonade began they left the pitch, which took fire. In the afternoon, it is reported Myer Moses's house was burnt, either by a carcass or the bursting of a shell." [*John Lewis Gervais.*]

"13th April. All the general officers were called by Gen. Lincoln to his quarters this morning, where he gave us the *first* idea of the state of the garrison, the men, provisions, stores, artillery, &c., in it; the little hopes he had of any succour of consequence, and the opinion of the engineers respecting our fortifications,—that they were only field works, or lines, and could hold out but few days more. With every information he could obtain of the numbers, strength of the enemy, &c., he was compelled to take up the idea of evacuating the garrison:—when, without hesitation, I gave it as my own opinion, that as we were so unfortunate as to suffer ourselves to be penned up in the town, and cut off from all re-

sources,—in such circumstances, we should not lose an hour longer, in attempting to get the continental troops, at least, out—while we had one side open yet over Cooper river—upon whose safety, the salvation, not only of this State, but some others, will (may probably) depend. The General said he only desired (and which, I think, all the gentlemen seemed to acquiesce in *now*) that we should consider maturely of the expediency and practicability of such a measure, by the time he would send for us again ; and the cannonade, mentioned this morning, from the enemy, beginning, broke up the council abruptly. Gov. Rutledge and part of his council went over to Cooper river about 12 o'clock this day. Between 9 and 10 this morning, the enemy opened all their guns and mortar batteries at once, (being the first time they fired upon the town, or our lines upon the front,) and continued a furious cannonade and bombarding, with little intermission till midnight ; their batteries from Wappoo playing upon the left flank of our lines and the town, at the same time, and their gallies from Wappoo Creek, during the night, as usual ; which we returned smartly from our lines, and we presume with good effect. A sergeant and private from North-Carolina killed, and some women and children in town ; the houses were much damaged and two were burned down near General Moultrie's, Ansonboro, by carcasses, of which they threw several from ten inch mortars. Their cannon are chiefly 24 pounders, opposite our lines, and 36 pounders upon Wappoo ; their mortars from $5\frac{1}{2}$ to (ten) thirteen inches. One embrasure at redan No. 7, destroyed ; and also a 26 pounder in the latter dismounted, with some other smaller damages." [*McIntosh.*]

"14th April. A slow fire was kept up on both sides last night. The approaches of the enemy a little advanced. The enemy's gallies (9) fired all night. He commenced another battery (N) opposite the town, on the banks of Ashley river." [*De Brahm.*]

"14th April. The enemy are approaching fast upon the right, and keep up an incessant fire from the small arms, cannon and mortars. A sergeant of North-Carolina killed by a cannon ball ; also two matrosses of South-Carolina, and one

of militia artillery (town) by two of our cannon going off while they were loading them. Capt. Hill says our horse were surprised this day at Monk's Corner." [*McIntosh.*]

"This was a shameful surprise," says Moultrie. See Tarleton's account of it; the effect of this disaster was to cut off all supplies from the garrison, and to enable the British to close effectually the only remaining outlet by Cooper river.

"15th April. Fire from the batteries and works as before. The enemy had a bomb battery (P). Their second parallel commenced and manned by the chasseurs, who kept up a continued fire upon our lines." [*De Brahm.*]

"15th April. The enemy continue approaching fast on our right. Our mortars are ordered to the right to annoy them. A continual fire of small arms, cannon and mortars from the enemy. A battery of two guns opened by the enemy at Stiles's place on James's Island, which played constantly on the town; distance across, 82 chain. Many of the enemy's boats hauled over the Neck into Town Creek. Two of them, mounted with brass cannon, came down the creek this morning, and fired at the Ranger and Adventure." [*McIntosh.*]

"15th April. We have accounts as late as the 15th, which was Saturday at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. The enemy continued the cannonade, but did very little damage. There was no other house burnt, and only two men killed, of Woodford's brigade, and one Lt. Campbell of the Georgia battalion."— [*John Lewis Gervais.*]

Tarleton writes :

"Soon after the middle of April, the second parallel was carried within 450 yards of the enemy's main works, new batteries were constructed, and all the communications were secured." [*Campaigns.*]

"16th April. In addition to his usual fire, the enemy opened his new battery (N). Last night we extended from our redoubt (M) a counter-mine with a small parallel (C) whence we could return the fire of the enemy's musketry. This evening one of our gallies ascended Cooper river to a place where

she enfiladed the English camp for several hours ; which was briskly answered by field pieces from the camp." [*De Brahm.*]

"16th April, Two 18 pounders, a quantity of provisions and other valuable articles, were got out of the wreck of the vessel near Fort Moultrie. It is said the enemy attempted to land on Hobcaw Neck from two gun-boats, but were prevented by Col. Malmedy (Captain Theus). Cannonading, &c., on both sides, all day and night, as usual. The New church steeple struck by a 24 lb. ball from James's Island battery. Pitt's arm broke off, &c. Major Hogg, with detachment of — men, ordered over this night to Lempriere's Point."— [*McIntosh.*]

The statue of Wm. Pitt stood in the centre of the space between St. Michael's Church and the Court House. According to the tradition we remember to have heard, a shell struck the steeple of St. Michael's, took off the arm of the statue, and opened for itself a grave in the street, in which several men might have been buried.

"17th April. The enemy enfiladed the town on all sides last night, and then threw a great quantity of bombs, sometimes from 15 to 20 at once. We worked upon our counter-mine (C). We received intelligence from our detachment at Lempriere's, that 1000 or 1500 of the enemy, under Gen. Lord Cornwallis, had passed Monk's Corner, Strawberry, Bonneau's Ferry and Wappetaw, and actually arrived within six miles of the said post. This morning the enemy's second parallel was prolonged towards our left, supplied with bags of earth and full of chasseurs." [*De Brahm.*]

"17th April. An inhabitant of the town killed, and a woman wounded, in bed together. The approaches continued to the right. The enemy advanced their bomb batteries to within 800 yards of our line." [*McIntosh.*]

"18th April. The enemy continues approaching fast, and firing from their cannon, mortars and small arms. We advanced a small breast-work, nearly fronting the square redoubt, for riflemen, to annoy the enemy in their approaches. Mr. Ph. Neyle, aid-de-camp to Gen. Moultrie, killed by

a cannon ball ; two men killed by small arms, and three wounded by a shell ; a soldier of Col. Neville's had an arm shot off by our own cannon, while he was sentry outside the abbatis ; also, two Frenchmen wounded—one lost a leg, and the other an arm. A twelve pounder burst in the horn-work, by which two men were much hurt. The enemy do not now throw large shells as they have done, but showers of small ones from their mortars and howitzers, which prove very mischievous, especially on our right, where one man was killed, and two wounded, of the North-Carolinians. We hear that our cavalry under Gen. Huger were surprised near Monk's Corner, and have been totally defeated ; that we lost between 20 and 30 killed and wounded ; among the former, Major Vernier of Pulaski's legion—and 150 horses. About forty of the Virginians got in last night over Cooper river. A large party of the enemy marched up the country, crossed Wando river, and took post at the church, Hobcaw Neck. Gen. Scott, with the light infantry, crossed over Cooper river to Lempriere's before day this morning, in order to keep open the communication, if possible, as any fresh provisions we got was from that quarter—(with private orders to secure Wappetaw, an advantageous bridge, for the retreat of the army, &c.) Lt. Cols. Webster, Tarleton and Robertson are said to have commanded the enemy's party who surprised our horse on the 14th inst., and gone over Cooper and Wando river afterwards ; they say 700 infantry and 300 horse." [McIntosh.]

The account of the surprise of the American horse greatly exaggerated the evil. The surprise was a wretched one, and resulted in the temporary dispersion of the command. The chief loss fell upon Pulaski's horse, commanded by Vernier. The effect upon the fortunes of Charleston, and the spirits of the besieged, was particularly unfortunate.

"18th April. Fire from the batteries as heretofore, and a shower of musketry all day. This day, like the last, very rainy." [De Brahm.]

"19th April. Fire from the batteries as heretofore. This evening three of the enemy's gallies descended from Wappoo,

down Ashley river to the fleet, under a heavy fire from our batteries ; one lost her main-mast. This night the communication [D] is made from the battery of the French sailors (Q) to the town." [*De Brahm.*]

"19th April. The enemy continued their approaches to our right, within 250 yards of the front of the square redoubt; and began an approach from the left battery towards our advanced redoubt, or half moon battery, and moved some of their mortars into the latter. A considerable party of them showed themselves before our post at Lempriere's this morning, but soon retreated upon giving them some cannon shot. Our party there was too small to pursue them. Gen. Scott mounted some men upon his own and other officers' horses, to reconnoitre them and get intelligence; and then, being sent for, set off for town to a council of war, which met this morning at Gen. Moultrie's quarters, having attempted it repeatedly before at Gen. Lincoln's, but as often interrupted so much that we could come to no determination, or do any business—(also to accommodate Col. Lamey, who was sick.) Besides the general officers at this council, Col. Lamey and Col. Beekman were called to it to represent the engineer and artillery departments; and Col. Simons, as commandant of the town military; when the subject first proposed to be considered upon the 13th inst., and several times since at our meetings, was again offered by Gen. Lincoln, and the returns of the army commissaries, provisions, &c., laid before the council, with charge of the greatest secrecy in that, as well as any determination that may be taken. Some gentlemen seemed still inclined to evacuation, notwithstanding the difficulty appeared much greater now, than when formerly (first) mentioned, which was my opinion also, and I proposed leaving the militia for the guards, &c., in garrison, until the continental troops left the city, but was carried against us by arguments of Col. Lamey, and for offering terms of capitulation. In the midst of our conference, the Lieut. Governor, Gadsden, happened to come in—whether by accident or design, is not known—and Gen. Lincoln proposed that he might be allowed to sit as one of the council. He appeared surprised and displeased that we had entertained a thought of capitulation, or evacuating the garrison, and he acknowledged

himself entirely ignorant of the state of provisions, &c., before ; but said he would consult his council, and promised that if it was determined by us to capitulate, he would send such articles as they required for the citizens of Charlestown, in an hour or two.

“Adjourned in the evening to Gen. Lincoln’s quarters, when Col. Lamey representing the insufficiency of our fortifications, (if they were worthy of being called so,) the improbability of holding out many days longer, and the impracticability of making our retreat good, as the enemy were now situated, carried it for offering (trying first) terms of honourable capitulation first. The Lieut. Governor, with four of his council, Messrs. Ferguson, Hutson, Cattle, and Dr. Ramsay, coming in a little after, used the council very rudely ; the Lieut. Governor declaring he would protest against our proceedings, that the militia were willing to live upon rice alone, rather than give up the town upon any terms, and that even the old women were so accustomed to the enemy’s shot now, that they travelled the streets without fear or dread ; but if we were determined to capitulate, he had his terms in his pocket, ready. Mr. Ferguson, on the other hand, said, the inhabitants of the town observed several days (some time) ago, the boats collected together to carry off the continental troops, but that they would keep a good watch upon us, (the army,) and if it was ever attempted, he would be among the first who would open the gates for the enemy, and assist them in attacking us before we got aboard. After the Lieut. Governor and Counsellors were gone some time, Col. C. C. Pinckney came in abruptly upon the council, and forgetting his usual politeness, addressed Gen. Lincoln in great warmth and much the same strain as the Lieut. Governor had done, adding, that those who were for business required no council, and that he came over on purpose from Fort Moultrie, to prevent any terms being offered the enemy, or evacuating the garrison ; and addressing himself to Col. Lamey, charged the engineer department with being the sole authors and promoters of any proposals, &c. I was, myself, so much hurt by the repeated insults given to the commanding officer in so public a manner, and obliquely to us all through him, that I could not help declaring, as it was thought impracticable to get the conti-

mental troops out, I was for holding the garrison to the last extremity; which was at once agreed to, except by Colonel Lamey, who said we were already come to the last extremity, or if we were not of that opinion, desired to know what we called the last extremity. But it was carried without other opposition to hold out, and we parted this night. I desired a letter signed by Gen. Moultrie and myself on the 17th, might be destroyed, which was done before us." [*McIntosh.*]

The success of the defenders of the post of Lempriere, in driving off the party of British that first showed itself in the neighbourhood, was perhaps a misfortune. It was a premature exhibition of strength which taught him caution, and saved him a disaster. On this point, Tarleton ought to be an authority. He writes :

"A detachment of continentals from Charlestown, took possession of Lamprey's Point, a peninsula on the east side of Cooper river. Col. Webster with the principal part of his command, marched towards the Neck, (which the Americans had fortified with indefatigable ardour, since their arrival,) and in all probability would have ventured an attempt to dislodge them, if a masked battery of eighteen pounders had not, fortunately for the English, opened upon a reconnoitering party; which circumstance, together with the flank fire of a galley and an armed vessel, demonstrated the impracticability of the design." [*Campaigns.*]

The council described above, was necessarily a stormy one. The citizens might well be indignant that, after being buoyed up with the assurances of the adequacy of their defences, the sufficiency of their provisions and material for defence and siege, they should be told, when too late to remove their effects and families, yet at the very beginning of the bombardment, that defence was impossible. Of what calibre could the general and his engineers have been, who could blunder in this fashion? We have seen what Whipple said about the scarcity of provisions—what Timothy said about the sluggishness of all proceedings, and what McIntosh says of the neglect

to call a council of war, until it became necessary to say that the defences were worthless, and the provisions inadequate to the wants of the garrison. Gen. Moultrie, according to a private letter of Mr. Gervais, was the only general officer who objected to capitulation. It was probably from him that the Lieut. Governor (Gadsden) and C. C. Pinckney received a hint of what was in progress. "This step, it is added," says Gervais, "had occasioned great discontent as well among the regulars as militia, who wish to defend the place to the last extremity—are in high spirits, and so resolved as to offer to receive only half rations a day, if necessary."

"20th April. Fire from the batteries, as usual. This evening the ravelin (II) commenced in front of the Horn wall." [*DeBrahm.*]

"20th April. This morning fourteen sail of shipping appeared off the bar, said to be a reinforcement to Gen. Clinton, having a fine day, cold and windy. Two of our magazines blown up by shells on Gibbs's battery, on the right; only one man hurt, but much other damage. This day Gen. Lincoln called a council of war again; same members as yesterday, and the same subjects debated on. Col. Lamey still insisted upon the impossibility of holding out the garrison much longer; and a retreat seeming to him impracticable, proposed that honourable terms of capitulation should first be offered, which possibly might be accepted by Gen. Clinton; or, if it did not succeed, that we might then attempt a retreat, if we thought it could be accomplished. The opposition now expected from the citizens of the town in evacuating it, in addition to the former obstacles we had in consideration, viz: a large party of foot and horse upon Wando Neck, and a number of the enemy's boats hauled across Charleston Neck from Ashley into Cooper river, &c., induced the whole council to come into the Colonel's proposal, and make the trial. I requested to be the last in giving our votes, upon which we parted.

"The enemy's approach continues on our left; their mortars moved from the left battery into their approaches. An 18 pounder dismounted in Capt. Bottard's battery, on our

right. Four of the enemy's galleys that lay in Wappoo creek, and came into Ashley river almost every night since 4th inst., went down about 9 o'clock this night to their shipping and Fort Johnson, under a very heavy firing from all our batteries, west and south of the town. The enemy retreated from Hob caw across Wappoo bridge, &c." [*McIntosh.*]

"21st April. Fire from the batteries as usual. This morning the enemy had commenced two batteries (R and S) near their second parallel." [*DeBrahm.*]

"21st April. A flag sent from us to Gen. Clinton, requiring a truce for six hours, to consider upon terms of capitulation; which is granted, and afterwards prolonged by messengers.

"The articles proposed and sent by Gen. Lincoln, were made out by himself and Col. Ternant, without his general officers; but they were called in the evening to Gen. Lincoln's tent, to consider upon Gen. Clinton and Admiral Arbuthnot's reply, which, after some hours spent in finding copy of the articles we sent out, was unanimously agreed to be a rejection of the whole, and that a messenger should be sent out to inform them that they might begin firing again when they pleased. Which they did immediately, about nine at night, with greater virulence and fury than ever; and continued it without intermission till daylight, and was returned smartly from the garrison.

"The enemy opened two embrasures against our battery No. 4. A twelve pounder dismounted in redan No. 7. The killed and wounded lately are so many, that they cannot be ascertained. Col. Timming, of North-Carolina, with his regiment of militia, about 200, came over from Lempriere's, and joined my brigade." [*McIntosh.*]

Moultrie tells us that the council called by Lincoln, contemplated the propriety of evacuating the town by the troops; but it was found they had put off the question to a period when it was no longer an open one. The officers consulted were of opinion, that evacuation was unadvisable, "because of the opposition made to it by the civil authority and the inhabitants, and because, even if they could succeed in defeat-

ing a large body of the enemy posted in their way, they had not a sufficiency of boats to cross the Santee before they might be overtaken by the whole British army." A capitulation was recommended in preference. In other words, lest the enemy should take us *vi et armis*, we will surrender. Whether, without cavalry, in which the British were not strong, they could have got to the Santee, is another question.

"22d April. Fire from the batteries as usual, and more from the musketry than ever. This morning (21) a parley was sent the enemy, and the answer returned about 9 o'clock in the evening." [*De Brahm.*]

"22d April. Our ration this day ordered to be reduced to $\frac{3}{4}$ lb. of beef. Lieut. Col. Laurens, with his light infantry, to return from Lempriere's to town, and resume his former post. The enemy keep up a heavy cannonade, and approach fast on our left, in front of the advanced redoubt, or half moon battery. Three men wounded, &c. They made several boyaux from their second parallel." [*McIntosh.*]

From the manuscript journal of an unknown officer, who calls himself a Snbaltern, we have the following only partially legible paragraph:

"Sent for by to come to town without baggage. Arrived in the evening. Heavy firing from both sides. The approaches towards our works carried on briskly by the enemy. Much execution done by their shells, which are thrown upon every part of our lines. The number killed and wounded difficult to be ascertained. From the 21st it was allowed there were fifteen lost each day from the continentals. . . . Alarm this night; the enemy approaching to our gate and appearing in column, as if intending a storm. A heavy cannonade from our lines. The soldiers on the right beginning to fire, it ran through the ranks, and for a few minutes, one continued roar from the cannon and small arms. Sergeant ———, of Parker's, killed by a shell this day." [*Subaltern.*]

"22d April. Approaches continued on our left in front of the advanced redoubt. The enemy kept up a heavy cannonade. Three men wounded." [*Moultrie.*]

"23d April. Fire from the batteries as usual. The enemy extended the saps of his second parallel." [*DeBrahm.*]

"23d April. The enemy's approaches continually carrying on upon our right and left; those on our right within twenty yards of our dam. A mortar moved from the right of Col. Parker's encampment. About 8 at night, two deserters from the enemy. They confirm the report of a considerable reinforcement (Lord Cornwallis with 2,500 men) from New-York; that they detached ten companies of light infantry to go over to Haddrill's Point; and say the enemy lost a number of men lately by our shells." [*McIntosh.*]

Tarleton writes :

"A considerable corps of troops recently arrived from New-York, enabled Sir Henry Clinton to strengthen the detachment under Webster. The importance of the command, and the critical situation of the enemy, induced him to request Lieut. Gen. Earl Cornwallis to direct the future operations of the army on the east side of Cooper river. The intention of Gen. Lincoln, in fortifying Lempriere's Point, seems to have been counteracted by the arrival of Lord Cornwallis with additional troops, as it was evacuated soon after that event." [*Campaigns.*]

"24th April. Fire from the batteries as usual. This morning at day break, a party of 200 men, under Col. Henderson, made a sortie upon the enemy's works, which caused a general fire of musketry on both sides. The party returned in a little while with 12 prisoners. Our loss was one captain and one soldier killed." [*De Brahm.*]

"24th April. A party of 200 men, detached from the Virginians and South-Carolinians, under the command of Lieut. Col. Henderson, sallied out at daylight this morning, opposite the 'half moon,' or advanced battery, upon the enemy's approaches, and completely surprised them in their trenches. About 15 of them were killed with the bayonet in their ditches, and 12 prisoners brought off, seven of whom were wounded. The enemy attempted to support them, but were obliged to retreat upon our giving them some rounds of grape shot. The prisoners say Major Hall, of the 74th regiment, commanded them, but no officer was to be found.

Capt. Moultrie killed, and two privates wounded, upon our side, in our retreat. The whole was done in a few minutes, without our party's firing a single gun, and in the greatest order. It is said Col. C. C. Pinckney and Lieut. Col. Laurens assured Gen. Lincoln they could supply the garrison with plenty of beef from Lempriere's Point; upon which the commissary was ordered to issue a full allowance again, as before the order of the 22d; but, unfortunately, the first and only cattle butchered at Lempriere's for the use of the garrison, were altogether spoiled and useless, through neglect or mismanagement, before they came over. These gentlemen are said, also, to have some days past promised to keep the communication open on the Cooper river side, and besides beef, to send a sufficient number of negroes over to town for the works, which were much wanted. ———, (Kelley's,) Lieut. Col. Laurens with the light infantry, and Col. C. C. Pinckney with the greater part (or almost the whole) of the first South-Carolina regiment, came into garrison this morning from Lempriere's, and ordered into the horn-works, and to mount the post guard. Major Harris and 75 of his regiment, North-Carolina militia, ordered to Lempriere's, under the direction of Col. Malmedy, who, with Major Hogg, is left to command that post; and Lieut. Col. Scott, with ——— of the South-Carolina regiment, and about ——— militia, to command at Fort Moultrie. Col. Parker, of the Virginians, killed about eight this evening, by a rifle ball, while looking over the parapet in the half-moon battery; two privates killed also, and seven wounded, with others not known; having kept an incessant fire of cannon, mortars and small arms on both sides." [McIntosh.]

Col. Laurens came in from Lempriere's, and Col. Pinckney from *Fort Moultrie*, bringing with him the greater part of the 1st South-Carolina regiment, which had been stationed at the latter post. A small body of troops was left to hold the fort, which might very well have been abandoned entirely. The passage of the enemy's fleet had rendered it of little use, and the garrison was only exposed to capture. Garrison and guns should have both been transferred to the city defences, as soon

as the British fleet had passed into the harbour. The journal of the unknown Subaltern, on the 24th, contains the following :

"24th April. At daybreak, Col. Henderson, Major Stephenson, and 200 men from Generals Woodford and Scott's brigade, made a sortie on the enemy in the trenches. The assault was conducted with spirit and success. Our men attacked with the bayonet, killed about twenty, wounded near as many, and took twelve prisoners. The enemy were discovered this night working near our half-moon battery. Col. Richard Parker, having reconnoitered them, returned to the battery to direct the fire, when the Yagers (Hessian) sending a platoon of rifles into the embrazure, * * * shot the Colonel * * * he died immediately * * * His character is so well known, it need not be said how much he is regretted. Capt. Moultrie (Thomas) killed at the sortie. Lempriere's Ferry evacuated by Col. Malmédy ; retreat disorderly. Lost Lieut. Worsham, of Russell's regiment, and twenty privates of the Virginia line, who were left as a party to cover the embarkation of the rest. He and the party taken coming down the river Pinckney's regiment, which was stationed at Fort Moultrie, called to the garrison ; three companies of * * * being left to defend that post, with some militia." [*Subaltern.*]

"25th April. As usual. Last night Col. Parker, of the Virginia line, was killed by a musket shot." [*De Brahm.*]

"25th April. Between 12 and 1 this morning, a heavy fire of cannon and musketry from our advanced redoubt, and the right of our lines, occasioned (it is said) by the enemy's advancing in column. It is certain they gave several huzzas, and abused us—calling us bloody dogs—being upon duty myself, and upon the lines all the night ; but whether they were out of their trenches is not so clear. It was forty or fifty minutes before I could put a stop to the waste of ammunition, until we could make sure of a proper object. The enemy returned the fire smartly, and threw several light balls and carcasses into the town. About 2 o'clock this afternoon, Lord Cornwallis, with about 3000 men, took possession of Mt. Pleasant, Haddrill's Point, having crossed from Charles-

town Neck over Cooper river, to —, last night. Three men wounded." [*McIntosh.*]

"26th April. As usual. The enemy commenced his third parallel. Troops from a vessel and 4 galleys landed at Mount Pleasant, and took possession of a battery of one piece, losing one galley in this affair." [*De Brahm.*]

"26th April. The small ship, Lord George Germaine, and a sloop, joined the enemy's fleet near Fort Johnson, after passing Fort Moultrie, at a great distance, with little or no damage. Some of the enemy's ships remain below, in Five Fathom Hole, and it was said two of 74 guns lay off the bar. The Vigilant, Captain Brett, at Beaufort. The enemy pretty quiet yesterday and last night. We suppose they are bringing cannon into their third parallel. They are seen strengthening their approaches, and in possession of Mount Pleasant. Brigadier General Duportail arrived from Philadelphia, which he left the 3d inst.; he says there was no prospect of our getting any reinforcement soon from our grand army, Congress having only proposed to General Washington (then at Morristown) the sending the Maryland line. One man killed; Captain Goodwin, of 3d South-Carolina, and one private, wounded. The enemy began their third parallel." [*McIntosh.*]

Our subaltern's journal, on this day (26th) contains the following:

"26th April. Much mischief done daily by the shells. Lieut. Philips, of Col. Russell's regiment, killed in the half-moon by a shell. Mr. Peter Lord, of the militia, killed at the same time. Circumstances begin now to grow somewhat alarming, from the allowance of provision being curtailed. Strict search made in the houses of the inhabitants for this article. Some discovered, but inadequate to the supplies necessary. Soldierly, notwithstanding the many inconveniences and fatigues thus suffered, are in high spirits."

Moultrie, on the same day, writes: "As soon as General Duportail came into garrison, and looked at the enemy, and at our works, he declared that they were not tenable, and that the British might have taken the town ten days ago.

He wished to leave the garrison immediately; but General Lincoln would not allow him, because it would dispirit the troops." A council of war was called, to consider this unpleasant opinion of Duportail. Here it was proposed again that the place should be evacuated, and the continental troops privately withdrawn. But, says Moultrie, "when the citizens were informed upon what the council were deliberating, some of them came into council and expressed themselves very warmly, declaring to Lincoln, that if he attempted to withdraw his troops they would cut up his boats and open the gates to the enemy. This put a stop to all thoughts of an evacuation."

27th April. De Brahm only reports "as usual." McIntosh gives a full report of the events of the day, his details being confirmed, as is generally the case, by Moultrie, who seems, indeed, to have freely used this journal of McIntosh.

"27th April. Last night, Col. Malmedy, with his detachment, at Lempriere's Ferry, retreated in great confusion across the river, after spiking-up four eighteen-pounders they left behind. About 1 in the afternoon, four of the enemy's galleys, an armed sloop and a frigate, moved down the river, and anchored opposite and near the mouth of Hog Island, after a very faint opposition from the cannon of Fort Moultrie. One of the galleys got aground, and was lost. Five militiamen of James Island (Capt. Stiles,) deserted last night in a boat. One private killed and five wounded. Tar barrels ordered to be fixed before our lines every evening, and burn all night, to prevent a surprise, as the enemy are close to the canal, and keep up almost a continued running fire of small arms, night and day, upon us. A picquet, of a field officer and 100 men, of my militia brigade, ordered every evening to Gadsden's old house, to support a small guard of a sergeant and 12 regulars, upon the wharf, in case of an attack by the enemy's boats upon that quarter. Major Pinckney ordered out on same duty."

"28th April. As usual. Last night our post at Lem-

priere's was evacuated, and taken possession of by the enemy to-day. It was not until this moment that Charlestown was completely invested; the English having possession [now] of James Island, Wappoo, Charleston Neck, Hobcaw Point, and his fleet anchored in the roadstead before the town." [*De Brahm.*]

"28th April. Two deserters from the enemy, at Hobcaw, brought over by our troops. We saw the British flag flying at our late post, Lempriere's. Major Low and several supernumerary officers quitted the garrison over Cooper river. The enemy very busy throwing up their third parallel, within a few yards of our canal, which is most plain is above 100 yards from our breastwork.

"Our fatigue hard at work, enclosing the horn work. The few negroes remaining in town are obliged to be pressed daily, and kept under guard, as the masters, as well as the slaves, were unwilling they should work. Two privates killed; Lieut. Campaign, of North-Carolina, and two privates, wounded." [*McIntosh.*]

A letter of this date, (28th April,) from John Lewis Gervais, at Georgetown, which is now before us, embodies a lively summary of events in Charleston, as they would be likely to traverse the country on the wings of rumour. We only quote from this letter those portions which relate to the seeming or promised resources in other parts of the State.

"During the course of this week, we are in hopes we shall have 1500 or 2000 men on the other side of the Santee. . . . By our last advices, Gen. Caswell was, with 1000 men, near Col. Thomson. Gen. Williamson was expected last Sunday at Orangeburg, with 900 men—say 600. General Caswell's second division was said to be at Camden; Col. Thomson was at Orangeburg with 200 men; and 400 Virginia continentals—I believe Gen. Scott's brigade—were said to be at Nelson's Ferry, and our horse at that place and at Murray's Ferry. They are all ordered to rendezvous at Lanneau's Ferry, with all the militia that can be collected from Pedee, and Richardson's former brigade—for he resigned long ago. We hope to

throw a supply of provisions this week into Charleston, of rice, corn, flour and pork, by way of Fort Moultrie."


In the evening he writes with a changed aspect. "Vessels were to sail this morning with provisions for Fort Moultrie, . . but if our advices be true . . . all communication must be at an end." Here follows a summary of particulars already in our possession. He continues :

"Light horse are expected here to-day to refit, for they are not yet in a condition to face the enemy. They lost a number of saddles, pistols and swords, besides horses ; yet Col. Washington will not allow it to have been a surprise. Col. White now commands all the horse. Major Vanderhorst, formerly in the first regiment, arrived yesterday from Colonel Thomson, where he saw a letter from General Williamson, giving an account that Colonel Pickens had been down with a party within five miles of Savannah, and had killed about sixty negroes in arms, and some white men with them, among whom were two overseers of Gov. Wright. . . . It appears that Gen. Williamson was at home, and that the news of his approach was premature. . . . In some places the enemy have behaved very well to the inhabitants ; in others, very ill. Some houses they plundered because there was nobody at home ; others have been plundered because they were at home. It is said that Charles Pinckney's family have been plundered of all their plate, linen and provisions. Mrs. Butler, wife to the Major, had everything taken from her. He and John Deas hid in the swamp and got off. Gen. Huger, and his aid, John Izard, were in the swamp from Friday morning, the day our horse were routed, till Monday. Gen. Huger is gone to his plantation in St. Mathews, very sick. It was a long fast. . . . Col. John Harleston is taken prisoner at his own house."

"29th April. As usual. The enemy's third parallel almost finished, and battery (T) commenced, as likewise a redoubt (V) on our side." [*De Brahm.*]

"29th April. The enemy's third parallel nearly finished, and redoubt begun towards the middle of it, opposite the gate, and another towards our left. Our hands began a re-

tired redoubt on the right of the horn work. Gen. Lincoln informed the general officers, privately, that he intended the horn work as a place of retreat for the whole army, in case they were driven from the lines. I observed to him the impossibility of those who were stationed at the South Bay and Ashley Ferry retreating there, in such case; to which he replied, that we might secure ourselves as best we could. A heavy bombardment from the enemy during the night, and small arms never ceasing. A deserter from them says, they are preparing a bridge to throw over the canal. Capt. Templeton, of 4th Georgia regiment, wounded by shell ['of which he died.' *Moultrie.*] Tattoo ordered not to beat. Colonel Malmedy ordered to deliver a written report of the evacuation of Hobcaw, etc."

"30th April. As usual. [*De Brahm.*] General Lincoln received a letter from Governor Rutledge, upon which he congratulates the army, in general orders, for hearing of a large reinforcement, that may open our communication again to the country, etc. The deserter yesterday, tells us the huzzas were from the enemy's working party, who thought we were sallying. The engineers, they say, ordered them, when that happened, to give three cheers, and fall back upon their covering party, who, not having been apprised of it, received them as enemies, in consequence of which a considerable number of them were killed and wounded. He confirms the account of their receiving a considerable reinforcement from New-York, and says the last detachment to Hobcaw amounts to above two thousand; that they expect their shipping up to town every night, and are preparing a large number of fascines to fill up the canal. Severe firing of cannon, mortars and small arms, continued on both sides. Lieut. Campaign and Ensign Hall, of the North-Carolinians, wounded badly, and Lieut. Philips, of the Virginians. Privates killed and wounded not known, there are so many.  I think it is this day that General Lincoln called the general officers together, at his quarters, that General Du Portail, who had viewed our fortifications, might give us his opinion respecting them, and the state of the siege, which was, in substance, much the same as Col. Lamey repeatedly expressed before—

viz: that our works could only be called field lines, and could hold out but a very few days, etc." [*McIntosh.*]

May 1. De Brahm writes of the three first days of May, that all goes on "as usual." "Our hospital ship taken by the English, and carried higher up the river."

"May 1. Our fatigue employed in erecting another redoubt on the left of the horn work, and completing. These new works intended for a retreat, in case of necessity. The enemy appear to be about another battery, their third parallel, opposite No. 12, on our right. Five men deserted last night from the galleys, which yet remain in Wappoo Creek; the many risks they ran in the attempt is astonishing. A very smart bombardment kept up during this day. Capt. Mumford, of North-Carolina, wounded by a musket ball, and Mr. P. Lord, a volunteer, [in the continental artillery,] killed yesterday by a shell." [*McIntosh.*]

Moultrie, on the same day, gives us quite a lively picture of the exhaustion and exposure consequent upon the incessant duties of the besieged. "Mr. Lord and Mr. Basquin, two volunteers, were sleeping upon a mattress together, when Mr. Lord was killed by a shell falling upon him; and Mr. Basquin, at the same time, had the hair of his head burnt, yet did not wake 'till he was called upon. The fatigue in the advanced redoubt was so great, that, for want of sleep, many faces were so swelled they could scarcely see out of their eyes. I was obliged to relieve Major Mitchell, the commanding officer. They were constantly on the look-out for the shells, that were continually falling among them. It was by far the most dangerous post on the lines. On my visit to this battery, not having been there for a day or two, I took the usual way of going in, which was a bridge that crossed our ditch, quite exposed to the enemy. In the meantime, they had advanced their works within 70 or 80 yards of the

bridge, which I did not know of. As soon as I had stepped upon the bridge, an uncommon number of bullets whistled about me. On looking to my right, I could just see the heads of twelve or fifteen men, firing upon me from behind a breast-work. I moved on and got in. When Major Mitchell saw me, he asked me by which way I came in. When I told him 'over the bridge,' he was astonished, and said, 'It is a thousand to one, sir, that you were not killed. We have a covered way to go out and in.' I stayed in this battery about a quarter of an hour, to give the necessary orders; in which time we were constantly skipping about, to get out of the way of the shells thrown from their howitzers. They were not more than one hundred yards from our works, and throwing their shells in bushels in our front and left flanks." John Lewis Gervais, writing from Georgetown on the 1st May, says, "I believe there are about 800 stands of arms here; but more than that number will be wanted to arm the South-Carolina and some of our own militia. If we had arms enough, I certainly should be of opinion to arm as many blacks as were willing to engage." This opinion of one of the Privy Council of South-Carolina, at a moment of greatest peril, shows no such fear of our "peculiar institution" as our Eastern brethren constantly intimate that we entertain. At that time the danger would have arisen from the great number of the slaves being of the African race—a race peculiarly brutish and capricious. The negroes of the South, now, are almost wholly natives of the country. The opinions of Gervais were entertained by many others, and the measure was recommended by General Greene. But they were not an efficient race in battle. The British uniformed some three hundred of them, and found no profit in it. Besides, they were most needed for agricultural purposes, by both parties. The negro labourer of Carolina fed the troops of both armies, as well in

Georgia as Carolina, during the last three years of the war. Thomas Bee writes from Newbern, N. C., (May 1)—

“The Legislature now sitting seem anxious to give us every assistance. They have resolved to raise and forward 6000 men to the assistance of our State; but this will be a work of time. I have suggested to the Governor, that 1 or 2000, pushed on in three or four weeks, will be of the greatest consequence; and he thinks he will be able to effect this in that period. Accounts from the *northward* mention the Maryland line, under General Smallwood, about 1600 men, as having crossed Chesapeake Bay, on their way to South-Carolina.”

“2d May. Last night the enemy made a ditch on the right, to drain our canal. A number of men killed and wounded the last three or four days, which cannot be ascertained.

“A general monthly return ordered to be made, with account of the killed, wounded and deserted since 1st April.

“A nine-pounder burst in battery No. 12, and a quantity of fixed ammunition blown up in batteries Nos. 10 and 12.”

“It is said the enemy throw shells at us, charged with rice and sugar.

“Lieut. Col. Smith, of town militia, with a party to press negroes for the works, if possible.” [*McIntosh.*]

According to tradition, it was not rice and sugar with which the shells of the British were thus ironically charged, but wheat flour and molasses. An inscription addressed it “to the Yankee officers in Charleston,” [our Eastern brethren must remember that “*Yankee*,” in the European mouth, applied to all the Americans—Lincoln and Whipple were probably the only two of Yankee nurture that were in the city,] and courteously informed them that it contained a supply of the commodities of which they were supposed to stand most in need. The spirit of the garrison was still good. They could still jest above the volcano. Having ascertained that the shell was sent them from a battery manned by a force entirely Scottish, they emptied the

shell of its contents, and, filling it with lard and sulphur, threw it back to their courteous assailants, with the same inscription which originally accompanied it. Garden says, "It was understood, after the siege, that the note was received, but not with that good humour that might have been expected, had it been considered as a *jeu d'esprit*, resulting from justifiable retaliation."

"They were misinformed," says Moultrie, "if they supposed us in want of rice and sugar." Of the latter article, indeed, the allowance was exceedingly liberal, and furnished to the troops in such quantities, by way of supplying the want of other articles, that one of their favourite amusements was to pursue the spent hot shot of the enemy, in order, by flinging the sugar upon the ball, to convert it into candy.

On this date, (2d May,) Gervais writes from Georgetown :

"We had an alarm here yesterday. It was said the enemy were at Durand's, on Wambaw. It seems a party of 25 men had been on Santee, near Dupre's Ferry. Gen. Caswell is at Lanneau's, with continentals and militia, 800 or 900 men; a force sufficient, I am sure, if properly disposed, to prevent 2 or 3000 from crossing that river; and this place may be secured till Charleston falls."

"3d May. Cannonading, bombarding, and continual firing with small arms, as usual, on both sides. Our citizens employed fetching pickets, etc." [*McIntosh.*]

"4th May. Our rations reduced to 6 oz. meat, and bad enough. Coffee and sugar allowed the soldiers, with their rice. The enemy appear to have possession of our battery, on the end of Gadsden Bridge, leading to Fort Moultrie. Fire from the enemy's cannon slack, but they do not spare shells or small arms. Our hospital ship carried away." [*McIntosh.*]

De Brahm again includes the events of three days, in his memoranda—the 4th, 5th and 6th. "The enemy," says he, "employed in making three batteries (W, X, Y) upon his third parallel, and we to make two redoubts, (Z, U.)"

5th May. "From all appearance," says Moultrie, "Fort Moultrie is in the hands of the enemy. A British flag is seen flying on the staff." The subaltern officer, unknown, whose journal may now be employed to supply the place of that of Gen. McIntosh, (which closed with the item of the fourth of May,) confirms the intelligence. He says :

"5th May. Fort Moultrie surrendered to the British forces. This fort, by many people, was deemed impregnable ; yet the want of provision, and the weakness of the garrison, obliged it to surrender—greatest part of the garrison which was posted there being ordered to reinforce the town. Lt. Col. Scott, of South-Carolina, commanded the fort at the surrender. This affair damped the spirits of the citizens, though not of the army. All communication between the city and country was now cut off, and the garrison and citizens entirely dependent on their own stores, which were exhausted to a few days short allowance. Some days before this accident, Col. Malmedy, having no command, and being somewhat disagreeable to the garrison, in consequence of the affair at Lempriere's, was advised to quit the town while there was a probability of a passage. He set out in a boat, accompanied by Edward Rutledge, Esq., late a member of Congress, who had served till this time of the siege with reputation, as Captain in the Charlestown artillery. There were also [in the boat] two men of suspected characters. They were taken by the enemy. Upon landing, Malmedy attempted to escape. Meeting with a negro, he desired him to pilot him clear of the British camp. The negro, intending to do the enemy a favour, conducted him close to their lines, which Malmedy perceiving, drew on him, and cut him several times. The negro closed with him, and drawing a knife, wounded him so * * that we hear he is since dead. The average of the killed, each day, amounted to fifteen, by shot, shells, etc."

Fort Moultrie was given up without firing a gun. Indeed, resistance was now idle. Tarleton writes that, in pursuance of intelligence which gave the Admiral a full knowledge of the condition of the post, "he landed a body of seamen and

marines, under the command of Capt. Hudson, to attempt the fort by storm, on the west and north-west faces, whilst the ships of the squadron battered it in front. The garrison, consisting of continentals and militia, to the amount of 200 men, seeing the imminent danger to which they were exposed, and sensible of the impossibility of relief, accepted of the terms offered by a summons on the 7th May, and by capitulation surrendered themselves prisoners of war." But the fact is, the supplies were cut off. Good fight might have been made; but the blockade was complete, and the garrison must have perished by starvation.

"6th May. This day Sir Henry Clinton sent proposals of surrender to us, beginning with a preamble, that it proceeded from his humanity and desire to spare the effusion of blood. Council of general and field officers called. Governor and Council also to be consulted." [*Subaltern.*]

"6th May. The besieging party finished their third parallel, which they had carried close to the canal, and by a sap pushed to the dam which supplied it with water on the right, drained it in several parts to the bottom. On the 6th and 7th of May, the artillery was mounted in the batteries of this parallel, and the traverses and communications were perfectly completed. Thus enclosed on every side, and driven to its last defences, Sir Henry Clinton, wishing to preserve Charlestown from destruction, and to prevent that effusion of blood which must be the inevitable consequence of a storm, opened a correspondence on the 8th with General Lincoln, for the purpose of a surrender." [*Tarleton.*]

The 7th May was distinguished by a disaster—the partial destruction of the principal magazine of the garrison, by the bursting of a shell. This magazine stood behind St. Philip's Church. Moultrie had the powder removed (100,000 lbs.) to the north-east corner of the Exchange, where it was bricked up, and where it remained undiscovered by the British, during the long period while they held the city.

"7th May. Negotiations continued. Various conjectures concerning the acceptance or rejection of our proposals." [*Subaltern.*]

"7th May. As usual. This morning, at 8 o'clock, Fort Moultrie capitulated. A sixty gun ship joined the English fleet." [*De Brahm.*]

"7th May. The conditions demanded by the American commander being deemed higher than he had a right to expect from his present situation, they were rejected, and hostilities renewed." [*Tarleton.*]

"8th May. As usual. Another redoubt (C) was commenced last night, in rear of our left line. This morning the enemy sent a parley again to demand the town. The truce was prolonged throughout the whole day. In a council of war, composed of all the officers of the general staff, it was resolved by a majority of votes to propose a capitulation." [*De Brahm.*]

"8th May. A second summons from Sir Henry Clinton, informing us of the fall of Fort Moultrie, and that the remains of our cavalry were cut to pieces the day before yesterday. The embrasures of the enemy's batteries of third parallel opened last night. Our meat quite out; rice, sugar and coffee served out." [*Moultrie.*]

"8th May. Truce continued till 8 o'clock in the evening. Our proposals were rejected, and hostilities commenced at the time above mentioned. * * * Although it was * * * that the subsistence of the garrison must depend entirely upon what rice was concealed in town by the inhabitants, for private (use), and this quantity known to be but small, yet some persons were clear for opposition, and insisted upon such terms as they were certain would not be complied with, yet ignorant of the most distant means of succour or resource. These people, consisting chiefly of those who were possessed of property in the town, joined only by two continental land, and one naval officer, outweighed the council and renewed the fire." [*Subaltern.*]

The fire was not renewed before the 9th of May, though our Subaltern, in a sentence which we omit, describes it as having followed the same day, and being continued, without

intermission, the whole night. There are several small contradictions among our several journalists, in their dates, arising, no doubt, from their making the record the day after the event, and forgetting to antedate. When the fight was resumed, we are told that it began with three vigorous cheers from the batteries of the besieged; though Moultrie mentions that while the flags were passing between the two armies, the militia, assuming the affair to be quite settled, retired to the town, leaving the works wholly undefended.

“9th May. The enemy had cannon mounted in the battery of his third parallel. *Note.*—That it was for the purpose of mounting these cannon that the English proposed the truce, I do not pretend to say; but this much is certain, that, had it not been for the truce, it would have been a very laborious and dangerous job, and almost impracticable.” [*De Brahm.*]

That the British presumed to add to their works or equipment, during a state of truce, was contrary to all military rule, and should have justified an instant resumption of the fire of the garrison. That the thing was so managed, argues a most gross remissness and indifference in the officers of the garrison. We have this fact from no other authority.

“9th May. The two commanders not agreeing upon the terms of capitulation, the siege commenced this evening at 9 o'clock, with greater warmth than ever.” [*De Brahm.*]

“9th May. Hostilities continued. Orders for the purchasing commissary to seize every steer and cow in town, for the use of the garrison.

“Warm fire from the enemy this day. Their approaches are now so near as to do certain execution with their musketry. Above twenty men killed this day. Soldiers more active than the commissary, drive the cavalry into the range of the shells, where some are killed, which they soon divide: an agreeable repast, after some days' want of meat. Since the approaches of the enemy became so alarming, tar barrels

were lighted every night near the abbatis, in order to discover their advances, should they attempt to storm. * * * *
Whispered this night that the inhabitants of the town (militia) were framing a petition to Gen. Lincoln, begging of him to accept the terms offered by Gen. Clinton ; at the same time many of them refused to do farther duty. The allowance of provisions consisted now of a little coffee, sugar and rice.”
[*Subaltern.*]

“9th May. The batteries on the third parallel were then opened, and by the superiority of the fire, both of artillery and small arms, the British troops were enabled to gain the counterscarp of the outwork which flanked the canal, which they likewise passed, and then pushed on their approaches directly for the ditch of the place.” [*Tarleton.*]

“9th May. When the enemy’s third parallel was completed, we had sand bags placed upon the top of our lines, for the riflemen to fire through. The sand bags were about two feet long and one foot thick ; we laid down, first, two of them, three or four inches one from the other, and a third was laid upon the top of the two, which made a loop-hole for the riflemen. The British followed our example. Many men were killed and wounded through these holes.” [*Moultrie.*]

The Americans were in the habit of drawing the fire of entire companies, by simply elevating a hat upon a sword or bayonet, above the parapets, when, so near were the assailants, so vigilant, and such good shots—particularly the German yagers—that it would be instantly riddled with bullets. But the struggle was drawing to a close. The rejection of the terms offered by Clinton left both parties free to commence the conflict by 8 o’clock in the evening. Moultrie says : “We remained near an hour silent, all calm and ready, each waiting for the other to begin. At length we fired the first gun, and immediately followed a tremendous cannonade. About 180 or 200 pieces of heavy cannon were discharged at the same moment. The mortars from both sides threw out an immense number of shells. It was a glorious sight to see

them, like meteors, crossing each other and bursting in the air. It appeared as if the stars were tumbling down. The fire was incessant, almost the whole night, cannon balls whizzing and shells hissing continually amongst us; great guns bursting and wounded men groaning along the lines. It was a dreadful night. It was our last great effort, but availed us nothing."

"May 10. As usual," says De Brahm. Our Subaltern is more communicative.

"Militia abandon the lines, and cannot be prevailed upon to join. Cannon entirely deserted. Two pieces in the half-moon dismounted, and one unfit for use. This battery unable to make * * * * * Circumstances alarming. Capt. Valentine Peyton, firing a cannon which was deserted, and in front of which the enemy were working uncovered—shot through the head—died almost immediately, much lamented. Adjutant Ferrell killed by a shell. At 4 o'clock this afternoon a flag was sent from us, to desire a negotiation with the enemy. The militia were now convinced they were deceived in their conjectures of the quantity of provision and other stores, and sincerely desired the acceptance of terms."

"May 11. As usual. The enemy's trenches were extended under the abbatis of the advanced battery (F). This afternoon a parley was sent to the enemy, to propose fresh terms of capitulation." [*De Brahm.*]

"May 11. The negotiation continued. The soldiers not served with provisions. People of the town flock to the lines." [*Subaltern.*]

"May 12. The terms were accepted, and the English army took possession of the town. The English have worked very hard upon the fortifications. All that I can learn is that they have strengthened the profiles of the lines—that they have constructed a fort at Hampstead, very nearly upon the plan herewith marked with dotted lines, and some redoubts more advanced. They have also commenced a battery upon Shute's Folly; but the foundation is scarcely raised." [*De Brahm.*]

"May 12. Capitulation agreed on. Detachment of grenadiers takes possession of the horn work at 3 o'clock. Our troops march out and pile up their arms; they return, and are dismissed to their tents. The enemy's guards take possession of the town." [*Subaltern.*]

"On the 11th May we capitulated, and on the morning of the 12th we marched out and gave up the town." Moultrie thus describes the last scene in this eventful drama—the surrender—the humiliating denouement :

"About 11 o'clock, A.M., on the 12th of May, we marched out between 1500 and 1600 continental troops, (leaving five or six hundred sick and wounded in the hospitals,) without the horn work on our left, and piled our arms; and the officers marched the men back to the barracks, where a British guard was placed over them. The British then asked where our second division was? They were told these were all the continentals we had, except the sick and wounded. They were astonished, and said we had made a gallant defence. Capt. Rochfort had marched in, with a detachment of the artillery, to receive the returns of our artillery stores. While we were in the horn work together, in conversation, he said, 'Sir, you have made a gallant defence; but you had a great many rascals among you,' (and mentioned names,) 'who came out every night, and gave us information of what was passing in your garrison.' The militia marched out the same day, and delivered up their arms at the same place. The continental officers went into town, to their quarters, where they remained a few days, to collect their baggage and sign their paroles, then were sent over to Haddrill's Point. The next day the militia were ordered to parade near Lynch's pasture, and to bring all their arms with them—guns, swords, pistols, etc.—and those that did not strictly comply were threatened with having the grenadiers turned in among them. This threat brought out the aged, the timid, the disaffected and the infirm, many of them who had never appeared during the whole siege, which swelled the militia prisoners to at least three times the number of men we ever had upon duty. I saw the column march out, and was surprised to see it so

large ; but many of them we had excused, from age and infirmities—however, they would do to enrol on a conqueror's list."

"13th May. At 12 this day ordered from the lines—the officers to empty houses and the soldiers to the barracks. By the articles of capitulation, we understood that the officers were to wear their swords ; yet the enemy affirm that, although it was allowed us to retain, yet we should not wear them, and insisted that it was the true spirit of the article. We were obliged to lay them down—that is, to keep them out of sight. No provisions this day. [*Subaltern.*]

From the Santee, John Lewis Gervais writes on the 13th :

"Yesterday we received an account of Fort Moultrie having surrendered—the garrison are prisoners of war. They consisted only of 150 men, thirty or forty of whom were sick. Col. Scott commanded. The privates of the militia are admitted on parole. I saw William Kershaw, a brother of Joseph, yesterday—he was in that garrison, which consisted, the greatest part, of militia. He was going to Camden on foot. The fort surrendered last Sunday. A number of seamen and marines had landed, and taken possession of the western battery. Last Tuesday night, to Wednesday, there was a prodigious cannonade. We have since learnt that another truce had taken place on Tuesday, for four hours, between the garrison in Charleston and Gen. Clinton ; but not agreeing upon the terms, they opened their batteries again, about 10 o'clock at night, and we heard the firing distinctly all Wednesday. Yesterday a party of horse and foot came opposite to Lempriere's Ferry, left a picquet, and marched off. Their route is not known. If the North-Carolina reinforcements do not come in soon, the garrison of Charleston must fall into the enemy's hands. Nothing can save them but a sufficient force to march down to St. Thomas. We hear nothing of the Virginia State regiments and Colonel Armand's corps [chiefly foreigners]. Congress have, at last, ordered the Maryland line, the Delaware regiment, and Major Lee's corps, to the southward ; but they will come too late. A good many of our horses have been recovered from the disaster last Saturday. The plan was for Colonel White to

march from Georgetown on Thursday evening, with the cavalry, and to take 300 foot from Col. Beaufort, of the Virginia, to endeavour to surprise a body of the enemy at Wambaw. The agreement was made with Col. Beaufort. Col. White crossed the river, but did not meet with the infantry; on the contrary, received a note from Col. Beaufort, that he could not send them, and wishing him success. Upon this, Col. White determined, nevertheless, to go near the enemy, as they might fall in with some of their parties. He went as far as Elias Ball's, at Wambaw, and took one officer and thirteen privates, and then retreated towards Lanneau's Ferry, at which place, he says, the enemy came so suddenly upon him as occasioned a complete rout. The enemy also recovered their prisoners. Our loss is one major of brigade, Medows, (?) one captain, and about twenty men; but the greatest is 50 or 60 horses. It seems, Col. White had ordered one-half of the horses to be fed, whilst the other half should cover them; but they had their bridles out of their mouths, and some people say many of the horses were not saddled. Col. Horry's regiment crossed at Dupuy's, safe. Upon the whole, it is an unlucky affair. * * * * The enemy certainly behaved very ill at Mepkin—broke open every trunk, and carried off every thing they could without a cart, took from poor Roderick what little money he had, his watch, shirt, stockings, and even the shoes from his wife's feet. At the widow Broughton's, they also plundered every thing belonging to her and Col. Isaac Motte's wife—took even all the children's clothing. Mrs. Motte took a little baby into her lap and begged to have its clothes; to which they replied, 'they wished they had the father—they would rip out his d—d rebel heart.' Col. Motte has lost everything he had, except a few negroes that are left. Col. M. is with us * * he bears his misfortunes with great fortitude. I am sorry to inform you that ——— piloted the enemy to Lanneau's, and was very busy. He spoke in a very improper manner to young Screven, a cousin of his, who was a volunteer with Col. White, was wounded and taken prisoner, but made his escape."

This letter affords us a sufficient idea of that want of co-

operation between the several detachments of the Americans scattered through the country, by which their efforts were rendered useless, and which subjected them to the fate which finally awaited all of them. Col. Beaufort, who refuses his support to the cavalry under White, to whom he is nevertheless civil enough to desire every success, was the same person who suffered his whole command to be cut to pieces by Tarleton, at the Waxhaws, by a feebleness and mismanagement almost unexampled in military history. Of Colonel White, we need only quote what Johnson somewhere says of him, that he never failed to obtain leave of absence, whenever he desired it. He was a totally incompetent person to wear sword and epaulet. For the surprise at Lanneau's, he deserved to be cashiered and shot; and a few such examples, at this period, would have compelled the resignation of the incompetent and imbecile, and secured good officers in their places, and that vigilance and habitual state of preparation, the lack of which is the great sin and deficiency of a militia force. Of the affair at Lanneau's, Col. Tarleton gives the following account :

“The American cavalry began to assemble on the north of the Santee river, toward the latter end of April, under the protection of two Virginia regiments of infantry and the militia of Carolina. Col. White had brought some dragoons from the *northward*, [from Virginia, not from New-England,] and had collected those who had escaped from Monk's Corner. He was soon after joined by a detachment from Georgetown, and by Col. Horry's regiment of light horse. On the 5th May, he crossed the Santee at Dupuy's Ferry. Fortune favoured his first attempt. He suddenly surrounded an officer and seventeen dragoons, who were foraging at Ball's plantation, and made them prisoners. From thence he directed his march towards Lenew's (Lanneau's) Ferry, with an intention to recross the river, under the protection of 200 continental infantry, ordered by Col. Buford to meet the cavalry at that

place. [Which did not come.] Lt. Col. Tarleton, without any knowledge of the misfortune which had happened to the detachment of light infantry cavalry, was proceeding, on the same day, with a patrol of 150 dragoons, to gain intelligence at Lenew's Ferry, of the force and motions of the enemy. On the road, the British were overtaken by a loyal American, who had been a witness to the success which had attended Col. White in the morning, but had luckily escaped his power. The description of the troops, the assurances of their intention to pass the river at Lenew's, and the hope of retaking the prisoners, stimulated Tarleton to push on his patrol with the greatest expedition. At the same time, the distance of Lord Cornwallis's camp, the fatigue of the march, the heat of the weather, *and the sight of their infantry on the opposite bank*, threw the Americans quite off their guard. At 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the advanced guard of the English arrived in presence of their videttes. Tarleton, instantly forming his troops, ordered them *to charge the enemy's grand guard, and to pursue them into the main body*. The corps being totally surprised, resistance and slaughter soon ceased. Five officers and 36 men were killed and wounded; 7 officers and 60 dragoons were taken prisoners; and the whole party of the light infantry were rescued, as the boat was pushing off, to convey them to the opposite shore. All the horses, arms and accoutrements of the Americans, were captured."

"May 14th. This day passed disagreeably. * * * * Ordered to attend for paroles at different times, when there was always something to prevent their being filled. Officers and men, of the continental line, ordered to parade at the barracks, at 12 this day, to be reviewed by Gen. Leslie, or an officer appointed by him. The above order postponed * * * to-morrow morning." [Subaltern.]

14th May. We have seen with what determination the North-Carolinians were to push forward four or six thousand troops to South-Carolina. A letter of this date, from Richard Nassau Stephens, dated at Bath, N. C., says: "I thank you for the intelligence, although the news is disagreeable; and what, I think, makes it much more so, is the supineness of

this State, whose legislative body, instead of pushing forward to remove the evil from their neighbouring State, which, in fact, was keeping destruction out of their own, were disputing who should be the greatest *man*, the governor or an idol of their own creation. I dare say you are no stranger to the proceedings of this late assembly, which, I think, verifies the old adage: 'after the steed is stolen, shut the stable door.' I am sorry I cannot give you any intelligence of the *northern* (Virginia, Maryland and Delaware) troops. . . . I think that Charleston (if ever) must fall before the men can be raised from this State for her assistance."

"15th May. Troops paraded according to order this day. Gen. Leslie attended. The enemy very much surprised at the smallness of our numbers. While the men were on parade at the barracks, the arsenal where we used to keep our fixed ammunition—where our arms, and the pistols and swords of the militia were deposited this day by the enemy—was blown up accidentally. As near as we could learn, two hundred lives were lost—one-half, the enemy's guard and artillery, with three officers; the other, the inhabitants who resided near, and the lunatics and negroes that were chained in gaol for trifling misdemeanours. Some * * * men of the enemy imagined it was perpetrated by our party; but the more sensible are certain it was occasioned by the forcing of one of the guns which they were laying in the store, as most of our soldiers' guns, when delivered, were loaded, and one had fired in the same place yesterday, by being too roughly handled in a removal. Contiguous to this arsenal, there was a magazine which contained thirty thousand weight of powder, which it was expected would take fire. The inhabitants were much alarmed, and both they and the British who were quartered at that end of the town removed their effects. During the confusion which this fire occasioned, both * * * who were on parade, were strongly guarded by a detachment of Hessians. However, when the danger abated and peace was restored, Gen. Leslie returned, made some apologies for our detention from quarters, and we, as prisoners, were glad

to be released. During the confusion, the British much alarmed. Patrols in the streets till the fire was extinguished. Their whole garrison under arms." [*Subaltern.*]

This terrible explosion was, in some degree, due to the Americans. We have it from an aged relative, who saw her father return from the lines with some of his comrades, who, being ordered to deposit his arms at the arsenal, deliberately thrust into his musket all the cartridges which remained in his cartouch box, eight or nine in number. His example was followed by his companions, and the feeling of vexation which prompted this proceeding was that of many more. The arms were thrown recklessly upon the heap, and probably many of them were on cock at the moment. The consequences might have been predicted. Moultrie thus describes the event, though he accounts for it in another way. No doubt numerous concurrent circumstances brought about the result.

"When the British received their arms, they put them in wagons and carried them to a store-house, where we had deposited our fixed ammunition (about 4,000 pounds); and although they were informed by some of our officers that the arms were loaded, and several of them went off before the explosion took place, yet, in taking them out of the wagons, they threw them so carelessly into the store, that some at last set fire to the powder, which blew up the whole guard of men, and many officers that were standing by—their carcasses, legs and arms were seen in the air, and scattered over several parts of the town. One man was dashed with violence against the steeple of the new Independent Church, (Gilman's,) which was a great distance from the explosion, and left the marks of his body there for several days. The houses in the town received a great shock, and the window sashes rattled as if they would tumble out of the frames. Most of our militia men were still together. After delivering up their arms, they went in a body to assist in extinguishing the fire, that had communicated itself to the neighbouring houses; and while they were working they were under the most dreadful apprehension

lest the magazine should take fire, as the work-house and others that were next to it were in a blaze. At last some timid person cried out that 'the magazine was on fire.' This gave the alarm. Every one took fright, both British and Americans, and instantly broke from the work, running away as fast as possible through the streets, throwing down and tumbling over each other, while others coming, tumbled over them, in endeavouring to get as far as possible from the expected explosion. I have heard some of them say that, though confoundedly frightened at the time, they could not help from laughing to see the confusion and tumbling. . . . I was then in a house adjoining St. Michael's Church, with some company. I advised the going out of the house and walking to South Bay, because I was apprehensive, from the great shock which was felt in the houses, from the explosion of 4,000 pounds of powder, that, should the magazine blow up, which had 10,000 pounds in it, many of the houses in town would be thrown down. A British officer asked me how much powder was in the magazine. I told him. 'Sir,' said he, 'if it takes fire, it will blow your town to hell.' I replied, 'It will give a hell of a blast.' The British were very much alarmed at the explosion. The troops were turned out under arms and formed. Some of the British and Hessians supposed it was designed by us. I was abused and taken up by a Hessian officer. He was very angry, and said, 'You, Gen. Moultrie, you rebels have done this on purpose, as they did at New-York.' . . . If they had considered a moment, they would have found that it was almost impossible for the magazine to take fire from the adjacent houses. It was enclosed with a high brick wall; the magazine itself was built of brick, and was bomb-proof."

With a single farther item, we conclude the journal of a Subaltern, who was probably transferred to Haddrill's Point with the rest of the prisoners of war :

"16th May. General, field, commissioned, and other officers, ordered to attend for their paroles, but put off till tomorrow. Officers almost tired out with attendance!"

Thus, then, ended this protracted struggle. Of the charac-

ter of the issue throughout, Moultrie expresses no opinions. His work, in this respect, is particularly meagre. Ramsay has already told us, in quotations previously made, of the incompetency of South-Carolina to such a struggle, at the period when it begun. His chief subject of complaint is, that Lincoln was deceived as to the degree of support which he anticipated from without. We shall endeavour to show that other troops might have been had, had they been required; that more soldiers would only have increased the misfortunes of the garrison, and precipitated the day of the city's downfall; and that it is to the miserable incapacity and ignorance of those to whom the defence was entrusted, the engineers and other officers, that the whole misfortune is attributable. Ramsay thus describes the final causes which precipitated the capitulation at last:

“During the siege, *a few secret friends of royal government fomented* and encouraged a mutinous disposition among the citizens, and successfully worked upon the fears of the timid. When it was generally known that there was an insufficiency of animal provision in the garrison, and that the town was completely surrounded, these men openly urged the necessity of an immediate surrender. The measure of petitioning [Gen. Lincoln] received its first and warmest support from the disaffected, to whom all capitulations were equal, as they meant to become British subjects. These had the address to strengthen themselves by the timid, and even by some of the bravest and best citizens, who believed that farther resistance was vain.”

And farther resistance was vain, when the garrison and people had exhausted their provisions, when the British leaguer was completed, and when the French General, Duportail, looking at the wretched works which were thrown up as defences, showed the greatest anxiety to get out of them as soon as possible, declaring them to be wholly untenable.

What must be the effect of such declarations upon the citizens—what was the effect upon the officers? We are, as the reader perceives, in possession of papers which Ramsay had never seen. What does Gen. McIntosh tell us? That the first council of war to which he was summoned was one in which Lincoln, having suffered the enemy almost entirely to close him within their meshes, coolly invites the officers to an evacuation. Who resisted this? The citizens—and well they might, since, up to this moment, every confidence had been expressed that the works were tenable, and that the place could be successfully defended. Yet, before a gun was fired, we find Commodore Whipple offering to bet that the salt meat of the garrison was deficient, and proposing to inquire into the quantity in store. All this time, the proper authorities assure us of ample supplies. By whose neglect was this deficiency? Ample time for its remedy, abundant resources for supply were to be had in the surrounding country; yet no attempt was made to procure them. Let us hear what Tarleton says of this defence:

“The garrison, under the orders of Major Gen. Lincoln, was composed of ten weak continental and state regiments; of militia drawn from the Carolinas and Virginia, and of inhabitants of the town; amounting, in the whole, to near six thousand men, exclusive of the sailors.* The body of regular troops destined for this service, though assisted by the militia and by the inhabitants, was scarcely adequate to the defence of such extensive fortifications, and could have been more usefully employed in the field, where judicious operations, assisted by the resources to be found in the country, and by the approaching heat of the season, would have protected the greatest part of the fertile province of South-Carolina, would have soon overbalanced the present superiority of the British forces, and would have effectually prevented the co-operation of the royal army and navy.”

* The British return of prisoners, exclusive of sailors, makes the number only 4,704.

Roderick Mackenzie, the bitter analyst of Tarleton, though differing with the latter in opinion, thus testifies involuntarily in favour of his reasoning, while he gives the relative strength of the two armies very fairly: "It cannot, by any means, be admitted that six thousand American troops, indifferently disciplined, should, in any situation, be able to counteract the measures of a British force, consisting of ten thousand." Tarleton speaks reasonably, and the argument of Mackenzie is conclusive. The works were not only worthless, but too extensive for the number of troops. But we have said that the number of troops, if increased, would certainly have increased the evil. Under the circumstances they certainly would, by increasing the number of consumers. There were too many mouths already for the supplies in store, and nobody talks of surrendering, among those by whom the citizens are represented, until the food begins to fail equally for garrison and people. Troops could have been had. Look at Col. Beaufort and Gen. Caswell, who, with their respective brigades, are specially kept in the open field. We have seen what Gervais says of these forces. Besides, there were the troops at Orangeburg, under Williamson, and others in small and useless detachments, scattered about the country, and which could have been brought to Charleston before the post at Haddrell's was surrendered—in other words, before the navigation of Cooper river was closed up. "Before this time," says Tarleton,—that is, before the middle of April, and when the second parallel of the British had not been begun—"the Americans had joined a body of militia to three regiments of continental cavalry, and the whole was entrusted to Brigadier General Huger. This corps *held possession of the forks and passes of Cooper river, and maintained a communication with Charlestown, by which supplies of men, arms, ammunition and provisions might be conveyed to the garrison during the*

siege." We would not have had the cavalry abandon this object; but this very body of militia might have been transferred to the garrison, as well as the troops under Caswell, Williamson and Beaufort. These were all left, to be cut up in detail by the British, as soon as they could detach a sufficient force from the leaguer of the city. There were troops enough for the defence of Charleston; but, unfortunately, other uses and objects were contemplated for them. The commanding general attempted too much—not only to defend the city, but to keep afloat an adequate force in the country, as well for its control, as for the purpose of forming the nucleus of an army, in the event of the conquest of the garrison. This was unnecessary, since such a concentration of force, within the city, as would have sufficed for its defence, and the defeat of the British, would also have concluded all their chances of making progress in the country. The country was taught too much to look to the city, as the great point of struggle, and, consequently, to exaggerate the importance of the result, whether that were safety or overthrow. But let us return to our extracts. We are nearly at the close of them. Our next quotation is from John Lewis Gervais, dated 16th May.

"We have received information that Charlestown and the garrison surrendered last Friday. It comes from so many quarters, that it admits of no doubt. It seems that the continentals marched out with the honours of war, and then laid down their arms. They are to be exchanged for Burgoyne's army. The country militia are to be allowed four days' provisions, to return to their homes, and to remain there on parole. The inhabitants of Charlestown are allowed thirty-six hours to remove their effects; and we suppose those that will take the oath, to remain. This is what we can collect from different quarters. One man that left the Sandwich (ship) on Saturday, says the shipping sailed up to town that day. The country will now be left open to them. We have no army

to oppose them. It is reported that they have detached 2,000 men, to march towards Camden. We have no troops but Gen. Caswell's brigade and Col. Beaufort's, and the shattered remains of our horse. Col. Pickens will join us to-morrow, with 300 men of the Ninety-Six regiment, the only one that has turned out cleverly. But they come too late, and when they hear the fate of the town I am afraid they will not stay long. I foresee a retreat to North-Carolina."

Tarleton thus sums up the terms of capitulation alluded to above :

"By the articles of capitulation, the garrison were allowed some of the honours of war. They were to march out of the town, at an hour appointed for the purpose, to the ground between the works of the place and the canal, where they were to deposit their arms ; but the drums were not to beat a British march, [*'we marched out with the Turk's march.'* Moultrie.] or the colours to be uncased. The continental troops and seamen were to keep their baggage, and to remain prisoners of war until they were exchanged. The militia were to be permitted to return to their respective homes, as prisoners on parole ; and, while they adhered to their parole, were not to be molested by the British troops, in person or property. The citizens, of all descriptions, to be considered as prisoners on parole, and to hold their property on the same terms with the militia. The officers of the army and navy to retain their servants, swords, pistols and baggage, unsearched. *They were permitted to sell their horses, but not to remove them out of Charleston.*"

It is not denied that they might shoot them ; but we do not hear that any of the captives followed the example of Sir Philip Sidney, who shot his horse, in France, when the *Grand Monarque* insisted upon buying him. But what are we to say of that exaction of the conqueror, which insisted upon placing all the citizens, of whatever description, including non-combatants, upon the same footing with the militia, placing them on parole, and holding them through their proper-

ty? But this is not the place, nor have we the room, to discuss the conditions of surrender. We pass to a letter of the same date, (May 16,) from Richard Henry Lee, of Virginia.

“In ten minutes after our house was formed, (which, unfortunately, was not until the 9th,) I moved for a bill to embody militia for the relief of South-Carolina, and one will pass tomorrow, for sending, with all possible expedition, 2500 men to your assistance. We have given such large pay *in tobacco*, and other encouragements, that I hope the number will soon be obtained; and they are to go off as fast as a battalion is collected. Should they not come in time to save Charleston—which yet I hope—they may be in time, with others, to control the farther operations of the enemy. The Maryland line of continental troops is coming on, and part are already arrived at Petersburg, where our government has been making every necessary exertion to facilitate their speedy progress to the scene of action. Col. Porterfield, with our last State regiment, about 500 men, and Major Nelson, with 60 horse, left Petersburg about 10 days ago, for Charleston, and at the same time went on from thence Col. Armand with his corps. We have about 300 good men remaining at Williamsburg, who will march south in a day or two. Yesterday our house voted that the governor should spare all the arms from the stores, that could be done, and this in consequence of a requisition from North-Carolina, for arms to put into the hands of their militia. By this, the governor is authorized to supply the arms wanted in North-Carolina—which, I think, he will immediately do—and leave us enough to arm the militia going south, and yet provide our eastern frontier with proper defence, which, next to the relief of Charleston, is our diligent object. To this is to be added, that our enemies are now stimulating an active war upon our western frontier, which calls for immediate defence, and which prevents so full and strong aid, as our wishes incline us to, from being sent to South-Carolina.”

This last sentence indicates another of the peculiar difficulties and causes of embarrassment at the South, which

prevailed in infinitely less degree at the North. A wild forest frontier, swarming with savages, whom the British had subsidized, and against whom it tasked all the rangers of the country to maintain their ground. A letter of Gov. Nash, dated Newbern, 19th May, shows him still in ignorance of the fall of Charleston, an event that took place just *seven* days before. On the 22d he is better instructed, and he expresses his surprise that some plan of communication had not been adopted, for the transmission of intelligence, "at a time like this, when the fate of countries is at stake;" as if it was not quite as much his concern—he being the governor of a State immediately interested—as that of anybody else. But what's everybody's business is the business of none. None does it, at all events. There are other letters in the collection before us, which relate to the progress of the British arms, and the various endeavours made by the contiguous (Southern) States, to oppose and embarrass their advance, But their introduction will carry us over a surface quite too extensive for the pages of a review, and can serve only in illustration of the several epochs and stages of the revolutionary war in Carolina. We conclude our extracts, therefore, with a paragraph from a letter of Col. John Laurens to his father, dated May 25th, 1780, which seems an appropriate finish to our quotations, and furnishes the only passage, from the voluminous papers before us, which affords any degree of sanction to the wholesale charges made by Mr. Lorenzo Sabine against the patriotism of the Charlestonians. It is contained in a sentence which we italicise, and upon which we shall comment hereafter.

"Disappointed in my expectations of accompanying Col. Ternant, I have barely a moment to inform you that I am as well as the humiliating circumstances of captivity will suffer me to be. That gentleman will give you a minute relation

of our misfortunes, and their causes. Some of the latter, and the principal ones, indeed, you pointed out before your departure. Besides the force of the enemy, without, *we had to struggle, at home, against incapacity in some very important persons, treasonable neglect of duty in the staff departments, and an almost general disaffection of the citizens.* It will appear very extraordinary that simple field entrenchments have supported a siege of six weeks—a space in which the best fortified towns of Europe generally yield; but the duration of it must rather be attributed to the natural tardiness and excessive caution of the English, than to the vigour or skill of our opposition.”

The opinions of Col. Laurens, which we have italicised, must be received with much allowance. Col. Laurens was one of the most remarkable and well-endowed of all the young men of his times—bold, ardent, generous—the “Bayard of the army,” as he was affectionately styled by his contemporaries; but the very ardency of his temper was apt to mislead his judgment, in a matter and at a moment like the present. That he was in great error, in ascribing almost general disaffection to the citizens of Charleston, is in our power to show, from other documents as well as those before us. But, read with a due regard to their full meaning, those which we have compiled in the present review are quite ample for the purpose. Disappointed in all his hopes and anticipations—mortified by the position of captive—with his pride humbled by defeat, and his soul stung by the consciousness that his native city groaned beneath the lordly tread of foreign footsteps—Col. Laurens naturally denounced the imbecility and lack of patriotism in the numbers who were found wanting to the new faith of the great movement party. He naturally exaggerated their numbers in his mortification, and quite as naturally disparaged the spirit of those who remained faithful through the whole. We *know* that, of the five thous-

and troops by which Charleston was defended—including thus the contingents of no less than three States beside—at least one thousand five hundred of the troops were Carolinian. Here, for example, is an extract from the British return, made of those who had actually borne arms throughout the siege :

South-Carolina artillery,	-	-	-	62
Charleston battalion,	-	-	-	146
1st Regiment South-Carolinians,	-	-	-	176
2d " " "	-	-	-	195
3d " " "	-	-	-	208
1st Battalion Charleston Militia,	-	-	-	312
2d " " "	-	-	-	446
				<hr/>
				1545

These we find as diligently employed, during the siege, as any other portion of the troops—as frequently in perilous service—as much exposed—as prompt when sorties were made, and suffering quite as much as any other bodies of men engaged in the defence. By what more decisive mode of exposition shall we arrive at their feelings and desires, than by the fact that, on two memorable occasions, headed by the civil authorities, consisting wholly of natives of Charleston and the neighbourhood, they thrust between the commanding general of the city and the enemy, and insist upon his continuance of the defence, long after his officers had declared the city to be indefensible. But we are reminded of their inferior numbers. It is not denied that their numbers are inferior. It is not denied that a large proportion of the citizens of Charleston, as well as the State, were hostile to the revolution, and to any transfer of authority from the Crown of Great Britain. The greater part of the trade of Charleston was in the hands of British merchants, chiefly Scotch by birth—men always distinguished for the tenacity

of their loyalty. These were not merely lukewarm in regard to the revolution, but positively hostile to it. At first, as is the custom with the commercial population, they remained in quiet, watchful of events. The first movements of the popular party in South-Carolina had been so warm and violent as to render them cautious. The successes which followed the first conflicts in which the Carolinians were engaged, tended still farther to make them careful in concealing their sentiments; and it was only when the State was threatened by an overwhelming force—when her resources were particularly low—when her troops were cut up by a two years struggle in Georgia and on the frontiers—for Georgia was the battle-field which opened the way to Carolina, and the forces of the latter were wasted in fruitless contests in the sparsely settled regions of her Southern sister, whom her fields had yet to supply with provisions all the while—it was then, when in her worst condition, and the enemy upon her in all his strength, that the loyalty of the foreign merchants of Charleston to the British monarch found courage to manifest itself, and take open part against the movement. On the subject of the strength and feeling of this party, the native Carolinians—with whom the whig movement wholly originated, and who were chiefly professional men and planters—entirely deceived themselves. They neither guessed their feeling or their numbers. They took for granted that those who did not openly declare against them were for them, and they themselves, by their resolution and activity, were enabled to supply the deficiency of numbers. No such deficiency appeared, as we have seen, at the first blush of the revolution. When, in 1776, the battle of Fort Moultrie was fought, there was no lack of troops in Charleston. When the British took Savannah, Carolina could send her forces into Georgia, to grapple with the enemy, who had proved too much for the

younger State. Subsequently, her troops, even drawn from the Charleston militia, could march to Savannah, and emulate and surpass the best achievements of the French forces under D'Estaing, losing some of her best blood upon that ill-managed field of carnage. But her resources were not inexhaustible. She had been playing the losing game in all these conflicts. Her troops had been wasted in repeated marches, cut up in detail, broken by frequent surprises, under inexperienced militia commanders, until the final formidable leaguer of the British found her overwhelmed with debt, without money, men, or means of subsistence. Undoubtedly, there were hundreds who preferred to fly, with their possessions, to a place of safety, rather than peril them on their patriotism. This is a common history, known to all regions. In a sparsely settled country, like that of the rich parishes of South-Carolina, in those days, a single example of this sort would show as conspicuously as the flight of a regiment in other places. When Moultrie or Laurens were told of the disappearance of some well-known planter, who had stolen off, with his household goods and gods, the effect was a loathing and revulsion, which produced unqualified denunciation, the more bitter and extreme from their own personal knowledge of the fugitive. A high-spirited and noble gentleman will dwell upon such a defection with prolonged bitterness, where a simple adherence to the laws of duty would fail to provoke attention, and would certainly command no eulogies. That Cataline should destroy his country is monstrous; but that Cato should be true to it, is only a matter of course. We contend that a fair proportion of the citizens of Charleston and the immediate neighbourhood were as true to the faith which they professed, as true to the patriotism which prompted them unselfishly to revolution, and as firm and courageous in their maintenance of their pledges, as any people in the country, and that there

is nothing in the details of this siege, regarded from the proper points of view, with all the circumstances in sight necessary for a proper judgment, which should make them shrink from the investigation of the world. That six thousand inexperienced troops should be able to contend with nearly twice their number of British regulars, commanded by professional soldiers, is scarcely to be expected ; that they should so contend, when their engineers knew not how to plan their defences, and when their general failed to satisfy himself of the adequate provision for their maintenance, and for nearly two months, is perhaps quite as much due to their steadiness and courage as to the patient forbearance of their enemy.

But why had you no more troops, demands the enquirer. Surely, says Mr. Sabine, "she could furnish *more* than Rhode Island, the smallest State in the confederacy?" She did furnish more ; but, thousands of them fought as Henry of the Wynd did, "on their own hook," and without caring to have their names recorded for pay and pension on the pay-rolls of the Federal Government.

We have endeavoured to indicate the various scenes of conflict in which the powers of South-Carolina were expended. We adopt, from Johnson, the summary of her remaining resources, at the approach of the army of Sir Henry Clinton :

"Howe's unfortunate expedition against Florida, had totally broken up the southern army. The Carolina regiments were thinned down by sickness to a mere handful. The *northern* regiments (Virginia and North-Carolina, *not* New-England) that had been sent on with Howe and Armstrong, had also melted away, chiefly by the expiration of their term of enlistment ; and the Georgia regiment had nearly all been made prisoners at different times, and perished in the prison ships. The quiet possession of Georgia, also gave such countenance to the loyalists and Indians, as to secure a powerful co-operation to the enemy from that quarter. Of

the loyalists, great numbers had fled from North-Carolina, South-Carolina and Georgia, and taken refuge in Florida and the Indian nation. These now began to collect from all quarters, under the cover of Provost's army, and either to add to the strength of the enemy, or, united in formidable bodies, to hunt down and distress the whigs; so that many of them were forced in their turn, to desert their plantations, and transport their families beyond the mountains."

Here we have a sufficient summary of the causes which prevented the adequate accumulation of the country militia, for the assistance of Charleston. On each previous occasion, when the British had made their descent in force upon the South, it had been a signal for the rising of the loyalists and the Indians. Great Britain had been better able to subsidize the capricious savages than the feeble colonies; and with the Apalachian ridges as a region of retreat, and Florida as a hive and harbouring place for the loyalists, from which we had no means of expelling them, our seas being entirely in the hands of the enemy,—it needed but the signal trumpet of Britain to bring down upon the unprotected frontier a terrible visitation from scalping knife and rifle. With this experience in mind, it was with a natural reluctance that the ranger left the precincts of his homestead. He knew not at what moment the war whoop would ring the knell of the dear ones in his blazing cabin. Besides, there was an enemy more potent than the British in Charleston—the small-pox—of whose presence he had been advised, and whose fearful ravages he dreaded more than the weapons of any foe. Very few of the colonists had ever had this terrible disorder. None of their slaves were secure against it. It was a foe that would haunt them to their hearthstones, seize upon their wives and little ones, which no fortress could wall out, and no rifle shot bring down. When Mr. Sabine shall again endeavour to draw an offensive [comparison between the patriotism of

Connecticut and Carolina, he will be pleased to bring together the array of circumstances in which their cases respectively disagreed. He will be so good as to remember that the ardour of Connecticut, shown at the beginning of the revolution, was scarcely superior to that of Carolina at the same time; and that the fall of Charleston only took place after years of bloody and harassing warfare, when the regiments of Carolina had been cut up by repeated conflicts, chiefly on the soil of neighbouring States, and when pestilence of the most fearful kind stood at the entrance of her habitations, threatening away the very champions who would otherwise have rejoiced in her defence. No such condition of things attended the first demonstration of Connecticut patriotism, to which Mr. Sabine invites our attention. She was fresh for the conflict—had not suffered yet from the exhaustion and the ravages of war. Warfare was commended by novelty, and patriotism was somewhat warmed by physical excitement. The leaguer of Boston was one which secured a plenty of provisions, and involved no hard fighting; and the only circumstance that drove away the patriotic legions of Connecticut, seems to have been the result of a certain costiveness on the part of Congress, “which had declared against bounties.” We must not forget the metaphysics of Gov. Trumbull: “The pulse of a New-England man beats high for liberty,” but, as Sparks says, “a soldier’s pay did not satisfy them, as they could obtain better wages in other employments.” Fancy, as an echo to all this, the dulcet voice of Lorenzo Sabine, crying ever and anon,—all New-England listening with complaisance,—“but the patriotism, Gov. Trumbull—the patriotism, Mr. Sparks! Don’t forget that Stark hurried stark-naked to the field; and Putnam went without his jacket.” But Stark was made a general, and Putnam a general; and the pay of lumber-cutter Stark,

and ploughman Putnam, was much better, as generals, than the most sanguine hope would ever find it to be in their former humble avocations. New-England continued to have her fair proportion of the officers in this war; and if the mere masses of the army went off, it is to the credit of the generals that all of them held on to the latest syllable of recorded time.

But it would be a great mistake to say or to suppose that the country troops of Carolina did not muster for the defence of the city, and were not willing, in considerable numbers, to do so. They were late, and for that reason have been accounted tardy and unwilling. Let us look a little at the fact. The population of South-Carolina, at this period, consisted probably of less than fifty thousand white persons, to something like sixty thousand slaves. One would think that six thousand troops was a very fair proportion in a population of fifty thousand. But these were scattered over an immense tract of forest country, in small groups or communities, connected by obscure pathways,—roads which were rather *blazed* than cut, and broken by immense swamps and thickets. Intelligence was received slowly. The sense of danger was remote. The people were not easily assured of the absolute fact, and mere rumour was naturally not much regarded. We have seen that ten or twelve days were necessary, even by express, and in times of exigency, to convey tidings from Charleston to Newbern. The intelligence of the battle of Lexington, expressed all the way, was twelve days coming from Alexandria, in Virginia, to Charleston; and this was a great thoroughfare. But, to penetrate the State with intelligence; to seek out every remote settlement on the borders of an Indian country; to beat through woods and fastnesses for the scattered cottage or the rising hamlet; to travel miles, for days, seeking the single settler, required

numbers of expresses, and was a work of time. Once apprised of the necessity, the forest-born and bred naturally revolted at the idea of being tasked to go to the defence of a place in which he was to be cooped up by an enemy, and which is naturally sickly—probably to exchange this abode for a worse, in the gloomy dungeons of a prison-ship. But when he surmounts these objections, he is to remember the condition of his wife and little ones. Shall he leave them to the tender mercies of the savage, within sight of whose smoke he lives, or to the doubtful humanity of the outlaw and the plunderer, who calls himself a loyalist only that he may the better pursue his nefarious occupation. He would be less than human himself could he leave them in such dangerous proximity, without the usual protection of his own and the rifle of his neighbours. They, too, are summoned away like himself; and he demands and insists that before he obeys the summons to the distant city, he shall first put his young ones and their dam in a place of safety. He hurries with them across the mountains into North-Carolina and Virginia, and then reappears with his trusty rifle. This occasions delay. Hundreds thus, who seemed indifferent to the fate of Charleston, yet reappeared under patriotic leaders, and, with competent captains, like Marion, Sumter, Pickens, Davie, and others, in whom they confided, maintained such conflicts as Connecticut had not seen for many a day.

It must be admitted that our forest population are dilatory in their movements. All agricultural people are of this character. They differ from the citizens, from those who dwell in active business communities, in respects that derive their controlling influence from inevitable laws of nature. While the merchant has to watch all the fluctuations and caprices of trade, and the manufacturer all the variations of fashion in the community, the agriculturist obeys only the

natural, gradual and successive progresses of the seasons. The influences of his life are pacific. They never hurry him. His life is one of musing, and he is slow to action, which is the habitual life of the dense community, where the very density compels a constant activity and watchfulness to avoid starvation, and where the incessant daily attrition of rival minds produces sharpness, eagerness and rapidity in the movements and objects of the mind. Even the hunter is one whose course is rather steady than swift. He has to circumvent a prey whose habits undergo no caprices, and his wants are too few to stimulate his enterprise. Our population were, at the beginning of the war, always caught napping. Their movements were slow, and they never seemed to apprehend an exigency. All of the successes of the British in Carolina, seem to have arisen from two things,—the tardiness of our movements, and the absence of the necessary caution which prevents surprise. It was only after repeated disasters, arising from carelessness and sluggishness of movement, that our partisans were able to impress upon their followers the necessity of being at once quick and vigilant. But on this head we need not dwell. The subsequent histories of Marion, Sumter and Pickens, show how little was wanting to convert our militia into the best guerilla troops in the world. Good officers, whom they knew, who had their confidence, soon furnished an adequate amount of proof to silence all cavil at the expense of the valour and patriotism of Carolina, in a fair comparison with any of the States of the Union.

Without pretending that Charleston should not have been defended, we do say that the management of the defence was exceedingly unhappy. In the first place, the preparations for the siege, as we have seen, were not really made till the last moment. The lines were worthless ; the engineers employed do not seem to have known their business, nor the commander

to have exercised the ordinary degree of energy under the circumstances in which he was found. One of the first mistakes which seems to have been made, was that which related to the inaccessibility of the harbour to large ships of war. On this conviction, without inquiry or explanation, the parties rely who have the town in their keeping. They calculate that, with the fort (Moultrie) on one hand, their own little fleet in front, and certain physical obstructions thrown between, to retard the passage of the enemy, while the fort and the fleet within shall do the necessary amount of cannonading—and it will be impossible for the British to reach the city. The plan was a good one. Floating batteries, constructed of ranging timber, of successive layers, with empty air-tight casks let down into the sections, grappled by chains together, and anchored directly in the channel, might have afforded the necessary obstructions. The manufacture of such *chevaux de frise* is exceedingly simple, and called for very little time. In our day, we should probably fill the open sections between the timbers with cotton bags, build a battery of cotton bags upon the rafts, and plant a few pieces of heavy cannon upon them. These, however, employed as obstructions simply, and moored between the advancing enemy and the city, immediately in the channel, would have sufficed, in giving all the time necessary for the shore and fleet batteries to have blown the British out of the water. But everything is put off, until, suddenly, the big ships, the 64's of the enemy, get over the bar, and scare Com. Whipple out of all his conceit. The obstructions are not in readiness, and the place is abandoned, while the fleet, consisting of some excellent vessels, are degraded to the work of hulks, and sunk as obstructions to a river which might be tapped at both extremities. Well—the entrance of the British fleet is securely effected, with the big

ships over the bar, when Gen. Lincoln calls a council of war, to ask if the town should be evacuated. "This," says Gen. McIntosh, "is the first council of war called since I have been in town." The proceeding, and the subject of inquiry, show conclusively that the reliance of the commander-in-chief has arisen wholly from the capacity of Fort Moultrie and the American shipping to prevent an entrance. We next hear of the deficiency of the provisions—a fact producing the notion that more troops were wanting; and next we are told of councils of war, to deliver up the city, which the citizens oppose with violence, insisting that they shall fight it out. What shall we say of a general who suffers such invasion of his province? Had he hung up a score of those who opposed him, suspended the functions of the Privy Council, imposed martial law, driven all suspected persons out, organized the militia who were averse to entering the city, in the interior, and thus saved them from being destroyed in petty squadrons—had he swayed firmly from the beginning, and showed that he was not to be trifled with—taken all precautions—seized upon all necessary supplies—when Whipple talked of obstructions, driven him at once to making them—in all probability he had saved the city and the State: for we have it on good authority, that the siege was about to be abandoned, when an imprudent letter from the garrison, which the enemy intercepted, informed them that the troops were at short commons, and the city was threatened with famine. We engage that, if such a man as Andrew Jackson—a man of cool and inflexible character, who would not allow himself to be trifled with, but would have scourged the insubordinate, if necessary, to his duty—had been in command, instead of the amiable Lincoln, the story would have had a different finish. Lincoln was a good man, and a brave one; but not the man for

such an emergency. His integrity is unquestionable; but his talents seem to have been quite as moderate as the British could have wished them.

NOTE.—It may be well to mention that, during the siege, the garrison lost not more than twenty men by desertion. This is the boast of Lincoln himself. In connection with this matter of desertion, we find in the Annual Register for 1780 one item, which, if it occurs anywhere among the details of our own historians, has escaped our recollection. According to the Register, “An American Lt. Colonel, of the name of Hamilton Ballendine,” [a Scotch name,] “was detected in his attempt to pass to the English camp at night, with draughts of the town and works.” He “immediately suffered the unpitied death of the traitor.” The fact is no ways important, except as making our details more complete, and as showing the spirit of the people during the siege—a spirit which has been sufficiently illustrated by several of the particulars which the preceding narrative unfolds.

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1918 1919

JUN 9 '16

JUN 1 '18

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AUG -5 '16

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